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Access to university education in Africa was inadequate during the col-
onial period. At independence, however, African countries departed from 
the elitist colonial education system by embarking on programs aimed at 
providing education to all, regardless of class, ethnicity, gender, or creed. 
Nowhere in Africa has the question of access to university education 
reached such a crescendo of concern and posed such a challenge to the 
polity than in Nigeria. This book constitutes a history of the policies and 
politics surrounding the push for mass university education (massification) 
in postcolonial Nigeria. The concept of massification as used in this study 
refers to Nigeria’s postcolonial shift from elitist university educational sys-
tem to mass education. As the most populous, oil-rich nation in Africa, 
with a protracted ethnic and religious conflict between the predominantly 
Muslim North and Christian South, the push for mass university educa-
tion is central to understanding Nigeria’s postcolonial socio-economic and 
political history. This book argues that the premise of building a mod-
ern Nigerian nation underscored the pursuit of mass university education 
policies by Nigeria’s successive postcolonial governments. It shows the 
centrality of a vision of university education to the “nationalist project” 
in Nigeria and demonstrates that the move to mass university education 
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was an essential social imaginary for Nigeria’s vision of itself as a modern, 
dynamic nation state.
Through analysis of the politics that drove the massification agenda, 
this study bridges and recasts scholarly understanding of the challenges 
of national integration and socio-economic development in Nigeria’s plur-
alistic society. It accounts for, and provides new insights on, how internal 
religious and ethnic/regional politics in Nigeria coalesced with external 
interests to shape policy initiatives on mass university education and the 
shifts and outcomes of the country’s education policies. In illuminating 
Nigeria’s experiment with mass education, this book enhances our under-
standing of the difficulties of the country’s postcolonial social engineering, 
as well as providing a valuable glimpse into some of the similar challenges 
facing African countries. If we are to grasp modern Nigeria, with its in-
tractable tensions, as well as its political instability, we must understand 
the dynamics of higher education policies. Thus by exploring the nature, 
problems, and pitfalls of the shift towards a system of mass university edu-
cation throughout its colonial configuration, the immediate postcolonial 
adjustments, and several years of transition of military, democratic, and 
neo-liberal leaderships, this book provides a window into the promise and 
problems of Nigeria itself. 
The British establishment of the first university in Nigeria, the 
University College of Ibadan (UCI), in 1948 was a response to decades of 
nationalist demand for an institution of higher education in the country. 
Afraid of the potential threat that educated Africans would pose to the 
colonial system and mindful of the financial implications of establishing 
universities in the colonies, colonial authorities had opposed the idea of 
higher education training for colonial subjects. Charles Wood, president of 
the Board of Control (1853–55) and secretary of state of India (1859–66) 
set the tone for British colonial higher education policy. In a dispatch to 
F.J. Halliday, lieutenant governor of Bengal, Wood had bluntly delineated 
the logic that ultimately shaped British colonial higher education policy:
I do not see the advantage of rearing up a number of highly 
educated gentlemen at the expense of the State, whom you can-
not employ, and who will naturally become depositories of dis-
content. If they choose to train themselves, well and good, but I 
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am against providing our own future detractors and opponents 
and grumblers.1
The end of Second World War marked a turning point in the history of 
higher education in Nigeria. As part of its postwar reconstruction and de-
velopment agenda, Britain came to regard university education as an im-
portant instrument, not only in the social development of her colonies, but 
also in training future African leaders. Thus British colonial authorities 
set up the Asquith and Elliot commissions to advise it on how to meet its 
new education vision. These commissions submitted their reports in 1945. 
Following the broad principles outlined by the Asquith Commission and 
the recommendations of the Elliot Commission, UCI was established. 
UCI, along with other colonial university colleges, was established based 
on a erroneous premise that what was suitable for Britain equally applied to 
the colonies. In Universities: British, Indian, African: A Study in the Ecology 
of Higher Education, Eric Ashby, a British historian, writes that 
[the] underlying British enterprise in providing higher educa-
tion for her people overseas was one massive assumption: that 
the pattern of university education appropriate for Manchester, 
Exeter and Hull was ipso facto appropriate for Ibadan, Kampala 
and Singapore. If we were going to export universities to our 
overseas dependencies they would of course be British universi-
ties, just as the cars we export there are British cars. As with 
cars, so with universities: we willingly made minor modifica-
tions to suit the climate, but we proposed no radical change 
in design; and we did not regard it as our business to inquire 
whether French or American models might be more suitable.2 
Soon Nigerians were disappointed with Britain’s wholesale exportation of 
their pattern of university education to Nigeria. With an annual intake 
of less than 130 students, a low rate of production of (admittedly) highly 
trained graduates for the public and private sectors, and a lopsided cur-
riculum and enrolment, UCI failed to satisfy the higher education needs 
of most Nigerians.  Nationalists such as Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi 
Awolowo thus rejected the elitist and conservative traditions of UCI and 
THE POLITICS OF ACCESS4
not only demanded changes in the institution’s curriculum and admis-
sion policies but also intensified their push for decolonization. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, 
policy-makers reconfigured university education to fulfill a new mission: 
the mission of nation-building and socio-economic development. Like in 
other African countries, colonial rule impoverished Nigeria, limiting so-
cial amenities, mobility, and economic opportunities, as well as deliberately 
creating discord in the country’s pluralistic society. “The fundamental chal-
lenge facing universities in a postcolonial setting,” as Oluwasanmi puts it, 
“is that of development, of bringing social and economic change rapidly 
into a situation which has been deprived for so long.”3 Understanding these 
problems and proffering solutions to them became a new task for postcol-
onial African universities. This book argues that attempts to engage uni-
versity education to promote nation-building and facilitate socio-economic 
development largely shaped the shifts towards mass university education in 
postcolonial Nigeria.
Unlike the colonial period, the driving force behind Nigeria’s postcol-
onial university education was hinged on Robbins’s principle that “courses 
of higher education should be available to all who are qualified by abil-
ity and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so.”4 Thus, the 
most dominant theme in the history of postcolonial university education 
in Nigeria is what Martin Trow, a sociologist, called the shift from elite to 
mass higher education.5 Conceptually, Nigeria’s massification agenda was 
an amalgam of three broad policies instituted by the federal government 
and its component units to reorganize its university education system in 
response to the needs of postcolonial Nigeria. First, it involved the expan-
sion of access to university education through the establishment of more 
universities, the diversification of university curriculum, the centraliza-
tion of university control, and the involvement of the private sector in the 
supply of university education. The idea was to train the country’s labour 
force, especially in the sciences, not only to fill the vacancies created by the 
departing Europeans, but also to help champion future economic develop-
ment and national integration. 
Second, massification involved the liberalization of access to univer-
sity education through measures such as state control of admission process 
to eliminate admission bottlenecks, the revision of the rigid British entry 
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qualifications, the awarding of scholarships, and the granting of free uni-
versity education. The purpose was to remove the historical and structural 
obstacles that had impeded access to university education in the colonial 
era. Third, massification involved the democratization of access through 
equal geographical distribution of universities and the introduction of an 
affirmative action policy (quotas) in university admission. The aim was to 
end the volatile and divisive educational disparity between the North and 
the South through equal representation of all ethnic groups in the existing 
institutions. The postcolonial policies of expansion, liberalization, and 
democratization aimed at mass university education. Although the goal of 
mass education was not met, these policies represented a radical departure 
from the elitist colonial system of higher education, which was inequitable 
and unrepresentative. 
Education for Nation-Building
The philosophy of using mass university education to promote nation-
building in Nigeria’s pluralistic society was one that postcolonial govern-
ments embraced. They sought to create a nation in a society where ethnic/
religious diversity, conflict, and competition had deprived it of a national 
identity. A nation can be viewed as a political arrangement and a cultur-
al phenomenon aimed at developing the state. It is, according to Ernest 
Renan, “a soul and a spiritual principle,” constituting both the past and the 
present, and renewing itself especially in the “present by a tangible deed: 
the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life.”  
For Renan, the “existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite; it is, like the 
very existence of the individual, a perpetual affirmation of life.”6  Nation-
building was not a factor in formulating colonial educational policies. 
Independence, however, created new realities and needs. Transforming 
the British educational system thus became necessary to meet those needs. 
Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist, argued that “In order for people to 
feel at any particular moment in time the need to change its educational 
system, it is necessary that new ideas and needs have emerged in which the 
former system is no longer adequate.”7 The broad framework for a shift in 
educational policy in Africa materialized in 1962 when a conference on 
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Development of Higher Education in Africa was held in Malagasy Republic 
between 3 and 12 September. Endorsing the role of universities in nation-
building, the conference declared,
African institutions of higher learning have the duty of act-
ing as instruments for the consolidation of national unity. This 
they can do by resolutely opposing the efforts of tribalism and 
encouraging exchanges, and by throwing open the university 
to all students who show capacity to benefit from a university 
education of internationally acceptable academic standards, and 
by resolutely ignoring ethnic or tribal origins and political and 
religious discrimination.8
According to Richard Sklar, nation-building is a process of creating “high-
er loyalties that supersede parochial loyalties to subnational communities, 
tribes, language groups, or regions.”9 Among other things, it involves “the 
progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities 
on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogenous territorial 
political community.”10 Ethnicity  is “the employment or mobilization of 
ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competi-
tion, conflict or cooperation.”11 Ethnicity has been “the most formidable 
barrier to national unity in Africa. Nearly every African state has at least 
one serious problem of ethnic or regional separatism.”12 Nigeria’s multi-
ethnic society presented a huge challenge and potential at its independ-
ence in 1960. The challenge was how to promote collective consciousness 
among its diverse groups in order to realize its great potentials. University 
education was identified as a force in uniting Nigerians in a common con-
science. Durkheim stated that every society “considered at a given stage 
of development, has a system of education which exercises an irresistible 
influence on individuals.”13 Durkheim’s model of nation-building posits 
that a society consists of individuals who are united in a collective conscience 
through the common values, norms, and rules that are partly transmitted 
through school. As Durkheim further noted, “Society can survive only if 
there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity by fix-
ing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarity that collective 
life demands.”14 Nigerian universities in a postcolonial setting were meant 
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to reflect the nation-building process and equally contribute to it by sup-
plying the knowledge that would constitute the basis for creating a national 
identity; for according to Durkheim, “it is the society as a whole and each 
particular social milieu that determine the ideal that education realizes.”15
One of the most common sources of conflict between the South and 
the North was the educational disparity between the two areas. This gap, 
which began to appear in the 1840s when Christian missionaries intro-
duced Western education to the country, widened throughout the colonial 
period. Due to geographical, political, and religious factors, as discussed 
in chapter 1, the North fell behind in Western education. The statistics of 
regional enrolment at UCI during the colonial period favoured southern-
ers. For instance, out of 939 students studying in the college between 1948 
and 1959, southerners numbered 865 with only 74 northerners.16 As south-
erners continued to outnumber northerners in school enrolment, mutual 
suspicion intensified. The British resisted the northerner’s demand for an 
affirmative action policy that would help address the gap. Such an admis-
sion policy, as they believed, “might lower academic standards, not only in 
terms of quality of the student’s entry but in terms of the work of the staff 
and students throughout the college.”17 
The North-South conflicts intensified in the 1950s when it became 
clear to the northern elite that the more educated southerners would likely 
dominate the political class after independence. As the editor of a northern 
newspaper, Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo decried, “In all the different departments 
of government it is the Southerner who has the power.”18 On the eve of 
independence, Nigerian nationalists saw higher education reforms as an 
opportunity to revise the elitist British higher education system by push-
ing not only for expansion of human resource training but also ways of 
addressing the volatile educational gap between the South and the North. 
Against the common tendency to examine Nigeria’s mass education ex-
periment as largely designed to train human resources to fill vacancies left 
behind by departing European administrators, this book offers a perspec-
tive that shows that mass university education policies constituted a central 
element in the government’s policy of addressing the historical rivalries 
existing among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria.19 It reveals how the 
ethno-regional tensions generated by the educational disparity between the 
two areas defined Nigeria’s postcolonial higher education politics, making, 
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for instance, the policy of affirmative action in university admission an 
inevitable, attractive, yet controversial tool in the push for university ex-
pansion as well as in the promotion of national unity. Here, politics, reli-
gion, and education intersect, shedding light on Nigeria’s turbulent march 
to nationhood. So when the viability of the idea and ideal of the Nigeria 
nation was tested during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–70), building “the 
nation anew,” as Gowon termed it, became the philosophical foundation 
for a renewed push for mass university education in the 1970s and 1980s.20
Education for Development
Successive governments in Nigeria subscribed to the human capital 
theory as part of the nation-building project and thus embarked on an 
ambitious investment in educational expansion. The human capital theory 
gained popularity in the postwar era as policy-makers, educationists and 
economists increasingly accepted education as a productive investment. 
The theory posits that economic development of a country is contingent 
on capital formation achievable through investment in human beings. By 
improving the quality of a workforce through educational expansion, the 
theory argues, a country increases the productivity of citizens and thus lays 
the foundation for socio-economic development.21 According to Harbison, 
“Education does contribute to growth but growth also makes it possible 
to expand and develop education. It is both the flower and the seed of 
economic development.”22 As many scholars have shown, human capital 
theory presumes that investment in education is a prerequisite to both mod-
ernization and economic growth of any society.23 The idea that investment 
in education is rewarding, explains, according to Fagerlind and Saha, large 
government expenditure on education in both developing and developed 
countries.24 A country’s human resources decide the nature and pace of its 
socio-economic development, and, as Psacharopoulos and Woodhall state, 
they constitute 
the ultimate basis of wealth of nations. Capital and natural 
resources are passive factors of production, human beings are 
the active agencies who accumulate capital, exploit natural 
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resources, build social, economic and political organization, and 
carry forward national development.25 
Postcolonial African countries, including Nigeria, anchored their mission 
of university education partly on the theory of human capital. This mission 
departed significantly from the narrow, elitist vision that characterized 
European higher education policy during the colonial period.26 Access to 
university education in Africa was inadequate during the colonial period. 
Colonial authorities accorded low priority to university education because 
they failed to see it as an investment.27 They were afraid of the implica-
tions of widespread production of highly educated Africans and therefore 
focused on training few Africans who would assist them in administering 
their colonies as well as occupy leadership positions after independence. 
Thus the admission criteria were intentionally rigorous, and, as Ashby 
notes, it was “more exacting than those for the universities in Scotland 
and Ireland, and much more exacting than the entry requirements for 
universities in America, Canada, and Australia.”28 To the disappointment 
of many Nigerians, between 1948 and 1959, only 939 students were in 
UCI while more than 1,911 Nigerians, who were considered unqualified 
by UCI standards, gained admission in American, Australian, European, 
and Canadian universities. The total graduates from UCI between 1950 
and 1960 were only 615.29 Worse still was the fact that course enrolment 
favoured liberal arts courses, neglecting courses closely aligned to the de-
velopmental needs of Nigerians, such as applied sciences, agriculture, and 
medical, technical, and vocational courses.30
The Nigerian situation was not unique; other African countries ex-
perienced similar problems. At the time of independence, only about one 
quarter of all professional civil service positions were held by Africans 
while foreigners dominated trade and industry throughout the continent.31 
Zambia, for instance, had only a hundred university graduates, while the 
University of East Africa that served Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – with 
a combined population of 23 million – produced only ninety-nine univer-
sity graduates. At its independence in 1960, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, formerly known as Zaire, had no indigenous graduate engineers, 
lawyers, or doctors. Few Africans were trained in agricultural science, a 
field most relevant to a continent known for subsistence farming. French 
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colonies in Africa produced only four graduates in the field while there 
were 150 in English-speaking colonies.32 
Since colonial university education failed to produce enough human 
resources to champion socio-economic transformation of the contin-
ent, independence presented African political elite with an opportunity 
to reconfigure university education to serve that societal need. The broad 
framework for a policy shift was also articulated in the 1962 conference 
on Development of Higher Education in Africa. The early 1960s was a period 
when many new states were emerging in Africa and thus participants at the 
conference focused on the new role university education would play. Faced 
with the choice of allowing universities to merely fulfill the narrow role 
that they performed in colonial Africa or take additional roles that rad-
ically distinguished them from other European institutions, as well as fit 
them “for greater service to the African Society,” the conference declared 
that the “establishment and development of higher education facilities … is 
basic to social and economic reconstruction of Africa.”33 It further declared 
that “in order to provide the high-level manpower that [Africa] will require 
in the process of social and economic development [they] … will need, in 
the next twenty years, to increase many times the number of students in 
their universities.”34
The place of education in Africa’s socio-economic advancement is cru-
cial and a host of scholars agree. In Higher Education in Postcolonial Africa: 
Paradigms of Development, Decline and Dilemmas, the authors “carefully 
packaged education as part of development, because this is what it really 
is.”35 Ashby sees universities as “absolutely essential to the economy and to 
the very survival of nations.” He further notes that “under the patronage 
of modern governments, they are cultivated as intensive crops, heavily ma-
nured and expected to give a high yield to the nourishment of the state.”36 
To Ajayi, university education is “a mechanism by which society generates 
the knowledge necessary for its own survival and sustenance, and transmits 
this to future generations through processes of instruction to the youth.”37 
According to Chinweizu, African universities should “serve as finishing 
schools for those who have to lead and develop the traditions of a society.”38 
The expansion of university training had become crucial in Nigeria 
as early as 1957 when a constitutional conference in London established 
a national government and decided on 1 April 1960 as the tentative date 
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for the country’s independence. As Nigeria approached independence with 
only 939 students (excluding about 1,000 who were studying overseas) in 
UCI in 1959, nationalists blamed the college for insufficient training of 
the high-level human resources needed to replace the departing Europeans 
as well as to advance economic development. Aja Nwachuku, the federal 
minister of education, expressed the federal government’s concern when he 
stated in 1959: 
If we are to approach independence with confidence and se-
renity, we must know that there will be adequate numbers of 
skilled technicians and of professional workers in all fields, who 
are aware and ready to accept the responsibilities attendant 
upon the attainment self-government.39
The ethos of realigning university education to address the economic chal-
lenges facing that postcolonial Nigeria was one that not only the Nigerian 
political elite embraced but also officials of the Carnegie Corporation, a 
leading philanthropic organization in the United States. Largely due to the 
perceived dilemma with maintaining costs and high academic standards, 
the colonial government had consistently resisted fundamental changes 
until the late 1950s when the seeming threat of the Soviet Union in Africa 
and the suspicion that African nationalists would seek assistance from the 
communists in their fight for independence opened up colonial minds to 
the necessity of change. The “wind of change” in the British colonies in 
Africa was uncontrollably fast in the postwar years. Britain’s chances of 
maintaining friendly relations with African countries after independence 
would have suffered if it failed to support Nigeria’s university reform.40 
Although the British were initially reluctant, the Carnegie Corporation’s 
subtle and sustained pressure helped get the British involved in reforming 
the colonial education system.
Following the Second World War, Carnegie leadership believed that 
“a search for a new balance of power to offset the expansion of Russian in-
fluence” was America’s role in the world.41 The corporation’s main mission 
therefore became “the effective propagation of the democratic and liberal 
ideals both in terms of its domestic and international connotations.”42 Led 
by Alan Pifer, a staff of Carnegie’s international program dubbed British 
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Dominions and Colonies Program, and identifying Nigeria as a potential 
giant of Africa, Carnegie took advantage of the Cold War to advocate an 
alternative education system based on American models and values as a tool 
in containing the spread of communism in Africa.43 Rebuffing the existing 
status quo in the colonies, Pifer called for expansion of all types and levels 
of education for Africans, especially in “agricultural, technical, and med-
ical education and teacher training.”44 Although Pifer began his campaign 
in 1954, it was not until 1958 that Britain finally accepted a joint Nigerian-
British-American commission to study Nigeria’s higher education needs. 
The corporation financed the commission, named after the chair, Eric 
Ashby. The Ashby Commission submitted its report at Nigeria’s independ-
ence in 1960; its far-reaching recommendations not only endorsed the link 
between university education and socio-economic development, but also 
provided Nigerian governments with a blueprint to guide their shift from 
an elite to a mass education system.45
Various studies by J.F. Ade Ajayi, Lameck K.H. Goma, and G. Ampah 
Johnson, Eric Ashby, and Apollos Nwauwa have masterfully highlighted 
the nationalists’ demands for establishing institutions of higher learning in 
colonial Africa and the subsequent attempts to “Africanize” the inherited 
education system.46 To extend these works, this book links a discussion of 
how the politics of postwar decolonization movements and the Cold War 
shifted Britain’s long objections to higher education reform in Nigeria to 
attempts by nationalists to redesign the country’s university system to serve 
the postcolonial need for rapid societal transformation. It shows how the 
domestic and international politics of the 1950s led to the coalescence of 
the interests of the Carnegie Corporation, Britain, and Nigeria, thereby 
laying the groundwork for Nigeria’s future commitment to mass education.
Postcolonial commitment to socio-economic development facilitated 
university expansion not only in Nigeria but also in virtually all African 
countries. Demand for access to universities escalated. Enrolment surged. 
Financial resources were strained.47 From less than a hundred thousand in 
the 1960s, students in higher education institutions in Africa increased to 
about 3.5 million in 2000.48 Egypt tops the list with an enrolment figure 
of 1.5 million, representing an enrolment ratio of 5 per cent for the 18–22 
age group. Nigeria comes second, followed by South Africa with total 
enrolment of about 1 million and half a million, respectively.49 In 2009, 
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sub-Saharan Africa alone had 4 million tertiary students. This growth, ac-
cording to the World Bank, “represents one of the highest regional growth 
rates in the world for tertiary enrolments, averaging 8.7 per cent a year.”50 
Inspired by the desire to promote economic development and often motiv-
ated by the country’s oil wealth, successive Nigerian governments between 
1960 and 2000 embarked on an unprecedented expansion of university 
education in that every four to five years in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
enrolment in all the universities doubled (but slowed down in the 1990s 
due to economic decline).51 Yet, the gross enrolment ratio for the 18–25 
age group was approximately 5 per cent, slightly above the overall average 
enrolment ratio in Africa, which was 3 per cent.52 
As this book demonstrates, the overall context of Nigerian economy 
and politics dictated continuities, discontinuities, and outcomes of mass 
university education policies. The need for rapid modernization of the 
economy shaped the emphasis on science and technology since independ-
ence, particularly from the 1960s to the early 1980s. This found expression 
in many official pronouncements. For instance, in his address at UCI (now 
University of Ibadan) in 1970, Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s head of state, 
1966–75, posed this challenge to Nigerian universities: “It is perhaps not 
too much to hope … that if it ever becomes necessary for the human race 
to transfer en masse to some other planets, like Mars, our scientists and 
technologists would be ready with the necessary means of transport for 
Nigerian citizens!”53 While the sudden oil wealth of the 1970s and 1980s 
facilitated the proliferation of universities, official corruption, mismanage-
ment of resources, and politicization of university education combined to 
truncate not only university expansion but also economic development.54 
Thus, the economic decline and political crisis of the late 1980s and 1990s 
diverted interests in university expansion as well as occasioned efforts by 
the military regimes to consolidate power at all cost while pursuing IMF/
World Bank-sanctioned rationalization policies. 
Organization
This book consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the aims and 
objectives of Western education as conceived by the British colonial 
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authorities, highlighting the multi-ethnic and religious settings in which 
Nigeria’s quest for mass education emerged. It examines the forces respon-
sible for the successful demand for the establishment of UCI in 1948, as 
well as the struggle to increase enrolment at the college. This chapter also 
gives a sense of how the disparities in school entrance between the South 
and the North exacerbated the existing regional tensions and rivalries, 
thereby making future consideration of affirmative action both unavoid-
able and contentious in Nigeria’s nation-building project. 
Due to their disappointment with the unmet demand for university 
education, nationalists, largely inspired by regional loyalties, campaigned 
for mass education and a reform of the elitist British higher education poli-
cies in Nigeria. Their demand received a boost from Carnegie Corporation 
officials, who campaigned for reforming the elitist British system of uni-
versity education as a means of extending America’s influence in Africa’s 
emerging nations.
Chapter 2 shows how a combination of domestic and external forces 
resulted in the setting up of the Ashby Commission whose recommenda-
tions directed postcolonial Nigerian governments in their efforts to achieve 
national integration and socio-economic development in Nigeria through 
university expansion. As this chapter reveals, the coalescence of the inter-
ests of Carnegie, Britain, and Nigeria formed not only the cornerstone of 
a new era in Anglo-American collaboration in Nigerian higher education 
reform but also a prelude to Nigeria’s postcolonial program to engage mass 
university education policies in the service of societal transformation. 
Based on the recommendations of the Ashby Commission for “mas-
sive” and “unconventional” expansion of university education, the newly 
independent government, led by Alhaji Tafawa Balewa and with assistance 
from various international donors, embarked on the first push for mass 
university education, 1960–70. During this period, student enrolment in 
all the Nigerian universities jumped from 939 students to 9,695 students.55 
Chapter 3 discusses the aims and objectives of higher education as con-
ceived by policy-makers during the first decade of Nigeria’s independence, 
the expansion of facilities and access, and the ways in which regional rival-
ries, flawed admission policies, and the Nigerian civil war (1967–70) trun-
cated university expansion. 
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In order to satisfy the rising demand for university education as well as 
to advance national unity after the civil war, the federal government, under 
the successive military regimes of Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed, 
and Olusegun Obasanjo, effectively took control of all the universities, 
federal and regional, in order to achieve uniform development. Chapter 
4 shows how Nigeria’s oil-rich economy and post-civil war reconciliatory 
mood shaped the unprecedented expansion of university education during 
the second push for mass education, 1970–79. 
After thirteen years of military rule, a democratic government under 
President Shehu Shagari came to power in 1979. Eager to fulfill their elec-
toral promises and keep Nigerians united, the newly elected officials at the 
federal and state levels, as chapter 5 shows, pushed for the liberalization 
and democratization of university education. In keeping with the vision of 
socio-economic development and nation-building, the Shagari adminis-
tration established universities of science and technology, introduced free 
education and affirmative action, initiated the National Open University 
scheme, and allowed states to participate in educational expansion. Some 
of these policies were ambitious and in some ways controversial. They were 
made with the hopes that the increase in oil revenue will continue to gener-
ate revenue to funds these social programs. But the mismanagement of the 
economy and rampant corruption not only compromised mass education 
attempts but also threatened nation-building and economic development 
during the third attempt at mass university education, 1979–83. 
Chapter 6 examines how the depressed economy inherited by the 
military regimes of Mohammed Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida required 
them to rethink educational expansion. Here, the premise of mass univer-
sity education for nation-building and economic development faded, de-
spite official government pronouncements to the contrary. Repositioning 
university education to aid economic recovery assumed great importance. 
This chapter shows how the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF 
in Nigeria’s economic policies constrained the government to implement 
the highly consequential policy of rationalization during the fourth at-
tempt at cautious massification, 1984–90. 
After seven years of underfunding for the universities, Nigeria’s oil 
revenue improved dramatically in 1990 because of the first Gulf War. Yet, 
efforts to address the question of mass university education, as chapter 7 
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demonstrates, were overshadowed by echoes of political instability and fre-
quent changes of governments in the 1990s, coupled with the mismanage-
ment of oil revenue during the fifth push for massification, 1990–2000. As 
the military governments wrestled with the tension generated by the surge 
in demand for university education, the radicalization of labour unions in 
the universities, and the controversy surrounding affirmative action, the 
deregulation of the university system seemed logical and attractive. Given 
the short supply of university places, the establishment of private universi-
ties, earlier resisted by various regimes in Nigeria, became “a normal and 
commendable supply response to a huge and growing demand for univer-
sity education.”56 This chapter demonstrates that the emergence of private 
university education not only underscores the problems of public universi-
ties and the short supply of university education but also represents a new 
direction in the push for mass university education.
Faced with the challenge of promoting nation-building and socio-eco-
nomic development, successive postcolonial governments in Nigeria had 
affirmed their commitment to mass university education. Still, there was a 
wide gulf between what was stated and what was practised and achieved. 
Although Nigerian governments often claimed success in the midst of 
policy failure, the 5 per cent enrolment ratio for the 18–22 age group in 
2000, the sustained deterioration of universities facilities, the prevailing 
crisis of nationhood and economic development, the radicalization of anti-
government academic unions in the universities, and the consequent in-
stability in the system, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, eloquently shows 
that mass university education program failed to produce the intended out-
comes. This work presents a picture of complex interlocking relationships 
between politics, economics and education in the push and outcomes of 
mass university education policies in postcolonial Nigeria. It is a compen-
dium of useful information and insights into the many policy shifts and 
turns in the optimism and betrayal of Nigerian education. More import-
antly, it provides valuable insight into the challenges of nation-building in 
Nigeria’s pluralistic society.
17
The Politics of Colonial Education
The overriding complaint was that there was not enough educa-
tion – of any kind – for the masses of the people. The key to 
the understanding of the whole problem of education in Africa 
is the appreciation of the fact that the whole region thirsts for 
knowledge. The wealthy and the poor, the aristocrats and the 
lowest peasants, Christians, Moslems and the “pagans” cry for it. 
– Kenneth O. Dike, 1962
Introduction
Nigeria’s passion for higher education in the twentieth century was never 
in doubt; what was at issue was the provision of such education in suf-
ficient quantities. Mass education was the priority neither of the European 
missionaries nor of the British colonial administrators. Consequently, 
throughout the colonial period, unmet demands for educational opportun-
ities as well as the short supply of trained personnel for public and private 
sector services characterized British education policy. Dissatisfied with this 
situation, nationalists pushed not only for the expansion of primary and 
secondary school education but also demanded for an institution of higher 
learning in the country. Although a higher institution was established, 
access remained a problem. Besides, southerners outnumbered northern-
ers in school enrolment, thus the existing mutual suspicion between the 
two areas. This chapter examines the origins and objectives of Western 
1
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education during the colonial period, the forces leading to the successful 
demand for the establishment of the University College of Ibadan (UCI) 
in 1948, and the causes and implications of regional education imbalance. 
It shows how the short supply of university education and the tensions and 
conflicts generated by the educational disparity between the North and 
the South largely shaped Nigeria’s postcolonial higher education politics, 
making a mass education program an attractive political tool in pursuing 
economic development and fostering national integration. 
Western Education and the Making of Nigeria
Missionaries introduced Western education in Africa. Before the advent of 
Western education in Nigeria, two types of education systems existed: the 
traditional educational system transmitted informally through everyday 
living and the formal Islamic system that was introduced in the northern 
part of Nigeria as early as the fifteenth century. Under these systems, edu-
cational opportunity was open and available to all members of the society. 
Precolonial education “acted as an important method of transmission of 
cultural identity” and inculcated “in children the behavior and knowledge 
needed for the part they were to play in society.”1 As Paul Desalmand 
shows, precolonial education in Nigeria was provided by all members of 
the society; it was directly related to the needs of the society; and it was the 
concern of everyone and comprehensive in character.2 
Intrinsically, indigenous education systems provided four basic edu-
cational competencies that UNESCO later adopted and promoted: learn-
ing to know, learning to do, learning to be, and learning to live together.3 
Intended to continue from ‘womb to tomb,’ they provided lower and higher 
levels of knowledge in history, identity, culture, and religion, among other 
areas, so as to develop the total personality of individuals from childhood 
to adulthood (learning to know and learning to be). In addition, they pro-
vided practical skills in agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, and crafts, 
among others (learning to do). Finally, they inculcated a sense of civic duty 
in members of society for the sake of peace and order (learning to live 
together). However, the advent of Western education through European 
missionaries and mission schools in the 1840s changed the dynamics of 
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the pre-existing education systems. Although those educational systems 
operated side by side with the Western system, over time the new educa-
tion system, introduced by the missionaries and imposed on Nigeria by the 
British colonial government, came to become the foremost tool of social 
mobility.
Formal schools came into existence in Nigeria with the arrival of 
Thomas Birch Freeman in 1842.4 Earlier, the Portuguese traders, who, in 
the early 1500s, visited Benin in southeast Nigeria, and São Thomé, off 
the coast of Nigeria, saw education as an important tool in the spread of 
Christianity. Missionaries who visited the Oba of Benin in 1515 taught 
his sons and the sons of other chiefs the Christian faith. The activities of 
missionaries during this period, however, were limited to a few trading 
centres, and with the growth of the transatlantic slave trade in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, “the legitimate trading centers declined 
and made no educational impact upon the people living in the interior of 
the country.”5 Missionary activity in Africa gathered momentum in the 
mid-nineteenth century as a by-product of the transatlantic slave trade. As 
part of the British strategy to stop the slave trade, Thomas Fowell Buxton, 
a prominent member of the British parliament and vice president of the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS), urged the cooperation of the govern-
ment and the missionary societies in the ‘deliverance’ of Africa. As Buxton 
advocated, 
Let missionaries and schoolmasters, the plough and the spade, 
go together and agriculture will flourish; the avenues to legit-
imate commerce will be opened; confidence between man and 
man will be inspired; whilst civilization will advance as the nat-
ural effect and Christianity operate as the proximate cause, of 
this happy change.6
Largely influenced by Buxton’s urging, European missionaries, traders, 
and explores flocked into Africa. By the mid-1800s, a number of mission-
ary bodies had made inroads into Nigeria.7 Eager to convert the natives 
to Christianity, these missionary bodies established schools in which they 
emphasized religious instruction. As Father Wauter, a Catholic mission-
ary in Western Nigeria, pointedly stated, “We knew the best way to make 
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conversion in ‘pagan’ countries was to open school.… So, when the district 
of Ekiti-Ondo was opened … we started schools even before there was any 
church or mission house.”8 Because the natives could not read or write in 
English, the establishment of schools became a priority for European mis-
sionaries, and, as Elias Shrent, a missionary, puts it, “I have a low opinion 
of Christians who are not able to read their bible.”9 Inspired by the call-
ing to spread Christianity, missionaries encouraged a policy of conversion 
through village schools. Admission to mission schools usually led to the 
conversion of the pupils to the new religion. 
The curriculum of mission schools emphasized the four Rs (religion, 
reading, writing, and arithmetic) and therefore produced “the much need-
ed evangelists, clerks and teachers for the colonial society.”10 Mostly, the 
education provided by the missionaries was not relevant to the immediate 
needs of the people. In the report of the Phelps-Stocks commission on 
education in Africa, Thomas Jesse Jones states that missionary education 
failed to “realize the full significance of education in the development of 
the African people.” He further states that, in “limiting education to class 
room instruction in book, missionaries were following the ideals prevailing 
in their home country … [and] have therefore been strangely indifferent to 
the economic value of agriculture, and little concerned with the health and 
morals of the people.”11 Yet, the missionaries laid the foundation for both 
the future development of education and the emergence of the political 
elite in Nigeria, a fact that many scholars recognize. In Christian Missions 
in Nigeria, 1841–1891, Ajayi thoroughly discusses the role played by mis-
sionaries in the spread of Christianity and Western education in Nigeria, 
especially in the south. These missionaries, as Ajayi stresses, shaped the 
emergence of a new class and therefore played a critical role in the country’s 
political history.12 According to him, “in their linguistic and educational 
work, in their economic policies, and above all, in the class of Western-
educated they were seeking to create, [missionary] influence covered the 
whole country.”13 British consuls, who had increasingly established effect-
ive political control of the region, modified or broadened the educational 
curriculum of mission schools to suit colonial objectives. 
The establishment of colonial administration in Nigeria began shortly 
after the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. Britain had acquired political in-
fluence in many parts of Nigeria through treaties of protection with local 
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rulers and later through conquest. Before 1900, the British had carved out 
the following territories in Nigeria: the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos 
(1886); the Niger Coast Protectorate (1893); and the Northern Protectorate 
(1900). In 1906, the Niger Coast Protectorate merged with the Colony 
and Protectorate of Lagos to become the Southern Protectorate. Modern 
Nigeria came into existence in 1914 when the British amalgamated the 
diverse peoples in the Southern and Northern Protectorates in an artificial 
political entity called Nigeria. A modern nation-state was born, composed 
of more than 250 ethnic groups, with diverse religions, languages, and cul-
tures. Sir Frederick Lugard emerged as the first governor-general (1914–
19). The unification of these two areas was not borne out of pressure from 
the local political groups. It was more or less an attempt to create a modern 
Nigeria for Britain’s administrative convenience. As Osadolor states, 
Lugard considered it unnecessary to carve up a territory un-
divided by natural boundaries, more so since one portion (the 
South) was wealthy enough to commit resources to even “un-
important” programmes while the other portion (the North), 
could not balance its budget necessitating the British taxpayer 
being called upon to bear the larger share of even the cost of 
its administration. This partly explains the amalgamation, an 
act which provoked bitter controversy at the time, arousing the 
resentment of educated elites and of some British administra-
tors. It, nevertheless, saddled the country with an issue – the 
relationship between North and South – that has dominated its 
politics to this day.14
The political, social, economic, and even educational problems that domin-
ated Nigeria’s history since the amalgamation of 1914 came to be dubbed 
“The National Question.” This question, as the postcolonial governments 
articulated, was concerned “with the problems that arise when a country, 
such as Nigeria, is made up of many language/ethnic groups that are at 
different levels of development hence the need to solve these problems, 
and find an equitable basis for the peaceful and harmonious co-existence 
of these groups.”15 That process was not easy and many Nigerians saw the 
union as a mistake; prominent among them was Tafawa Balewa, who later 
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became the country’s first prime minister. In a statement on the floor of 
the Federal House of Representatives, Lagos, Balewa declared that “Since 
the amalgamation of southern and northern provinces in 1914, Nigeria has 
existed as one country only on paper.… It is still far from being united. 
Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.”16 Obafemi 
Awolowo, leading southern nationalists, echoed Balewa’s sentiment when 
he wrote that “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. 
There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense there are ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ or 
‘French’. The word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish 
those who lived within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.” 17
Having effectively established a colonial government, the control of 
education became crucial in administering Nigeria. Colonial authorities 
initially allowed missionaries to dominate the education sector, but they 
increasingly came to understand the importance of consolidating imper-
ial rule through education. This meant direct government involvement. 
Accordingly, the British promulgated the 1882 Colonial Educational 
Ordinance for West Africa (revised in 1887 and 1905). The education or-
dinance stipulated, among other things, that “the subject of teaching shall 
be the reading and writing of the English language.”18 It regulated educa-
tional activities and practices in Nigeria and provided the colonialists with 
the opportunity to justify colonialism, which included bringing to the col-
onized people the “blessings of civilization” and creating a body of literate, 
obedient, organized, and productive natives who would be indispensable in 
the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources. In addition to the religious instruc-
tion provided by missionary education, the British encouraged the read-
ing and writing of the English language, which they considered a proper 
medium of communication and reporting to the imperial government as 
well as a powerful tool for cultural assimilation. Other subjects included 
arithmetic and British history and geography. The British educational phil-
osophy sought to create a group of Nigerians sufficiently literate and skilled 
to achieve further integration of the colonized into the mainstream of the 
colonial economy and administration as clerks, messengers, and interpret-
ers. A British educator, H.S. Scott, stated that the government’s view of 
education was creating “useful citizens,” which means “literally citizens 
who would be of use to us. The conception was one of exploitation and 
1: The Politics of Colonial Education 23
development for the benefit of the people of Great Britain – it was to this 
purpose that such education as given was directed.”19 
Due financial constraints as well as traditions obtainable in Europe, 
both the missionaries and colonial authorities did not invest in educational 
expansion in response to many Nigerians who yearned for Western educa-
tion. In a letter in which he complained about the depressing nature of his 
work, a CMS mission secretary wrote: 
My work is pathetic in the extreme low, in one aspect: almost 
every week I have to turn away deputations from both near and 
distant begging us to come teach them.20 
Meanwhile, the division of Nigeria into three unequal regions in 1939 by 
Henry Bourdillon, Nigeria’s governor-general between 1935 and 1940, set 
the stage for conflict between the North and the South. For administra-
tive purposes, Bourdillon divided the country into Northern, Western, and 
Eastern regions, with Lagos as the administrative centre. The boundaries 
of these regions were conterminous with the three largest ethnic groups: 
the northern region with the Hausa-Fulani, the western region with the 
Yoruba, and the eastern region with the Igbo. The deficiencies in this div-
ision marked the beginning of the fear of domination that characterised 
Nigeria’s political history and mostly reinforced by the educational dispar-
ity between the predominantly Christian South and the Muslim North. 
The North had 729,815 square kilometres of territory and about 16.8 mil-
lion people. The figures for the other regions were as follows: the east had 
119,308 sq km and 7.9 million people; the west contained 117,524 sq km 
and about 6.1 million people. Lagos was 70 sq km and 273,000 people. 
As these figures show, the North held 75 per cent of the land mass as well 
as 54 per cent of the population. Because the North was bigger than the 
two other regions put together (as shown in Map 1), southern elites feared 
potential northern domination after independence: hence the unavoidable 
regional rivalry, a situation for which the British bear primary responsibil-
ity. As Apollos Nwauwa puts it, “While it could be said that under British 
rule efforts toward unity were begun with the formation of Nigeria on the 
outbreak of World War 1, paradoxically, it was the same British who sowed 
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Map of Nigeria showing major ethnic groups. 
(Courtesy of R.C. Njoku.)
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the seeds of disunity when [they] divided Nigeria into the three unequal 
and ill-fated regions.”21
The geographical, political, and religious factors that shaped the his-
tory of educational development in Nigeria laid the foundation to the 
North-South educational gap. According to Dike, this disparity “has been 
the result of the differences in timing and intensity of impact of modern 
education on the two sections of the country.”22 Missionaries first settled in 
the coastal regions in the south before they moved into the interior. While 
southerners were the first to embrace Christianity and Western education, 
northerners pursued Islamic/Arabic education and in many cases resisted 
the new education, a situation that was worsened by the Puddah system 
in the North where women and girls were deprived of access to Western 
education.23 However, Islamic schools had provided a source of learning 
for Muslims for centuries before European incursion in Africa. In 1900 
when the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was established, there were, 
according to Lord Lugard, about 250,000 students in the 20,000 Koranic 
schools.24 
Although proximity to the coast gave southerners advantage in edu-
cational attainment over northerners, “the more important factor was the 
hostility of the natural rulers of the North to Christian teaching and the 
Western type of education, and the British policy of supporting them in 
this opposition.”25 Throughout the colonial period, missionaries controlled 
primary and secondary education. According to Coleman, “As late as 1942, 
they controlled 99 percent of the schools, and more than 97 percent of the 
students in [Africa] were enrolled in mission school.”26 Given the mission-
ary hold on education, the spread of Christianity and Western education 
became interwoven. Murray brilliantly summarized it in The School in the 
Bush thus, 
To all intents and purposes the school is the Church. Right 
away in the bush or in the forest the two are one, and the village 
teacher is also the village evangelists. An appreciation of this 
fact is cardinal in all considerations of African education.27
The “general antipathy for Western-style education” among the predomin-
antly Muslim North created and maintained the educational gap between 
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the two areas, especially since Western education not only became the 
yardstick to measure individual achievements but also a model for future 
socio-political development in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria.28 Of 
course, the North would have been educationally advantaged than the 
south, had Islamic education been adopted as the only means of social mo-
bility in Nigeria. There were 1,100 primary school pupils in the North in 
1914 while the south had 35,700. As pressure for educational opportunities 
in the south increased in the 1920s, many community and private schools 
emerged, largely financed by local contributions. As shown in Tables 1.1 
and 1.2, in spite of having more population than the other regions com-
bined, the northern region had far less community schools. This is because 
southerners not only embraced mission education but also raised money 
to build schools in order to supplement the limited education provided by 
the missionaries. Northerners, on the other hand, saw no reason for that. 
In “Educational Imbalance: Its Extent, History, Dangers and Correction 
in Nigeria,” Jubril Aminu, a former executive secretary of the Nigerian 
Universities Commission (NUC) and federal minister of education sums 
the major cause of the North-South educational gap thus:
The first and foremost cause is the fact that Western Education 
came much earlier in the South than in the North. Even in the 
South, the early efforts were made by Christian Missionaries. 
The concomitant proselytizing activities of those educationists 
rendered them unacceptable in the Muslim North.29
In his desire to forestall potential conflict between mission schools and 
the Muslim North, Lord Lugard pledged (at the inauguration of the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria on 1 January 1900) to abide by the agree-
ment with the emirs that included, among other things, preventing mis-
sionary work in the North.30 This policy remained for much of the colonial 
period, and even when the government established experimental schools 
in the North, the pace of growth was slow. The schools were open only 
to the sons of chiefs. These schools, the colonists hoped, would help “turn 
out future [northern] leaders” who would be instrumental in the successful 
implementation of British indirect rule.31 
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Up to 1959 3 11 15 1 30
1960–69 10 12 13 2 37
Total 13 23 28 3 67
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Up to 1959 2 9 9 5 25
1960–69 0 10 24 15 49
Total 2 19 33 20 74
Source: J.M. Kosemani, “The Ethnic Factor in Educational Disparity in Nigeria,” Bensu Journal of 
Education 3, no. 1 (1992): 16a.
Given the educational disparity, regional competition and conflict was in-
evitable. As early as 1944, the Daily Service newspaper predicted “an era 
of wholesome rivalry” among the dominant ethnic groups: Igbo, Yoruba, 
and Hausa.32 Adeyemo Alakija, the president of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa 
(a pan-Yoruba organization in the west), in a direct declaration of what he 
saw as the Yoruba role in Nigerian politics, noted in 1948 a great future 
for Yoruba children in which “they will hold their own among other tribes 
of Nigeria” and resist being “relegated to the background in the future.”33 
Similarly, on the anticipated role of the Igbos, Nnamdi Azikiwe urged 
them not to shrink from their responsibility as leaders.34 The Hausa eth-
nic group in the North similarly expressed apprehension over the likely 
domination of the more-educated Christian south, comprising the east and 
west. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who later became the first prime min-
ister of independent Nigeria, expressed concern over steady migration of 
THE POLITICS OF ACCESS28
southerners to the North, whose presence he believed threatened to dis-
place northerners in the colonial civil service.35 Because southerners had 
more Western-educated people, the editor of the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo 
newspaper warned against early independence for Nigeria. According to 
the paper, if the British granted Nigeria early independence, southerners 
would dominate the country:
It is the southerner who has the power in the north. They 
have control of the railway stations; of the Post Offices; of 
Government Hospitals; of the canteens; the majority employed 
in the Kaduna Secretariat and in the Public Works Department 
are all Southerners.36
Development of Higher Education
West African intellectuals such as Edward Blyden, James Horton, J.E. 
Casely-Hayford, and Nnamdi Azikiwe had been demanding the estab-
lishment of universities in Africa since the second half of the nineteenth 
century.37 Except for Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, founded by the 
Church Missionary Society in 1827 to train Africans as schoolmasters, 
catechists, and clergymen, nothing was done until 1934 when Yaba Higher 
College, a vocational institution, was established in Nigeria.38 The British 
hoped the institution would train Nigerians to meet the need for a lower 
cadre of officials for the colonial service. Admission to Yaba was accordingly 
dependent on the availability of positions in the civil service. The college 
offered courses in engineering, medicine, agriculture, education, and arts, 
leading to diploma awards. Since the college did not award degrees, the 
promotion opportunities of its graduates were limited. Because graduates 
of the college were rated as inferior in terms of income and rank, national-
ists attacked the college, and, according to Dike, they did not regard the 
institution “as an adequate answer to their higher education aspirations.”39 
Nationalists therefore intensified their demands for a degree-awarding in-
stitution in the colony similar to those available in England – to obtain 
degrees that they hoped would qualify them for senior service positions. 
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As Kenneth Mellanby recalled, Nigerians showed passionate desires “to be 
given the opportunity to qualify for senior service posts.”40
Despite the demands for a local university in Africa, Britain did not 
immediately change its policy for strategic and practical reasons. First, the 
British sought to avoid producing graduates who would demand to occupy 
the few available higher posts in government. As Lord Hailey stressed, 
“The considerations which decide the character of higher education are 
largely political, for the type of instruction given depends on the view held 
of the place in society which the educated African may be expected to 
fill.”41 Since there were few positions for African fill, it did not make sense 
for the British to produce educated men who would become, as Charles 
Wood bluntly stated, “depositories of discontent … detractors and oppon-
ents and grumblers.”42 
Under the system of indirect rule, introduced by the British to govern 
their colonies in Africa, there was no place for highly educated Nigerians. 
The system of indirect rule, especially before the Second World War, in-
volved the retention of the traditional pre-colonial political institutions, 
utilizing ‘illiterate’ indigenous rulers in governance while excluding highly 
educated Nigerians who had obtained their degrees abroad. Bad blood en-
sued. European visitors to Nigeria commented on the tension and animos-
ity between colonialists and Nigerians who had obtained higher education 
overseas. According to one observer, the relationship was “delicate and dif-
ficult.”43 Likewise, Charles Roden Buxton, an English philanthropist and 
politician, stated that “Few white people have a good word to say for the 
educated Africans.”44 This situation was not surprising. Since British policy 
alienated educated Nigerians, they strongly opposed colonialism, and col-
onial officials had good reasons to dread them, especially the so-called 
‘radicals’ who received higher education training in the United States. As 
James Coleman confirmed, “It was the educated who … provoked disturb-
ances in the provinces, published vituperative articles in the local press, 
and made life miserable and insecure for British administrators. There was 
nothing a district officer, a resident, or a governor dreaded more than pol-
itical disturbances and unrest during his tour of duty.”45 In these circum-
stances, colonial authorities frowned on the idea of establishing universities 
in Nigeria to either train or to expand the educated elite, as the national-
ists demanded. Given the strong opposition to the colonial government 
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emanating from the educated elite, “the expansion of the educated class 
remained an anathema.”46
Second, the colonial director of education, E.R.J. Hussey, did not want 
to hurry the establishment of universities in the colonies in order to main-
tain the high standard of British higher education. Instead, he proposed a 
three-stage scheme in the 1930s: the production of candidates for available 
positions in the public and private sector by West African colleges; the 
later affiliation of these colleges with an English university for the purpose 
of granting external degrees; and, finally, the granting of local autonomy 
to the colleges. Consideration of academic standards underscored this 
proposal. As Hussey declared, “We must at all cost avoid giving what we 
proclaim to be a university degree unless we can safeguard standards.”47
Third, faced with the economic recession of the 1930s, the British, 
who had not provided adequate funding to Yaba, could not contemplate 
shouldering the additional financial burden of another higher education 
institution. In the 1930s, the return that the British government obtained 
from Nigeria’s primary products was extremely low, and there were very 
limited funds available for other development projects. In fact, during the 
Second World War, a lack of sufficient funds compelled the British to re-
duce their funding allocations to Yaba while many members of the institu-
tion’s slender staff were conscripted for war service. Worse of all, in 1939, 
the army took over Yaba’s buildings and converted them to a military hos-
pital. As a result, the engineering students moved to the CMS Grammar 
School (equivalent to a secondary school in the United States) in Lagos, 
while other departments relocated to Achimota College, in the Gold Coast 
(now Ghana).48 Faced with resource constraints, establishing a university 
in Nigeria was the least priority of the British. Many Nigerians to their 
frustration travelled overseas for university training.49 
Last, another common excuse in objecting to establishing universities 
in the colonies was the slow expansion of primary and secondary school 
education in most territories since the 1900s. West African governors 
had insisted that the pyramidal growth of primary and secondary educa-
tion should be accomplished first before a university was contemplated.50 
In contrast, however, the report submitted to the Advisory Committee 
on Education in the Colonies (ACEC) in 1940 by the Mouat Jones sub-
committee that reviewed the recommendations of West African governors 
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stated that university education should progress together with other lower 
levels of education. Employing the analogy of a volcano that “built up its 
cone in all stages at once,” the sub-committee stressed the relationships 
between primary, secondary, and university educational structures.51 In 
December 1940, the ACEC endorsed the recommendations of the Mouat 
Jones sub-committee and asked the secretary of state to appoint a com-
mission to review the university question. This step was a turning point in 
Africa’s education development and occurred in the context of the Second 
World War. In fact, as Nwauwa notes, “from the late November 1942, 
when Allied victory became more likely, colonial development and welfare 
programmes were revived along with the university question.”52 Britain had 
finally realized that it needed to establish a university to facilitate the train-
ing of leaders in the colonies who would carry out colonial development 
schemes that, according to Oliver Stanley (the secretary of state for the 
colonies between 1942 and 1945), had suffered due to shortage of trained 
personnel.53 
Second World War politics shaped Britain’s overseas higher education 
policies. Britain needed the continued support from its colonies to wage a 
successful war against Nazism and Fascism and thus decided to embark on 
social programs designed to appease the increasingly agitated nationalists 
in the colonies who yearned not only for the establishment of institutions 
of higher learning but also for socio-economic development. In effect, the 
British Parliament passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 
1940 that aimed at addressing, among other things, the long-felt education-
al needs of its colonies. Supporting the initiative, Malcolm MacDonald, a 
member of the British parliament and later secretary of state for the col-
onies between 1938 and 1940, noted the contributions of overseas colonies 
in the Second World War “by gifts of treasure, by production of essential 
foodstuffs and raw materials, and by the eager raising of Colonial military 
units far in excess of anything that they did at a similar period in the last 
war.”54 In a sense, the Act sought to appease the colonies notwithstanding 
MacDonald’s insistence that it was not “a bribe or reward for the colonies’ 
support in this supreme crisis.”55
In line with the new colonial attitude occasioned by the Second 
World War, the British appointed the Elliot and Asquith Commissions 
in 1943 to examine the university question for Africans. The reports of 
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both commissions appeared simultaneously in 1945 and addressed various 
aspects of the university question; they constituted the blueprint for the 
development of university education in Nigeria as well as in other British 
colonies. The Asquith Commission, appointed to articulate the fundamen-
tal principles needed to guide the promotion of teaching and research in 
higher education and the development of university colleges in the British 
colonies, called for the creation of universities overseas to produce local 
leaders as a precondition for independence. It recommended a residential 
university college in a special relationship with the University of London 
and insisted on high academic standards in student admissions and staff-
ing.56 Anticipating the eventual independence of the British colonies over-
seas, the commission hoped the institution would help “produce men and 
women with the standards of public service and capacity for leadership 
which self-rule required.”57 
While the Asquith report supported the idea of developing higher 
education in Africa in anticipation of imminent independence, it did not 
view full independence as imminent. Even though the British encouraged 
constitutional developments in Nigeria from 1946 to 1954 with the pur-
pose of granting self-government, they did not anticipate the immediate 
independence of Nigeria. Thus, it would be quite deceptive to equate self-
government, as conceptualized by the British, with full independence. In 
the British tradition, internal self-government or responsible government 
meant government with full responsibility for local affairs. This explains 
why as late as 1955, the British Cabinet, troubled by the political implica-
tions of the terms ‘self-government’ and ‘independence,’ resolved that the 
term ‘self-government’ should be used in all references to the constitutional 
development of the colonies, stating that the term “independence in this 
context should be discontinued.”58 Clearly, the British were playing games 
in the face of U.S. and UN disapproval of imperialism as the Cold War 
heated up. 
The Elliot Commission, on the other hand, had a limited mandate. 
Unlike the Asquith Commission, the Elliot Commission was established 
to “report on the organization and facilities of the existing centers of higher 
education in British West Africa and make recommendations regarding fu-
ture university development in that area.”59 The commission acknowledged 
that “the need for educated Africans in West Africa in general already 
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far outruns the supply, present and potential.”60 To this end, it specifically 
recommended the establishment of a university in Nigeria whose students 
would obtain degrees from the University of London.61 However, the com-
mission did not envisage mass university education, as was the practice in 
Europe; instead, they espoused education for the few who would take over 
leadership positions at independence. The minority members of the Elliot 
Commission, Julian Huxley and Creech Jones, were even more conserva-
tive and short-sighted when they insisted that there would be enough stu-
dents for only one university in the whole British West Africa.62
The report issued by the Elliot Commission was a turning point in 
Nigeria’s higher education. Following its recommendations – and in line 
with the broad principles outlined by the Asquith Commission – UCI was 
established in 1948. Nigerians hailed the institution as a fulfillment of years 
of demands for the establishment of a higher institution in Nigeria. As 
the Elliot Commission suggested, the college immediately entered into a 
special relationship with the University of London and was “by and large a 
sort of a carbon copy of the newer university institutions in Britain, most of 
which were at one stage or the other god-fathered by London University.”63 
The curriculum was not modified to meet Nigeria’s peculiar needs. The 
emphasis was on arts courses such as history, classics, and English, and 
pure science courses such as chemistry, physics, and mathematics. The 
students prepared for and wrote the University of London degree exam-
inations. The Inter-University Council for Higher Education, a body that 
monitored higher education development in the colonies, appointed all the 
academic and administrative officers of the college from London on behalf 
of the University of London. Undeniably, the college was run according to 
an educational philosophy in line with the British or classical model of a 
university, which viewed a university as an ivory tower preoccupied with 
the training of the elite. 
The quality of education obtained at UCI, as Ashby pointed out, was 
“beyond reproach,” as the institution set “standards in Nigeria at a level 
which would be a credit to any country in the world.”64 In defence of the 
standards of an institution whose degree was internationally recognized, 
S.O. Awokoya, the minister of education in the Western Region, said: 
“We don’t want another Yaba.”65 Similarly, a suggestion made by several 
critics of UCI that Nigeria should adopt the Egyptian pattern of higher 
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education, characterized by easy entrance, diverse classes, non-residential 
students, and night classes, was rejected, as captured in the editorial pages 
of the Lagos Daily Times.66 This is not surprising, since the Nigerian elite 
would have frowned upon any university that was not designed according 
to the pattern obtainable in London. They would have accused the British 
of running a ‘slummy’ second-rate university in Nigeria. 
Access, Economic Development, and Nation-Building
Colonial authorities did not see education as an investment nor did they 
relate it to African needs. By the late 1940s, it became clear to many 
Nigerians that, given its narrow curriculum and lack of facilities, UCI 
would not satisfy the demand for places or address the human resource 
needs of the country. The curriculum was to a certain extent inappropri-
ate. In the sciences, for instance, UCI emphasized pure science subjects 
such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry, and neglected applied science 
courses. Ten years after its founding, the college was not offering courses 
in engineering, economics, law, geology, anthropology, sociology, or public 
administration, and it took eight years to establish a department of educa-
tion.67 As Tai Solarin further notes,
During the first ten years of the existence of our first university, 
agriculture was not taught, even though anybody could have 
thought it should have been the first subject on the curriculum. 
Between 1948 and for almost ten years later, medicine did not 
appear on the curriculum of our premier university … when 
anybody could have expected medicine to be the second faculty. 
What then were the subjects that glowed on the curriculum 
of the first university? English Language and Literature, Latin 
and Greek, and Religious Studies.68
Worse still was that admission to Ibadan, which was obtained through 
either direct entry or concessional admission, was highly restrictive.69 
The entrance examination at Ibadan was highly competitive and more 
demanding than in many overseas universities.70 Many students who were 
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classified as non-university material and were denied admission owing to 
the stringent admission policy of Ibadan ironically proceeded to America 
and Europe where they successfully pursued university education, often 
graduating with distinctions. To worsen the admission problem at UCI, 
the annual intake of students in the college was not decided by the number 
of qualified candidates or even by the country’s needs, but principally by 
the availability of “sleeping accommodation [at] the elite residential halls 
in the College.”71 Moreover, the North-South educational gap, especially 
in university enrolment, continued to favour southerners. Between 1948 
and 1952, the percentage of students coming from the regions shows that 
97 per cent of students at UCI came from the western and eastern regions 
while only 3 per cent were from the North.72 This gap was bound to create 
potential tension in regional relations. Collectively, the narrow curriculum, 
lopsided regional enrolment, the exacting entrance requirements, and the 
few spaces in the residential halls constrained enrolment at UCI. Thus, 
by 1954, there were only 406 students, forcing many qualified candidates, 
who were denied the opportunity to obtain university education at Ibadan, 
to travel overseas. As shown in Table 1.3, more Nigerians studied abroad 
than at UCI.
Dissatisfied with the university’s failure to satisfy increasing demand 
for university education, the new institution came under attack by Nigerian 
nationalists, who saw it as “conservative, cautious, elitist, and ill-equipped 
for pioneering a new University in an alien culture.”73 E.E. Esau, the gen-
eral secretary of the Nigerian Union of Teachers, called for the expan-
sion of Ibadan’s curriculum by suggesting the establishment of a faculty of 
education to train teachers.74 Editorials in one of the leading newspapers 
in Nigeria supported Esau’s call.75 In the same way, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
a leading nationalist from the east, questioned the narrow curriculum of 
the institution, a curriculum that was not only unrelated to the needs of 
the society but restricted student intake as well. According to Azikiwe, 
Nigeria could not “afford to produce or to encourage the continued pro-
duction of upper class parasites who shall prey upon a stagnant sterile class 
of workers and peasants.”76 He argued that the number of students the 
college trained did not match the amount of public expenditure on the 
institution and thus dismissed UCI as “a million pound baby simply be-
cause it knows that whenever it cries it will be accorded a million pound 
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1948–49 210 510 32 752
1949–50 298 719 104 1,121 
1950–51 322 938 301 1,561
1951–52 338 1,190 361 1,889
1952–53 367 1,316 370 2,317
Source: A.B. Fafunwa, A History of Nigerian Higher Education (Yaba, Nigeria: Macmillan, 1971), 
19–20.
kiss.”77 From time to time, columns in newspapers spoke out against UCI. 
One called on the institution to end the “rigid method of selection of can-
didates for entrance to the University.”78 Another noted that Ibadan was 
not established “to compete with [the] standards of British institutions.”79 
There were suggestions that the entrance qualifications should be lowered 
to hasten Nigerianization.80
The demands for the expansion of access to UCI in the 1940s and 1950s 
reflect Nigeria’s yearnings for higher education and growing dissatisfaction 
with the elitist British higher education policy. With the exception of the 
establishment of three colleges of arts, sciences, and technology, the British 
resisted fundamental changes to their education policy. The colleges did 
not have university status, and they conducted their courses in arts and 
sciences at the intermediate level only. The British seemed to have won 
the day, but the forces at work were too strong to allow the status quo 
to remain. As nationalists continued their campaign for the expansion of 
university opportunities, and as Nigeria moved towards independence, the 
politics of the Cold War and the dynamics of decolonization gradually 
coincided in the 1950s to make a shift towards massification of university 
education a crucial element in the country’s postcolonial attempts at foster 
economic development and promote nation-building.
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Towards Educational Reform:  
The Cold War, Decolonization, and  
the Carnegie Corporation, 1952–60
Educational development is imperative and urgent. It must be 
treated as a national emergency, second only to war. It must 
move with the momentum of a revolution. 
– S.O. Awokoya, 1952
Introduction
Nationalists’ campaigns for colonial reform and independence in the 1950s 
resulted in two constitutional reviews that, for the first time in the coun-
try’s history, placed education under the control of Nigerian politicians. 
While the South used that opportunity to pursue universal education poli-
cies at the primary and secondary education levels, the North was rather 
slow. The educational gap between the two regions thus widened. As 
Nigeria marched towards independence without the University College of 
Ibadan (UCI) producing adequate human resources needed for postcol-
onial economic development, reforming the elitist British educational sys-
tem became critical. The British resistance to fundamental changes in the 
early 1950s increasingly eased when the perceived threat of communism in 
Africa and the politics of decolonization caused them to accept national-
ists’ aspirations aimed at realigning the country’s university education to 
2
THE POLITICS OF ACCESS38
address the challenges of economic development and nation-building. It 
was in the context of promoting those two goals of university education 
that the Carnegie Corporation of New York came to play a fundamental 
role in Nigeria’s educational development in the 1950s.
This chapter examines the mass education schemes undertaken by the 
federal and regional governments in the 1950s, the regional rivalries that 
threatened the Nigerian project, the increasing nationalist agitation for 
greater access to UCI, and the support of the Carnegie Corporation for 
tertiary education. It shows how the coalescence of domestic and external 
forces laid the foundation for the postcolonial governments’ determination 
to use mass university education to reorganize the country’s elitist higher 
education system. Intended to provide full opportunities to all, accelerate 
economic development, and unify Nigeria’s pluralistic society, these poli-
cies provide a glimpse of the ways in which education, politics, and societal 
forces intersected to shape Nigeria’s turbulent march to nationhood.
Education in National Politics
Since the introduction of Western education in the 1840s, the educational 
disparity between the Muslim North and the Christian South had been 
a potential source of conflict. Although mutual misunderstanding existed 
between the North and the South, the British maintained peace in the 
country through a centralized system of administration. Yet, largely due 
to the diversities of the two areas, the colonial authorities decided to move 
the country from a unitary to a federal state after the Second World War. 
The Richards Constitution of 1946 marked the beginning of that shift. The 
constitution created regional houses of assembly but denied politicians the 
power to legislate for their own regions.1 This policy led to regional agitation 
for administrative autonomy. Because the British imposed this constitution 
on the regions without consultation, nationalists criticized it and demanded 
changes that would grant more power to the regional assemblies.
The first attempt at constitutional change occurred in 1950. John 
Macpherson, who was appointed governor in 1948, yielded to the nation-
alists’ demands for a re-examination of the Richards Constitution by con-
vening a constitutional conference in January 1950 in Ibadan. Delegates 
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to the conference unanimously agreed on greater regional autonomy and 
settled for a federal system in which the regions would share power with 
the central government and have representatives at the national congress. 
By settling on a federal arrangement, the regions highlighted the ethnic 
divisions and tensions in the country and demonstrated a unanimous desire 
to safeguard their sovereignty. This, however, constituted a crucial obstacle 
to the prospects of building a united nation.
Although the regions agreed on a federal structure, they disagreed on 
the ratio of representation of each region. Conscious of their disadvan-
tage in terms of Western education, and determined to use their bigger 
population to counterbalance supposed Southern domination, delegates 
representing the Northern Region at the Ibadan constitutional conference 
demanded a 50–50 representation ratio in the central legislature between 
the North and the South (eastern and western regions). In their defence, 
Mallam Sani Dingyadi, a spokesperson for the North, admitted that the 
South feared that the North would dictate policies for the rest of the coun-
try if given 50 per cent representation in the House of Representatives.2 
He stressed, however, that the North would feel the same way if the three 
regions got equal representation. According to him, since the South had 
a common religion, with the same standard of education, they were more 
likely to arrive at a common cause and thus shift the country’s balance of 
power to their advantage. On the other hand, he lamented that
the North has a different religion and different standards of 
education, so the North must stand alone by itself. Therefore, in 
any matter of importance one would find the East, West, Lagos 
… on one side leaving the North on the other side. Therefore, 
I do not think it is fair and cannot tolerate it that equal rep-
resentation should be given to each region. What we would 
recommend is at least one-half representation for the North and 
one-half for what I call the South.3
In contrast, Chief Obanikoro, the spokesperson for the Western Region, 
together with Alvan Ikoku who represented the Eastern Region disagreed, 
stating that if the North had its way, this would amount to “placing the 
fate of the two regions at the mercy of the North.”4 They recognized that 
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“the population of the North is larger than that of the other two regions. 
But if the principle is one of federation and not of domination, the basis 
of representation at the centre must be regional.”5 Apparently, the fear of 
domination, stirred by regional educational disparity, manifested itself 
prominently for the first time in Nigeria’s history. However, at the end of 
the debate, the preference of the North prevailed without which the Emir 
of Zaria had threatened to “ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria.”6
Based on the agreements reached at the constitutional convention, the 
Macpherson Constitution emerged in 1951. Unlike the preceding consti-
tutions, the 1951 document came into being after extensive consultation 
with the people of Nigeria as a whole. Initiated by Sir John Macpherson, 
governor-general of Nigeria (1948–54), the constitution established central 
and regional legislative councils as well as a central executive council for 
the country.7 The regional legislatures legislated only with respect to cer-
tain specified areas affecting their regions, namely, agriculture, education 
(primary and secondary), local government, and public health, while the 
central legislature was responsible for all other legislative areas. In 1952, 
elections were conducted, and regional political parties with clear major-
ities emerged to advocate the course of social and economic advancement 
for their respective regions. In the eastern region, the National Council of 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) (which became the National Council 
of Nigerian Citizens after 1960) dominated the Eastern Region with the 
Igbo as its major ethnic base. Nnamdi Azikiwe was one of the founding 
members of the party. The Action Group (AG) emerged in the Western 
Region, led by Obafemi Awolowo and with its membership mostly from 
the Yoruba ethnic group. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), a north-
ern party was led by Ahmadu Bello and was dominated by the Hausa and 
Fulani ethnic groups.
Education was uppermost in the minds of the newly elected regional 
leaders who felt that the British had failed to invest in education. According 
to K.O. Dike, “The nationalist realized that no impression can be made on 
the colossal ignorance of the country until education, of all types, perme-
ates every sector of the community, and until it is available to the majority of 
the people.”8 The British government refused to introduce mass education 
schemes, notwithstanding high demand for education. In fact, the British 
education report in 1951 stated that “while universal primary education is 
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one of the essential aims of educational policy, it is not the only, nor is it 
necessarily the most urgent aim.”9 The neglect of education was deliberate; 
colonial authorities did not see education as an investment; otherwise, they 
would have allocated adequate resources to expand it. The percentage of 
government investment on education remained low for the greater part 
of the colonial period. For instance, from 1898 to 1923, expenditure on 
education was less than 2 per cent of the revenue. While the total revenue 
for 1923 was £6,509,244, only 1.5 per cent (£100,063) was spent on educa-
tion. The revenue in 1936 was £6,585.458 but only £231,983 (3.5 per cent) 
was allocated to education. The cumulated result was that at the outbreak 
of the Second World War, only 12 per cent of Nigerian children of school 
age were in schools.10
Contrary to the educational assumptions of the colonial authorities, 
nationalists thought of expansion of the system as urgent because they 
recognized the role of education in the society. Given the popular faith 
in the power of education as “the motor of social development,” it was 
understandable, as rightly captured in Education and Nation Building in 
Africa, “why the control and planning of education became, often even be-
fore independence[,] a political issue of crucial magnitude.”11 Motivated by 
the powers granted by the Macpherson Constitution, Obafemi Awolowo, 
the Action Group leader who won the first election to the Western House 
of Assembly in 1952, promised free universal primary education. In July of 
the same year, the minister of education in the region, S.O. Awokoya, pre-
sented to the House of Assembly a sessional paper on the region’s educa-
tional policy that was a radical departure from the British policy. It insisted 
on the imperative and urgency of educational expansion, which it hoped 
should “move with the momentum of a revolution.”12 Thus the educational 
policy of the region, which reflected the position of the Action Group, was 
“one of expansion and reorientation [implying] an all-out expansion of all 
types of educational institutions [so] that in a few years time, it should be 
possible to have universal education for all children of school age in the 
Western Region.”13
The bold steps taken by the Action Group government in the west 
largely influenced the NCNC-led party in the Eastern Region to con-
template a similar policy. In 1953, the region’s minister of education, R.I. 
Uzoma, articulated only a modest mass education policy, which involved 
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cost-sharing between the region and the local governments.14 However, 
in that year, the NCNC witnessed a leadership overhaul, with Nnamdi 
Azikiwe replacing Eyo Ita as the leader of the party, while I.U. Akpabio 
took over from Uzoma as the minister of education. Azikiwe rejected the 
modest proposal of his predecessor and proposed an eight-year free educa-
tion plan instead. In 1953, over half a million of the region’s children of 
primary age were in school.15 In the report of its 1953 mission in Nigeria, 
the World Bank observed that the “intense and widespread desire in 
Nigeria for education is encouraging … [and the] enthusiasm for education 
in much of Nigeria amounts to a blind faith that schooling … is a passport 
to employment and affluence.”16 As the report highlighted,
The people of Nigeria are anxious to live better and hence to 
produce more goods, in greater variety; they want to become 
better educated; they show a growing willingness to modify 
those institutions which hold back economic progress and ac-
cept methods of social, economic and political organization 
which elsewhere have proved conducive to such progress.17
While the Eastern and Western regions made aggressive attempts at ex-
panding educational opportunities, the North was rather cautious in push-
ing for expansion. The issue with the North was their general antipathy 
towards Western education As noted in chapter 1, missionary control of 
education through most of the colonial era meant that demands for educa-
tion and desires for Christianity intersected. The South received the mis-
sionaries and their education. The Muslims, who dominated the North, 
perceived Western education as synonymous with Christianity and there-
fore resisted it. Most children from ages four to twelve attended compul-
sory Koranic schools. The influential local authority officials, including the 
emirs and the chiefs, saw no useful purpose in sending their children to 
Western educational institutions; indeed, they were afraid it would corrupt 
them. Thus, while the Koranic schools attracted the vast majority of chil-
dren, the Western educational institutions in the region remained virtually 
empty.18
Unlike other regions, the North did not introduce universal educa-
tion scheme. The major practical problem confronting the North in terms 
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of expanding its education program was the inadequate number of teach-
ers and the low entrance of northerners in UCI. Consequently, the region 
pursued a policy of cautious planning and maximizing efficiency through 
teacher training while advocating for affirmative action in university ad-
mission, which the British rejected. As the Inter-University Council report 
in 1952 declared, “the college while admitting every woman and northern 
candidate qualified for university work should resist any proposal to accept 
or introduce a quota system.” As the report stressed, “a quota system of 
admission might lower academic standards, not only in terms of quality 
of the student’s entry but in terms of the work of the staff and students 
throughout the college. It would damage the college and would not assist 
the object it was designed to serve.”19
Commenting on the insufficient supply of university education, the 
World Bank Mission stressed “that Nigeria needs many times more college 
graduates than even the most optimistic plans could provide.”20 As the mis-
sion recommended, “every effort [should] be made to increase enrolment at 
the university, presently around 400, as quickly as possible.… At the same 
time the University College should offer a greater variety of courses … 
related more directly to the economic advancement of the Nigerian people 
than it has been thus far.”21 The World Bank echoed the Elliot Commission’s 
view on the development of higher education in West Africa, which argued 
that “the need for highly trained Africans is too great to be met in any 
way other than by training them in their own country.”22 The World Bank 
report was an indictment of UCI. It added great impetus to the national-
ists’ opposition to the limited opportunities provided by UCI and propelled 
them to agitate for changes in the institution’s admission policies. Though 
few, if any, educational changes were made immediately, the constitutional 
changes in 1954 paved the way for a major milestone in Nigeria’s higher 
education development.
The year 1954 was remarkable in the history of higher education in 
Nigeria because the Lyttleton Constitution placed legislative power over 
higher education in the hands of both the federal and regional governments. 
Named after Oliver Lyttleton, the secretary for the colonies, who chaired 
the constitutional review committee, the constitution officially fashioned 
Nigeria into a federation of three regions, with Lagos as the federal capital 
territory. It defined the relations between the federation and the regions 
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in the distribution of legislative powers, as outlined in the legislative lists: 
the Exclusive List (subjects exclusively reserved for the central govern-
ment), the Residual List (subjects exclusively reserved for the regions), and 
the Concurrent List (subjects shared by the central and regional govern-
ments).23 Under this constitution, regional governments could legislate on 
the subject of primary and secondary education, which the constitution 
placed on the Residual List. In response to these changes, the three regions 
and Lagos enacted education laws that became the basis for mass education 
at the primary and secondary school levels.24 In addition, the constitution 
placed higher education on the Concurrent Legislative List, giving both 
the central and regional governments authority to establish and run higher 
education institutions.
In line with the provision of Lyttleton Constitution, the Eastern 
Region went beyond the pursuit of mass primary and secondary education 
to initiate plans to establish a university in the region. The government of 
the region was conscious of the new constitutional powers granted to the re-
gions under the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, inspired by the World Bank’s 
advice on the need to expand the opportunities for university education, 
and was still disappointed with the elitist nature of UCI. Consequently, 
the region seized the moment and began to push for the establishment of a 
regional university. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had been a vocal critic of UCI, 
and who had since 1920 nursed the ambition of establishing a Nigerian 
university, championed the idea. Azikiwe led a delegation to Europe and 
America to attract investors to the Eastern Region and to seek the ad-
vice and backing on the feasibility of establishing a university in eastern 
Nigeria. He also introduced a motion in the Eastern House of Assembly 
in May 1955 seeking to create the University of Nigeria to meet the needs 
where UCI had failed. As Azikiwe stated,
Such a higher institution of learning should not only be cultural, 
according to the classical concepts of universities, but it should 
also be vocational in its objective and Nigerian in content. We 
should not offer any apologies for making such a progressive 
move. After all, we must do for ourselves what others hesitate 
to do for us.25
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In addition, the proposed bill called for the establishment of twenty dip-
loma-conferring institutes. Azikiwe reasoned that if the institutes were 
organized to operate pari passu with the university, the region would have 
embarked upon “an historic renaissance in the fields of academic, cultur-
al, professional and technical education on the same lines as the leading 
countries of the world.”26 In formulating the policy of the region for the 
establishment of the University of Nigeria, Azikiwe noted that the govern-
ment was obliged to make a radical departure from the restrictive practices 
and long-held elitist traditions of UCI. In contrast to UCI, the proposed 
university was intended to achieve the following goals, as Azikiwe later 
recollected:
It will not only blend professional cum vocational higher educa-
tion, but it will create an atmosphere of social equality between 
the two types of students. It will adapt the “land-grant college” 
philosophy of higher education with the classical tradition in 
an African environment. It will cater for a larger student body 
to specialize on a variety of courses, whilst maintaining the 
highest academic standards. It will not restrict the number of 
its students purely on the basis of the potential absorption of 
its graduates into vacant jobs within the territorial limits of 
Nigeria. It will spread its activities over a wide range of fields of 
human endeavor to enable the average student to specialize on 
the basis of his aptitude.27
The idea of a university in the Eastern Region, dedicated to accomplish 
the above objectives, was unique and revolutionary because it sought to 
remove the obstacles that had hindered access to university education. In a 
sense, it was a desire for mass university education, educational expediency, 
and nationalism – coupled with Azikiwe’s connections – that fundamen-
tally drove the push for a new university. Azikiwe and other supporters of 
the American system, such as Ita Eyo, Nwafor Orizu, Mbonu Ojike, and 
others, received university training in the United States and were united 
in their opposition to the British elitist system. Apollos Nwauwa has 
shown how the influence of American-trained university graduates facili-
tated the establishment of universities in Africa, including Nigeria.28 These 
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supporters of American-style higher education did not stop when UCI was 
established in 1948. Rather, they continued as crusaders for American prac-
tical education, as contrasted to the British literary tradition. For instance, 
Professor Eyo Ita, a veteran teacher and a former leader of the opposition 
in the Eastern House of Assembly, supported the idea of establishing a 
vocational university education as obtainable in the American universities 
to challenge UCI’s elitism. He predicted that a day would come when all 
states in Nigeria would own a university.29
Attraction to the U.S. system of education among American-educated 
Nigerians was one of the major reasons for the post-Second World War 
migration of hundreds of Nigerians to the United States. At the same time, 
their bias in favour of American educational ideals and radical national-
ism contributed to the dislike of both the British and the British-educated 
Nigerians toward American education and American-educated Nigerians.30 
Nevertheless, on 18 May 1955, the Eastern House of Assembly passed into 
law the bill establishing the University of Nigeria.31 The first practical fi-
nancial step towards putting into effect the plan contained in the bill was 
the government’s decision to direct the Eastern Nigeria Marketing Board 
to lay aside £500,000 annually from 13 December 1955 to the end of 1964. 
This fund was expected to amount to £5 million by the end of 1964.32 On 
paper, the University of Nigeria was born in 1955, and, as the region con-
tinued to raise funds for the proposed university, the politics of the Cold 
War and decolonization created circumstances that made broader higher 
education reform unavoidable.
Postwar Nigeria
The postwar world was a remarkable period in the history of Africa, a per-
iod when international events commingled with domestic situation to pro-
duce changes not only in the political scene but also in educational arena. 
Between 1945 and 1949, Soviet-backed communist governments came to 
power in some eastern European countries such as Poland, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania. 
Joseph Stalin’s policy of spreading communism globally threatened Western 
democracies, most notably the United States and Britain. The Cold War 
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was raging and the Western and the Eastern blocs both looked to influ-
ence events in Africa, a continent they considered a strategic ally in their 
ideological confrontation.33 On the domestic front, nationalists, angered 
by the failure of the colonial powers to fulfill their wartime promises, 
coupled with acute food shortages and unemployment in the colonies, had 
intensified their demands for social change. In the 1950s, the politics of 
decolonization and the Cold War helped to link the interests of Carnegie, 
Britain, and Nigeria for higher education, producing a policy shift in 
which the push for mass university education was now conceived as a tool 
in facilitating both socio-economic development and nation-building. The 
resulting Anglo-American-Nigerian collaboration in Nigerian higher edu-
cation expansion produced a blueprint in 1960 that shaped the direction of 
postcolonial higher education in Nigeria.
In the context of the Cold War and decolonization, Britain sought 
to crack down on the radical and rebellious Nigerian nationalists, who 
they suspected received support from communist governments, as well as 
Nigerians travelling to communist countries for higher education stud-
ies. The “fear of cold war communist intervention in Africa and a deter-
mination to resist the ‘extremist’ nationalists,” as Roger Fieldhouse notes, 
“created a very different atmosphere in the West African territories after 
1948.”34 Communist-inclined Nigerian nationalists saw communism as a 
powerful tool in ending colonial rule and as a model in building a West 
Africa Union.35 The growing conviction to fight colonial repressive measure 
more forcefully lay at the centre of the formation of the Zikist Movement 
in Nigeria. Newspapers such as the West African Pilot and the Daily Comet 
openly supported the workers strike led by Michael Imoudu in 22 June 
1945 and attracted the wrath of colonial authorities who banned them. 
Other leftist elements in Nigeria, such Nduka Eze, Unasu Amosu, Osita 
Agwuna, Raji Abdallah, Ogedegbe Macaulay, and J.J. Odufuwa, served 
jail terms for engaging in what colonial authorities regarded as subversive 
activities.
In Britain, Leftist Nationalists and the Transfer of Power in Nigeria, 
1945–1965, Tijani discusses the activities of leftist groups in Nigeria who 
received financial support from the Eastern bloc and the British measures 
to suppress them.36 Tijani argues that the Criminal Code Ordinance in 
1950, which criminalized seditious activities, was occasioned by the Zikists’ 
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“Call for a Revolution,” a call to Nigerians to defect from the colonial se-
curity forces, the discovery of weapons at the Kaduna and Lagos offices of 
the Zikist Movement, and “the increasing volume of communist revolu-
tionary newsletters, and funding of leftists-led trade union organizations 
by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).”37 So threatened were 
the colonial authorities in Nigeria by communism that they banned thirty-
three books, pamphlets, and other publications that carried communist 
propaganda in early 1955 and clamped down on Nduka Eze and those 
associated with the Scholarship Board.38 Strict conditions were imposed on 
Nigerians travelling to communist countries for studies or conferences as 
nationals of communist countries were denied visas to Nigeria.39 The fear 
of communism made future cooperation between the British and Nigerian 
elites in educational issues inevitable. Yet, while the British continued to 
suppress communist elements in Nigeria, Carnegie Corporation, inspired 
by a desire to contain the spread of communist ideas in Africa, began a 
campaign for educational expansion in Nigeria.
The Cold War and decolonization presented Carnegie Corporation 
with an opportunity to push for the reform of the elitist British educational 
system aimed at extending American social values in the emerging African 
nations. The corporation believed that this approach would be a strategic 
tool in forestalling a potential Soviet influence in the continent, as well as 
challenging Britain’s power in Africa by offering Africans an alternative, 
more inclusive higher education system. Carnegie’s interest in educational 
expansion in Africa was reinforced after the end of the Second World War 
as a strategic tool in successfully fighting the Cold War. America’s largest 
foundations, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and 
the Ford Foundation, had assisted the United States in furthering its in-
terests worldwide during the ideological war with the Soviet Union. These 
foundations emphasized education by funding programs linking the edu-
cational systems of the new African nations to the “values, modus oper-
andi, and institutions of the United States.”40 This was part of the United 
States’ Cold War agenda, designed to assist in the process of decolonizing 
European colonies in Africa in order to establish strong socio-economic 
and political ties with emerging countries in Africa. Failing to do that, 
Carnegie thought that the USSR, intent on internationalizing commun-
ism, would establish a stronghold in Africa.
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Alan Pifer was a staff member of the Carnegie Corporation’s inter-
national program called British Dominions and Colonies Program (BDC), 
who championed the course of educational expansion in Nigeria on be-
half of the corporation. He disbursed funds to help the British colonies in 
Africa expand their educational facilities and opportunities. Established 
in the 1920s with $10 million as its budget, the BDC program aimed at 
providing assistance to British overseas colonies. Before the Second World 
War, the program focused on bringing Africans to the United States, an 
approach that failed to address human resource shortages in the continent. 
After the war, Carnegie decided to change this policy. With close to $2 
million in accumulated revenue, Carnegie decided to devote greater atten-
tion to British colonies in Africa, believing “that the speed and nature of 
developments in the British Colonies afford opportunities now for assist-
ance from a private Foundation which could be particularly productive and 
timely.”41 Pifer was the man to accomplish Carnegie’s objectives.
Pifer joined Carnegie in 1953 after working as the executive secretary 
of the U.S. Educational Commission in Britain and administering the 
Fulbright Program of educational exchange for five years. He had trav-
elled extensively to Africa. As I have argued elsewhere, Pifer’s “years in the 
Fulbright Program helped him forge a close relationship with top colonial 
officials in London, and through his trips to Africa, he had not only made 
friends with colonial officials but also garnered greater understanding of 
both colonial politics and nationalists’ aspirations.”42 Pifer believed that 
“American aid, if wisely given, cannot be regarded as anything but benefi-
cial – indeed urgent.… Education, of course is the key. There is no aspect 
of African life which is not affected by it.”43
To discuss the steps needed to intervene in Africa’s educational de-
velopment, Carnegie Corporation officials met on 11 May 1954 in New 
York. In attendance were Alan Pifer and Steve Stackpole, executive as-
sistants in the British Dominions and Colonies Program; Walter Adams, 
secretary of the Inter-University Council; and Sally Chilvers, secretary of 
the Colonial Social and Science Research Council.44 At the meeting, Pifer 
and Stackpole stated that the focus of Carnegie assistance in the British 
colonies would henceforth be universities, university colleges, and research 
institutions, with the intention of changing British policy on higher educa-
tion. Pifer specifically proposed that the first step toward amending these 
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reports was to conduct a broad survey of higher education in Africa, pref-
erably in Nigeria. In a memo to staff, Pifer explained the reasons why he 
chose Nigeria for the study:
It was realized, however, that a general study of all colonial edu-
cation was impracticable. Nigeria, therefore, as the largest, most 
important territory and the one with possibly the greatest likeli-
hood of future disorganization in its higher education system 
was selected as the place where the study should be made.45
In a letter to Stackpole, Pifer wrote that his “own view, shared by Adams, is 
that too many people have been resting on the Asquith and Elliot Reports 
for too long. A lot has happened in the African colonies in the past ten 
years.”46 He advocated a review of the Asquith Commission with a view 
to determining UCI’s relevance to the Nigeria’s professional, agricultural, 
technical, and general education.47
Pifer used every opportunity he had to pursue this project. For in-
stance, between 16 and 18 June 1955, when the principals of six Asquith 
university institutions, including UCI, met informally at a conference at 
the University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, to re-evaluate the prin-
ciple of elitism that the Asquith Commission had endorsed, Pifer used 
the forum to advance his reform agenda. At the end of the conference, it 
was decided that alternative patterns of higher education, such as the idea 
of “mass” university education in Puerto Rico and the democratization of 
access to higher education in the United States, were possible models for 
British colonies in Africa.48 The delegates concurred on the need to set up 
a commission to study strategies to expand education in Africa, beginning 
with Nigeria. The pact reached at the Jamaica Conference and the proposal 
to establish a university in eastern Nigeria according to the American pat-
tern threatened the elitist British system of higher education.
Resistant to any attempt to reform British higher education policy, 
Dan Maxwell, the assistant secretary of the Inter-University Council, in-
formed Pifer in October 1955 that the colonial office had suspended the 
implementation of the Jamaica resolution. The reasons he gave were as fol-
lows: events in the colonies were moving so fast that the study might not 
keep up with them; the Asquith principles should not be reviewed but 
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instead interpreted, modified, and applied to each region; the best people 
to conduct the study would not spare the time for it; a delegation from 
the University of London had gone to West Africa to assess the capacity 
of the universities to cope with engineering courses; and the premier of 
the Eastern Region had proposed the establishment of the University of 
Nigeria. As Maxwell concluded, “until the results of these delegations and 
discussions have been made known and digested, the review idea has been 
put into cold storage.”49 Though the British shelved the idea of reforming 
the prevailing system, Pifer did not give up. He continued to press on, al-
beit diplomatically. His cause received a boost as more and more people in 
Nigeria questioned whether the existing higher educational facilities were 
suitable to the needs of developing country such as Nigeria.
Of all the regions, the North was most apprehensive of colonial 
educational shortcomings. That trepidation was demonstrated in 1956 
when Anthony Enahoro, a southerner and a member of the House of 
Representatives, called for Nigeria’s independence in 1956. Northern pol-
itical leaders rejected it. They were afraid of perceived southern domination 
due to their educational lead. In refusing the motion, Ahmadu Bello, the 
Sarduana of Sokoto, stated that the northerners “were late in assimilating 
Western education yet within a short time we will catch up with [other] 
Regions, and share their lot…. We want to be realistic and consolidate 
our gains.”50 Indeed, the shortages of highly educated people in Nigeria 
provided the context in which Nigerian leaders sought to reform the 
educational system, especially in 1957 when the demands for independ-
ence reached a crescendo. In that year, a constitutional conference held in 
London, among other things, created a ‘national government,’ with elec-
tions scheduled for 11 December 1959 and a target date for independence 
tentatively scheduled for April 1960. Independence meant that Nigerians 
would have to take over the top bureaucratic positions previously held by 
expatriates, mostly British. As many expatriate civil servants consequently 
began to leave the country due to impending independence, labour short-
ages loomed for Nigeria’s would-be leaders. Given this fact, the national 
government under Balewa contemplated measures to train Nigerians in 
preparation for the challenges of independence.
In pursuit of the Nigerianization policy, the national government ap-
pointed an officer specifically to push for the training and recruitment 
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of Nigerians for public service positions.51 In addition, the government 
selected a special committee of the House of Representatives in March 
1958, which commented harshly on previous plans to train Nigerians: on 
unwarranted concessions accorded to expatriate officers, lack of progress in 
placing Nigerians in senior posts, and insufficient production of graduates 
from UCI.52 Nevertheless, the government continued to train Nigerians, 
particularly for senior civil service positions, through the awarding of 
scholarships. As a result, the government increased the number of scholar-
ships for Nigerian students to 101 in the UK, 44 in the United States, and 
one in India.53
The regional governments were equally engaged in efforts to train 
high-level personnel abroad in readiness for independence. The govern-
ment of the Western Region sponsored 312 students from western Nigeria 
for training abroad, while about 2,639 private students studied in overseas 
higher institutions.54 The government spent about £140,000 annually to 
support these students. Similarly, the Eastern Region awarded overseas 
post-secondary scholarships to 549 students, while 735 private students 
studied abroad.55 The Northern Region did not make similar efforts. 
Although the region nursed the ambition of establishing a university, it 
was handicapped by an insufficient number of applicants due to its long 
antipathy to Western education. Sir John Lockwood, the permanent sec-
retary in the federal Ministry of Education, recounted that as far back as 
1957, “the Premier and the Ministry of Education of the Northern Region 
had left me under no illusions about their hopes. They told me at Kaduna 
last January [1956] that as soon as there were enough potential candidates 
from their region, they would wish to have a university (of their own).”56 
Nevertheless, the massive educational advances made by the governments 
in the Eastern and Western Regions, coupled with generous scholarship 
awards, ensured that either southerners or expatriates dominated federal 
and regional government jobs, and perhaps the same applied to jobs in 
the private sector. The situation was indeed very disturbing because, as a 
Nigerianization officer put it:
It is believed that only one per cent of the staff of the (federal) 
service is of Northern origin, and it is doubtful whether, among 
the senior posts, the percentage is as high as this. The size of the 
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problem can be estimated when it is realized that Northerners 
constitute approximately 55 percent of the population of the 
federation.57
Since southerners filled the available posts in the federal civil service, north-
erners interpreted ‘Nigerianization’ as synonymous with ‘southernization.’ 
In response, the Public Service Commission of the Northern Region initi-
ated a ‘Northernization’ policy in December 1957 as a counterpoise to the 
‘Nigerianization’ policy. The policy stated that “if a qualified Northerner is 
available, he is given priority in recruitment; if no Northerner is available, 
an expatriate may be recruited or a non-Northerner on contract terms.”58 
The policy was intended to help fill the public service in the North with 
northerners by discriminating against southerners, who were, indeed, the 
targets. Headlines like “Northernization: More Southerners Sacked,” 
dominated daily newspapers in the South, which had harsh words for the 
policy.59 The discomfort and fear in the North, arising from the education-
al imbalance between it and the South, underscore the Northernization 
policy. Because the regions were autonomous entities, the central govern-
ment was too weak to prevent the resulting bitter regional competition and 
rivalry. As Robin Hallett noted:
The relations of the Regions one with another are haunted by 
fear and suspicion; the North apprehensive of the South hurries 
forward its policy of Northernization; the South is half-afraid, 
half-contemptuous, and almost wholly ignorant of the North. 
Then look how weak the Federal Government is.60
The artificial division of Nigeria into three regions with substantial region-
al autonomy satisfied colonial administrative strategy but compromised the 
chances of building one nation out of the various antagonistic nations in-
habiting Nigeria. Some colonial officials recognized this problem. Sir Alan 
Burns, Nigeria’s governor-general from 1942 to 1943, noted that “there is 
no Nigerian nation.… The very name of Nigeria was invented by the British 
to describe a country inhabited by a medley of formerly warring tribes with 
no common culture, and united only in so far as they are governed by a sin-
gle power.”61 Also, Lord Milverton (formerly Arthur Richards), Nigeria’s 
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governor-general from 1943 to 1948, maintained that Nigeria was more of 
a geographical expression than a nation.62 In addition, an American social 
scientist, Martin Kilson, who conducted research on the rise of national-
ism in Nigeria, concluded that “the chances for a viable, united Nigerian 
nation-state are rather slim indeed.”63 Educational disparity between the 
North and South further worsened that chance. The importance, there-
fore, to build a united nation through expansion of education was one that 
Pifer understood. During his visit to Nigeria, Pifer realized that the major 
source of regional tension was located in the North, a region he noted that 
was “educationally and economically the most backward part of the coun-
try and yet with its eighteen million people holding the whip hand politic-
ally over the Eastern and Western regions.”64 Unresolved regional tensions, 
Pifer warned, would undermine national security and potentially “give the 
Russians their first big chance in Africa.”65 He stressed that the prospect of 
a cohesive and strong Nigeria presented “the few counterbalancing forces” 
against the Soviet Union.66
From 1954, when the Carnegie Corporation held its first meeting on 
the subject of reforming higher education in the British colonies, pressures 
on the British government to expand opportunities for university edu-
cation continued to grow. When the principals of university colleges in 
the British colonies met again in Salisbury in 1957 to discuss the type of 
university required in rapidly developing countries, they favoured the U.S. 
comprehensive system. Yet, Pifer knew that for his reform agenda to suc-
ceed, he needed British cooperation before Nigeria’s independence because 
he was uncertain of succeeding in reforming the system after independ-
ence. Moreover, involving the British would ensure that Nigerians accept 
the American system of education that was less respected by the British-
educated Nigerians. Thus, Pifer continued to push for Anglo-American 
cooperation.
The increasing fear of communist infiltration in Nigeria, the need to 
maintain friendly relations with a postcolonial Nigeria, and Pifer’s con-
sistent push for educational reform, coupled with Carnegie’s readiness to 
provide financial support to conduct a study of Nigeria’s educational needs, 
caused the British to allow a re-examination of their educational tradition. 
Sir Christopher Cox, educational advisor to the Colonial Office, after dis-
cussing the proposed study with Carnegie Corporation, committed Britain 
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to the idea of holding an Anglo-American conference to discuss further 
cooperation between the UK and the United States in providing assist-
ance to former British colonies in Africa that had achieved independence 
and to British colonies that were about to achieve independence. Pifer’s 
resolve had been manifested in his consistent impact at conferences and his 
many informal meetings and communications with colonial administrators 
and educators since 1954. In addition, the United States had put pressure 
on Britain in general to speed up decolonization as part of its Cold War 
agenda.67 Thus, the British agreement to hold a conference at which the 
specifics of educational reform were to be discussed was a turning point in 
Anglo-American participation in Nigeria’s educational reform.
Carnegie consequently sponsored the Greenbrier Conference, which 
met from 21 to 25 May 1958, at White Springs, West Virginia, with par-
ticipants invited from universities, foundations, businesses, and government 
agencies in the UK and United States. At the end of the conference, the 
delegates agreed on the need to conduct a joint British-Nigerian-American 
study of Nigeria’s higher education needs.68 This new partnership between 
the British and the United States in African education emerged in the con-
text of the Cold War and decolonization and apparently recognized the 
need to forge closer relations with Africans in order to prevent them from 
shifting their allegiance to the communist bloc. At the conference, Pifer 
spoke on the need to get Nigerians on board, stressing that “we must not 
try to settle issues which affect the African leaders more vitally than any-
one else by discussing them on a purely Anglo-American basis without the 
participation of the African leaders themselves.”69 But as of 1958, Nigerians 
were not involved in the Anglo-American deliberations. One problem was 
that no one in Nigeria had advocated a national study to reform the higher 
education system, a fact acknowledged by Cox in his letter to Pifer in July 
1958, “at present I cannot clearly see an initiative of this kind coming from 
the Nigerian Government, or from ourselves unless we have carried the 
various parties concerned in Nigeria.”70
Given the heightened wave of Nigerian nationalism in the late 1950s, 
any proposal coming from non-Nigerians would have been considered sus-
picious. Pifer and the British were therefore very uncomfortable with the 
idea of taking the initiative themselves. Undeterred, however, Pifer under-
took a trip to Nigeria in November 1958 to sell the idea to the government 
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officials subtly at the federal and regional levels. His goal was to get Nigerian 
officials to ‘initiate’ the study on their own. Before Pifer went to Nigeria, he 
stopped in London on 20 October 1958 and met with Cox, Thompson, and 
Sutton at the Colonial Office. At the meeting, the British expressed con-
cern that the head of government of the Eastern Region, Azikiwe, would 
likely resist the proposed study because he would view it as an attempt to 
obstruct the implementation of his plans for the University of Nigeria.71 
Aware of what he was up against in Nigeria, Pifer informed the governor-
general, Sir James Wilson Robertson, and the deputy governor-general, 
Sir Ralph Grey, of the purpose of his trip, and requested them to talk in-
formally with key government officials about his impending visit. The idea 
was to create an atmosphere that would be receptive to Pifer’s idea. In turn, 
top colonial officers in Nigeria approached the federal minister of educa-
tion, Aja Nwachukwu, with the information that Carnegie might be inter-
ested in funding a study of post-secondary education and that Nwachukwu 
should use Pifer’s imminent visit to appeal to him to sponsor the scheme. 
Nwachukuwu agreed. In November 1958, Pifer arrived in Nigeria. In a 
letter to Stackpole, he noted, “Shortly after I arrived in Lagos, the Federal 
Minister of Education proposed the survey to me and asked for Carnegie 
assistance to finance it.”72 Nwachukuwu’s readiness to welcome Carnegie as 
a sponsor of higher education reforms in Nigeria was the consummation of 
Pifer’s long years of sustained effort to involve America in the development 
of education in British colonies in Africa through the corporation. To Pifer, 
this was a dream come true.
Pifer’s interest in Nigeria’s higher education reform was not completely 
altruistic; it was an opportunity to extend American influence in Africa’s 
most populous nation. While in Nigeria, Pifer presented a lecture at the 
Philosophical Society of the University College of Ibadan, on 16 November 
1958, where he articulated America’s goals in what he described as the 
“sixth period” of the “great American discovery of Africa.”73 According 
to Pifer, American interests in Africa during this period were academic, 
philanthropic, strategic, and economic. The establishment of formal and 
informal African studies programs in nine universities and one theological 
seminary, and the formation of the African Studies Association in 1956, 
Pifer stressed, indicated growing American attention to Africa.74 Pifer 
noted that Carnegie was primarily in Africa to advance higher education 
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and research.75 Pointing out why Africa was important to the United States, 
he stressed that “a continent that occupies a fifth of the earth’s surface can-
not be without interest to us [America] and of course to the whole Western 
world.”76 In keeping with America’s strategy, particularly in the context of 
the Cold War, Pifer further noted that “an unfriendly Africa would be a 
direct threat to our security.”77 The United States was mindful of the great 
natural endowments in Africa and therefore desired “the continent’s min-
erals and raw materials” and saw no reason “why equitable arrangements 
cannot be made for us to buy our share of these, and we believe that in so 
doing we can help Africans develop their resources for their own ends.”78 
Revealing why he selected Nigeria for the study, Pifer stressed that the 
country had a great potential as “the twelfth largest independent nation in 
the world and the third largest in the Commonwealth.”79 Pifer spoke the 
minds of American policy-makers and showed that American involvement 
was aimed at furthering their own interests while meeting the aspirations 
of Nigeria. These interests, as I have argued elsewhere, “are not necessarily 
contradictory. They are, indeed, complementary, for a strong, stable and 
united Nigeria presented – at least in the mind of Pifer – a future invest-
ment opportunity for American businesses.”80
To assess how the regions would receive the proposal, Pifer and 
Nwachukuwu toured the three regions in December 1958. The reaction was 
positive. It was clear from the 1958 tour that the three regions, which had 
functioned more or less independently since the time of the Macpherson 
Constitution, were willing to cooperate in educational matters, especially 
since the educational expansion will help them produce the needed human 
resources to develop their regions. The enthusiasm expressed by the regions 
was by no means surprising, because they had made earlier efforts along the 
lines of expanding educational opportunities and facilities at the primary 
and secondary school levels. From 1952 when universal free education was 
introduced in the Western Region to 1959, school facilities expanded to 
such an extent that primary school enrolment rose from 811,432 in 1955 
to 1,080,303 in 1959, while enrolment in secondary grammar schools rose 
from 10,935 during the same period to 22,374.81 In the Eastern Region, 
primary school admission rose from 742,542 during the same period to 
1,378,403, and secondary grammar school students rose from 10,584 to 
15,789.82
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Though the North did not introduce universal free education, primary 
school enrolment nevertheless increased from 168,521 to 205,912, and sec-
ondary grammar school enrolment from 2,671 to 4,683 during the same 
period.83 Similarly, when the ‘national government’ under Balewa enacted 
the Education (Lagos) Act of 1957 for the federal capital, Lagos, primary 
school students grew from 37,038 to 66,320, and secondary grammar school 
admission grew from 3,157 to 4,804 during the period between 1957 and 
1959.84 By 1959, about 2,775,938 students were registered in various pri-
mary schools all over the country while 47,650 students were in secondary 
grammar schools.85 According to Fafunwa, “more primary and secondary 
schools were built and more children enrolled at the two levels between 
1951 and 1959 than during the one-hundred years of British rule.”86
Disappointingly, the existing university turned out an insufficient 
number of graduates. Data on student registration at UCI reveal that, by 
1959, a total number of 939 students studied in UCI: 359 from the Eastern 
Region; 484 from the Western Region; 74 from the Northern Region; 7 
from Lagos; and 17 from Cameroon.87 The mass primary and secondary 
education schemes pursued since 1952, the Nigerianization policy, the cri-
tique of UCI’s elitism, the initiative of the Eastern Region, and the demands 
for more universities and more opportunities underscored Nigeria’s longing 
for mass education. This explains, quite explicitly, why Pifer’s campaign to 
review the existing rigid educational system enjoyed wide support among 
Nigerian leaders. It was apparent in December 1958 that a commission 
would be set up to revisit the foundations of British higher education policy 
in Nigeria and articulate ways and means of expanding facilities to achieve 
mass access. This is because, by that date, the interests of Carnegie, Britain, 
and Nigeria in higher education reform had coalesced and formed not only 
the cornerstone of a new era in Anglo-American collaboration in Nigerian 
higher education expansion but also a prelude to Nigeria’s postcolonial 
commitment to mass university education as well. One major objective that 
united Carnegie, British, and official Nigerian thinking – though for dif-
ferent reasons – was the achievement of a shift from elite to mass university 
education. For Carnegie, it was an opportunity to use education as a means 
to further American involvement in the emerging African nations, though 
its success depended, in essence, on British endorsement. It was also a way 
to challenge British influence in Africa by offering Africans an alternative 
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higher education system based on the American model. In the eyes of the 
British, the pace of change in the colonies in the late 1950s was uncontrol-
lably fast, and, for that reason, failure to identify with and plan together 
with these colonies would greatly jeopardize British chances of friendly 
relations with African countries after these countries had attained their 
independence. Besides, Britain was concerned that American readiness to 
assist Azikiwe in his bid to found a university in the east would comprom-
ise British influence in Africa’s most populous nation. Yet, Britain had no 
choice but to cooperate since Azikiwe and other pro-American element in 
Nigeria campaigned for education that was more inclusive and Carnegie 
was ready to provide funds.
For Nigeria, the proposed study was an unprecedented and a revolu-
tionary opportunity to advance the course of mass university education as 
a practical and desirable alternative to the elitist system of British higher 
education. Emergent policy-makers in Nigeria were well informed on the 
need to satisfy the mounting demand for university opportunities, imbued 
as they were with the idea of accelerating the training of a skilled labour 
force for postcolonial economic development and encouraged by the pros-
pects of addressing the regional educational imbalance in order to promote 
national unity. Therefore, the study – the first inter-regional and inter-
national collaboration in Nigeria – became a critical step in the process of 
integrating Nigeria’s pluralistic societies into a united nation. Besides, not 
only did the proposed study provide a glimpse of how education, politics, 
and economics intersected, but it also shed light on how massification poli-
cies became crucial ingredients in Nigeria’s march to nationhood.
The Ashby Commission and the Question of Relevance
Carnegie’s major contribution to postcolonial higher education develop-
ment was its direct involvement in initiating, sponsoring, and shaping the 
recommendations of the Ashby Commission. Stimulated by the federal 
and regional governments’ mass education programs, Nigeria’s primary 
and secondary school registration soared phenomenally in the 1950s. No 
similar trend, however, existed at the university level. Although Nigerians 
yearned for more opportunities for university education, the government 
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had not assessed the extent of the need. So, when the interest of Nigerian 
governments in favour of massification coincided with those of the Carnegie 
Corporation and the British colonial government in 1958, Nigerian federal 
government officials seized the opportunity to call for the appointment of 
a commission to assess the higher educational needs of Nigeria. This was 
what Pifer campaigned for since 1954.
Although it was obvious by December 1958 that a commission would 
be appointed to re-examine Nigeria’s higher education needs, its member-
ship and terms of reference had not yet been figured out. Pifer’s early step 
was to recommend a notable British scholar and admirer of American 
system, Eric Ashby, to chair the commission because of his prestige in 
the British higher educational system as well as his familiarity with and 
admiration of American patterns of education.88 Pifer’s choice of Ashby 
was strategic. It aimed at protecting American interest in the final rec-
ommendations of the commission as well as guaranteeing that Nigerians 
would accept the American system of education they hitherto considered 
as inferior. More importantly, Pifer wished to avoid the possible charge by 
both the British and Nigerians that the commission was in reality a blatant 
piece of American interference and a strike against British hegemony in 
Africa. Thus, Carnegie had to tread carefully and diplomatically. Ashby’s 
leadership, therefore, reassured the British, even though the new ‘kids’ on 
the block were, in fact, the Americans.
In his correspondence with V.H.K. Littlewood, the permanent sec-
retary of the federal ministry of education, Pifer conveyed his discussions 
with British officials in London on the importance of conducting certain 
professional studies prior to the commission’s work. Based on his discus-
sion with Ashby, whom he met in Belfast in December 1958, he suggested 
that an economist should study the Nigerian economy to determine its cap-
acity to support the expansion of post-secondary education; that an educa-
tion specialist should organize and supervise the collection of educational 
statistics; and that an Islamic educator should prepare a paper on Islamic 
studies in Nigeria and its possible relationship to the development of higher 
education in the Northern Region.89
Nigerians were absent at this stage of the study at which the design of 
the commission and its membership were discussed. The understanding be-
tween Pifer and Lockwood was that either Carnegie or the Inter-University 
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Council would appoint the commission and have it submit its report before 
Nigeria’s independence (now scheduled for 1 October 1960). However, 
when Ashby agreed to head the commission, he demonstrated a better 
understanding of the politics of nationalism by insisting that the Nigerian 
government should appoint the commission and be intimately involved in 
the whole process. In addition, he objected to the schedule that required 
the commission to submit its report before independence, stressing that if 
the independent Nigerian government were to accept the commission’s re-
port, it must reflect the views and initiative of Nigerians. As he cautioned, 
Is it not conceivable that the fact that the report was published 
before independence would give some Nigerian leaders an ex-
cuse for disregarding it? In brief, I considered whether the re-
port of this commission wouldn’t be better as a first product of 
an independent Nigeria rather than the last fling of advice to a 
British colony.90 
Pifer accepted Ashby’s suggestions, and in a letter to Lockwood, Pifer ex-
pressed his desire to see that the survey was “fully regarded in Nigeria 
as a Nigerian affair and if the commission were appointed by Carnegie 
Corporation or I.U.C., it would tend to be regarded as something imposed 
from outside.”91 
Another area of focus was the nature of the recommendations that 
the commission would make. The discussion centred on whether the com-
mission’s report should link the purposes of higher education directly to 
economic development by emphasizing training relevant high-level per-
sonnel. This developmental dimension echoed the prevailing trend of 
thought among Western economists who believed that higher education 
had a critical role to play in socio-economic development of any society.92 
Carnegie held the notion that education was a tool for modernization, 
and it hoped that the commission would investigate the interconnection 
of high-level labour needs, educational development in Nigeria, and eco-
nomic development. In a memorandum addressed to the deputy governor-
general of Nigeria, Sir Ralph Grey, Pifer stressed the economic implica-
tions of the commission’s tasks and indicated that Carnegie planned to 
offer assistance to the Nigerian government specifically “to reorganize its 
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system of higher education in order to make education a direct factor in 
economic development.”93 Similarly, in a memo to Ashby, Pifer empha-
sized that since economic development would be of immense importance 
to Nigerians, the commission should “concentrate on how to develop the 
personnel for leading positions as a basis for planning of national economic 
development.”94 Sir Christopher Cox, the advisor to the British Ministry of 
Overseas Development, supported Pifer but stressed that “the commission 
should deal partly with economic development and partly with solution of 
[the immediate] manpower problems of Nigeria.”95
In promoting national development in postcolonial Nigeria, the train-
ing of a high-level workforce was fundamental. Yet Aja Nwachukwu la-
mented over shortages of “adequate numbers of skilled technicians and of 
professional workers in all fields,” as the country prepares for independ-
ence.96 Mindful of the human resource shortages in Nigeria, and motivated 
by the support for change, the federal and regional governments moved 
speedily to propose the immediate appointment of the commission to 
study the higher education needs of Nigeria. Consequently, in March 1959, 
the governor-general of Nigeria, James Robertson, sent a dispatch to the 
secretary of state for the colonies, Lennox Boyd, to inform the Colonial 
Office that the Nigerian governments welcomed the idea of a commission 
to study post-secondary education. The dispatch further stated that the 
education minister had also accepted the recommendation of the colonial 
advisor on education, Cox, that Eric Ashby should head the commission.97 
Acknowledging the importance of the proposed commission, Robertson 
declared that
the number of educated young Nigerians produced from these 
sources is significant, but they are in no way adequate to the 
needs of the country. It is the view of the government that there 
must over the coming years be a considerable expansion of facili-
ties for higher education in Nigeria. That the need exists and that 
it is urgent is not doubted; but its extent has not yet been studied 
and no programme has been drawn up for meeting it.98
The education minister in concurrence of the government of the regions 
announced the appointment of the Commission on Post-Secondary and 
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Higher Education on 27 April 1959. The terms of reference of the commis-
sion, usually referred to as the Ashby Commission, were principally “[t]o 
conduct an investigation into Nigeria’s needs in the field of post-secondary 
and higher education over the next twenty years, and in the light of the 
Commission’s findings to make recommendations as to how these needs 
can be met.”99 The members of the commission consisted of three Nigerians 
(one from each region), three Americans, and three Britons.100 The com-
mission, as Pifer had suggested, invited five experts to prepare papers on 
certain aspects of the commission’s work.101 Although the commission was 
a joint Nigerian, U.S., and UK operation, Carnegie funded it.
The inaugural meeting of the commission was held on 4 May 1959 in 
Lagos.102 This was the beginning of an extensive study, involving meetings 
and regional field trips. The Ashby Commission was a milestone in the 
history of education in Nigeria. For the first time, Nigeria, the UK, and 
the United States came together to re-examine the principles that guided 
British higher education policies in Nigeria with a view to adjusting them 
to serve the current and future needs of a country advancing towards in-
dependence. As J.F. Ade Ajayi and others have noted, international in-
volvement “interacted with the politics of independence to usher in a new 
age of higher education in Nigeria.”103 Besides this, it was the first time that 
the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions had consented to a collective 
project in educational matters. Earlier, they had independently pursued 
their education policies without accepting federal coordination.
Should the anticipated recommendations emphasize courses in ap-
plied sciences in order to achieve economic development, or should they 
call for an expansion of access to university education with emphasis on 
the liberal arts? This question dominated discussions until September 1960 
when the commission submitted its report. Lockwood, a British member 
of the Ashby Commission, hoped that “whatever the final recommenda-
tion, Nigerian universities should not continue to follow the pattern of 
the University of London.”104 He noted that such changes did not mean 
a departure from “what we regard as reasonable demands upon students,” 
and he recommended that Nigeria should incorporate the Scottish model 
because “if it had the benefit of considerable infiltration of American-type 
courses it would probably be especially beneficial for meeting some of the 
special needs of Nigeria.”105 An American member of the commission, 
THE POLITICS OF ACCESS64
Francis Kepple, dean of Harvard’s Graduate School of Education, insisted 
that Nigeria should modify the tradition embodied in the Asquith report 
by “making opportunities for higher education more widely available, and 
by changing its content so as to approximate the pattern of American land-
grant colleges.”106 This thinking implied that the recommendation of the 
commission on university reform would emphasize courses in the voca-
tional and applied sciences that were vital to Nigeria’s economic develop-
ment as opposed to the existing emphasis on liberal education.
On the other hand, a British member of the commission, G.E. Watts, 
an educationist, argued that recommending only the training of a technical 
labour force for purposes of economic development would be a futile exer-
cise as it was unlikely in the “foreseeable future that a considerable number 
of Nigerians would be attracted to it.”107 However, he urged the commission 
to stress that an adequate supply of applied scientists, engineers, technolo-
gists, technicians, and artisans was indispensable for economic develop-
ment. The main issue, according to Watts, was to find “some blend of the 
British and American system which might be acceptable and effective in 
Nigeria.”108 Eric Ashby, in retrospect, believed that the best way to achieve 
Watts’s goal was “not to go slow on education but to ruthlessly ensure that 
education is relevant, even if it means a radical departure from the forms 
and patterns associated with education in modern industrial societies.”109 
He affirmed that
The recommendations … had on the one hand to be sufficiently 
deeply rooted in the existing pattern of Nigerian education to 
be acceptable and practicable … on the other hand the recom-
mendations had to promote adaptation, to stimulate innovation 
and prevent Nigerian higher education from congealing into a 
neo-British mould.110
Although there was a consensus among members of the commission and 
Nigerians on the expansion of educational facilities, some members of the 
commission and faculty of UCI opposed the idea of closely associating 
higher education with economic development through an emphasis on 
the sciences. Kenneth Dike, the principal of UCI and a member of the 
Ashby Commission, argued that the proposed curriculum reform in favour 
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of science courses should not affect established institutions like UCI. He 
further stressed that “progress in science, medicine, and technology should 
tend to follow rather than precede education.”111 He therefore urged the 
commission to allow UCI to continue with “the higher education of the 
elite,” who would be leaders of thought.112 Likewise, John Fergusson, the 
head of classical education at UCI, maintained that Nigerian university 
education should be limited to the act of nurturing and producing the “men 
and women with standards of public service and capacity for leadership 
which self-rule requires.”113 Onabamiro, a member of the commission, be-
lieved that the unwarranted prominence given to science and technology 
would endanger education standards, suggesting that the “special relations 
existing between UCI and universities abroad – preferably the UK – should 
be maintained.”114
In addition, some members of UCI’s senate expressed considerable 
fear that the proposed curriculum changes would interfere with the high 
standards of the college and could counteract the influence of the college 
on the future pattern of higher education in Nigeria.115 Even the Joint 
Consultative Committee on Education (JCC), the most influential body 
in the formulation of policy in the 1960s, opposed any adjustment in the 
existing pattern, objectives, or curriculum, basing its objections on the 
need to preserve academic standards.116 Undeniably, the strong opposition 
to curriculum changes from the academic community, who constituted a 
small percentage of the Nigerian population, highlighted the pervasive 
influence of the elitist British tradition; many scholars who had studied 
under the British system selfishly defended liberal education even when an 
emphasis on applied courses was vital to economic development. As Sime 
rightly noted, “The upholders of traditional education in the humanities 
often hold views biased by their own success, a success which was achieved 
in the absence of any real competition from other disciplines.”117
Whether there was to be an emphasis on applied science courses or 
on liberal arts courses, the three regions were eager to pursue the expan-
sion of university facilities and the opportunities to train personnel who 
would fill senior positions in the civil service. They were less concerned 
with whether or not at the national level the federal government empha-
sized science and technology courses in the university education curricu-
lum. Alhaji Isa Kaita, the regional minister of education in the Northern 
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Region, expressed his government’s overriding concern to see the creation 
of a university in Zaria to help produce the skilled labour the region des-
perately needed.118 Political leaders in the Western Region wanted an end 
to limited opportunities at UCI, which was why the region had advanced 
a plan to found its own university.119 In the Eastern Region, Jerome Udoji, 
the secretary to the premier, indicated that the educational concern of his 
government was to enable the regional government to meet their admin-
istrative needs by producing local candidates for employment in various 
branches of the public service.120
The regions’ overriding need for an educated labour force showed that 
UCI did not train enough Nigerian personnel for public service. Nigerian 
nationalists and government officials had since 1948 bemoaned the in-
adequate opportunities and facilities to ensure mass access to university 
education in spite of the high demand. Mass education experiments in 
the 1950s produced potential candidates for higher education and whetted 
appetites for more education. Sir Ronald Gould, a British schoolteacher 
and trade unionist who conducted a three-week tour of Nigeria in 1960, 
observed that “the demand for education … at all levels seems to be insati-
able.… Everybody sees its desirability and even its necessity.”121 However, 
since opportunities for access to education were limited, many Nigerians 
who had the means continued to travel overseas for higher studies. By 
August 1960, there were at least 47,500 overseas students in Britain. Out 
of the 8,500 students from West Africa studying overseas, Nigeria topped 
the list with 6,000 students.122
The lack of adequate opportunities for Nigerians who desired univer-
sity training was a common criticism of the British higher education sys-
tem, and the call for massification of university education in place of elitist 
education dominated newspapers throughout the 1960s. American educa-
tional policy, based on the maximum development of every individual to 
the limit of his capacity, reverberated in the discussions and constituted a 
crucial reference point in the public quest for unlimited access to university 
education.123 Notably, Olalekan Are, a former UCI student, specifically 
dismissed UCI as “a waste of taxpayers’ money.” He reminded the govern-
ment of the belief in the United States that every qualified candidate was 
capable of learning. According to him, what UCI needed was the U.S. land 
grant college policy, which held: “admit and give education to all qualified 
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candidates. Never refuse any qualified student.”124 He further argued that 
if this policy were implemented, UCI would handle 10,000 students, as 
opposed to less than a thousand. He made the following recommendations:
The UCI entrance examination should be open to all persons ir-
respective of their grades in the West African School Certificate. 
Students should be paired up in every room and off-campus 
students should be encouraged as from 1960–61 session. The 
idea of all students being in residence must be forgotten in the 
interest of the nations’ needs and progress. The building of more 
staff quarters should be discouraged so as to have enough room 
for future college expansion.… Money should be made available 
to students who cannot afford the college fees.125
Are’s suggestions highlighted the factors that had limited access to univer-
sity education for many Nigerians. These factors, as Dr. S.D. Onabamiro 
stated, were absent from the American system because American higher 
education broadly reflects “the fundamental democratic principles gov-
erning the structure of its society, and are a sharp reaction to the traditional 
European conception of university which used to be an exclusive preserve 
of the aristocracy, the upper classes, the rich and the privileged.”126 Instead 
of shutting out capable prospective students, according to Onabamiro, the 
general principle governing admission into American higher education 
“prefers to err on the side of taking in people who may not be able to go 
through the courses.”127 In their letters to the editor of the Daily Times, 
Orotayo Kitchie and J.A.O. Odupitan supported the call for expansion. 
Kitchie strongly appealed to the government to respond to the universal 
yearning for education by eligible candidates and to abandon the policy of 
education for the few.128 As Odupitan stated, the government “must make 
haste to expand the existing scheme to suit our outlook; abandon forth-
with the bogus idea of education for the very few who could afford it; [and 
encourage] more afternoon and evening classes.… Call it cheap education 
or whatever you like, but we are sure to have education at its best for the 
masses.”129
Public sentiment in favour of educational expansion was rife as 
Nigeria even approached independence. They highlighted the growing 
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belief that Nigeria’s modernization and nation-building would be possible 
only through mass access to university education. Members of the Ashby 
Commission, who travelled to all the regions, were attentive to public opin-
ion on education and, as shown in chapter 3, they echoed it in their report 
submitted to the federal government in September 1960. The implementa-
tion of the report produced by the commission marked a turning point in 
Nigeria’s higher education, economic development, and nation-building. 
As the Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa noted, the report was 
“simply most important piece of business facing Nigeria” stressing that “the 
country’s very future depends on it.”130
69
The Ashby Commission, Regionalism, 
and University Education in the 1960s
Our program for higher education should include a chance for 
the man who was not chosen in the early days of small numbers.
– Francis Keppel, 1959
Introduction
The 1960s was a period of optimism in Africa. This was not surprising; 
most African countries had successfully fought to end colonial rule. To 
postcolonial African people, education, as shown in Education and Nation 
Building in Africa, held “the key that will open the door to a better life 
and the higher living standards they were promised as the reward of the 
struggle for nation liberation.”1 Rising expectation naturally weighed heav-
ily on the shoulders of Africa’s new leadership. Educational expansion, as 
a passport to future socio-economic development and nation-building, was 
the premise that shaped and directed the socio-economic policies of these 
leaders. Access to education in colonial Nigeria was highly limited, and 
although policy-makers in Africa recognized that educational expansion 
would be expensive, they believed it was a rewarding investment.
Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, envisioned that universities 
must “join with the people of East Africa in the struggle to build a na-
tion worthy of the opportunity we have won.”2 Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 
3
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the president of Côte d’Ivoire, wished to engage universities in realizing 
the expectations of modern economy. As he rightly stated, the “problems 
of political, economic, and cultural development of our societies, and ris-
ing of the standard of living constitute immediate objectives … require 
us to enlist the help of all the institutions of our states.”3 In his address at 
the inauguration of Haile Selassie 1 University in 1961, Emperor Haile 
Selassie, the president of Ethiopia stressed that “universities today stand 
as the most promising hope for constructive solutions to the problems that 
beset the modern world … and the money spent in coordinating, strength-
ening, and expanding higher education in Ethiopia is well invested.”4 The 
period following political independence in most developing countries, es-
pecially those in Africa, was characterized by rapid expansion of access to 
education at all levels. In Education and Social Transition in the Third World, 
Carnoy and Samoff noted that
the leadership in these societies does not just mouth rhetoric 
about changing and developing education. They expand it more 
rapidly and reach out to more people of all ages than in any 
previous efforts in history. They mobilize entire populations 
to achieve universal literacy over a short period and invent 
new ways to expand and deliver all levels of schooling to their 
citizenry.5
Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, and Nigerian leaders 
shared the prevailing conviction in Africa that investment in university 
would help modernize their country. In an inaugural address delivered on 
his installation as the first chancellor of UCI, the prime minister, Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, declared that in this age of rapid technological develop-
ment in the Western world, “the key to a nation’s economic well-being 
is likely to be the amount of effort that is put into scientific research and 
education.”6 Earlier in 1959, the Ashby Commission was set up to help 
chart the course for the country’s educational expansion. Based on its pre-
diction of Nigeria in 1980 as a nation “taking its place in a technological 
civilization, with its own airways, its organs of mass-communication, its 
research institutes,” the commission submitted bold proposals of educa-
tional expansion to the Balewa administration in September 1960, fittingly 
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titled Investment in Education: The Report of the Commission on Post-School 
Certificate and Higher Education.7
The proposals addressed six interconnected issues, revolving around 
the necessity of expanding educational facilities and opportunities in order 
to advance both economic development and national integration; to com-
mit available financial resources as well as secure international assistance to 
meet that objective; and finally, to create institutions to implement, evalu-
ate, and monitor performance. Here, education, national needs, and ex-
ternal forces intersected, shedding light on how education policies shaped 
modern Nigeria during the period of first attempt at mass university edu-
cation (1960–70). Although the goal of using mass university education to 
meet the country’s needs for economic development and nation-building 
was not met during the 1960s due to regional rivalries, flawed admission, 
and science policies, as well as the Nigerian civil war (1967–70), the modest 
progress made during this period laid the foundation to future ambitious 
attempts at educational expansion.
Ashby recommendations guided the government in departing from 
the British system and employing educational expansion to serve Nigeria’s 
needs. The commission’s bold approach to educational planning differed 
significantly from the cautious and modest approach that had character-
ized colonial educational planning. Britain’s policy on education, which 
offered £50 million to the colonies under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940, provided for controlled educational expansion within 
‘financial limits.’ In contrast, Ashby suggested that financial limits should 
not hinder expansion. For the commission, education was an investment 
for which financing must be sought from Nigerian as well as external 
sources. It was no longer, as the commission insisted, a matter of budget-
ing according to what the country could afford but a matter of budgeting 
according to its future needs.8
Blueprint for Change
Unlike previous colonial educational reports and policies, the Ashby report 
acknowledged the link between investment in education and economic de-
velopment, declaring that the training of a labour force in the universities, 
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especially in the sciences, was a vital component of economic development. 
As the report noted, “of all Nigeria’s resources her young people are the 
most valuable; expenditure upon their education should be a first charge 
upon the nation’s finances.”9 Accordingly, it recommended that the min-
imum need over the next ten years was 80,000 people with higher educa-
tion, 30,000 of whom would be in senior positions, “managerial, profes-
sional and administration.”10 To attain the target, the report recommended 
“an annual flow of at least 2,000 graduates from universities” in place of the 
present flow of “300 from Ibadan and perhaps 600 from overseas.”11 This 
projection was based on the submission of F.H. Harbison, an economist 
and human capital theorists who conducted a special study of Nigeria’s 
labour needs at the post-secondary level. In Harbison’s report, published in 
full as chapter 1 of the Ashby’s report, he stressed that the training of hu-
man resources was indispensable for Nigeria’s economic development and 
was a matter of urgency. Harbison argued that
Of all the resources required for economic development, high-
level manpower requires the longest ‘lead-time’ for creation. 
Modern dams, power stations, textile factories, or steel mills 
could be constructed within a few years. But it takes between 10 
and 15 years to develop the managers, the administrators, and 
the engineers to operate them. Schools and college buildings 
can be erected in a matter of months; but it requires decades to 
develop high-level teachers and professors.12
Second, to meet the commission’s estimate of the required workforce, it was 
necessary to build more facilities to absorb demand. Thus, the report pro-
posed three additional universities, to be located in Lagos and the Eastern 
and Northern regions. The one in Lagos would operate day and evening 
courses leading to degrees in commerce, business administration, econom-
ics, and social science, including courses at the graduate level in higher 
management studies.13 In the east, the University of Nigeria at Nsukka 
would be integrated with the Enugu branch of the Nigerian College of 
Arts, Science and Technology, while the buildings of the Nigerian College 
of Arts, Science and Technology in Zaria would become the nucleus for 
the northern university. The huge land mass and population of Nigeria 
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were major factors in the spread of universities to all regions. As the re-
port noted, “the distances in Nigeria, the variety of people which comprise 
her population … all point to the need for at least one university in each 
Region.”14
With UCI located in the West, all the regions would have a university 
but regional politics propelled politicians in the West to seek the creation 
of another university they would control since the federal government con-
trolled UCI. The report, however, rejected the idea of another university in 
the Western Region but anticipated a time when there would be “a need 
for more than one university in each region.”15 As the commission revised 
its recommendations for submission, the education minister in the Western 
Region informed the commission that the region had decided to establish 
a university with regional funds.16 Nevertheless, the commission insisted 
in its recommendation that the federal government should not extend fi-
nancial assistance to more than one university in each region.17 In support 
of his region, S.O. Onabamiro, who represented the Western Region in 
the commission, disagreed with the majority report and issued a minority 
report where he proposed the establishment of two universities in all the 
regions, which would bring the number of universities to seven.18 
To ensure a steady supply of candidates for university education, the 
commission’s report stressed the need to maintain a healthy education-
al pyramid with the primary school at the base, followed by secondary 
schools, and with post-secondary schools at the apex. The report observed 
that, while the pyramid in the South (East and West) was broad at the 
primary and secondary levels, it constricted far too sharply at the university 
level. In the North, the pyramid was slim at all levels. The report strongly 
urged that a proper balance of primary, secondary, and post-secondary 
education should guide subsequent educational programs.19 It suggested 
the creation of 600 more secondary schools, an enlargement of existing 
secondary schools to facilitate a massive intake, and an increase in second-
ary school admission from 12,000 per annum since 1958 to more than 
30,000 in 1970.20
Furthermore, the report suggested an increase of sixth forms to ex-
pand the number of university aspirants. The British introduced the sixth 
form in 1956 as a two- to three-year intermediary period of study between 
secondary school and university, leading to the Higher School Certificate 
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(HSC) or General Certificate “A” Level. It was a requirement for direct 
entry into UCI. Few secondary schools had the facilities and personnel for 
sixth form education. Besides, it was easier to gain admission to the univer-
sity with ‘O’ Levels than with ‘A’ Levels. The commission recognized this 
problem by recommending an increase in the number of sixth forms from 
22 to 110 to provide a sufficient stream of potential university students. It 
noted that 29,000 children would complete secondary school certificates; 
about 21,000 of them should seek employment, and about 8,000 should go 
for further training.21
Third, to enhance access to universities, the report emphasized the 
overriding need for greater flexibility and diversity in university education 
to accommodate the diverse interests of potential candidates. It suggested 
greater diversification of the university curriculum to include courses often 
neglected in UCI such as African studies, commerce and business admin-
istration, teaching, engineering, medicine and veterinary science, agricul-
ture, law, and extension services. The report acknowledged that the British 
system of university education as obtainable suited the British because in 
Britain there were many alternative routes to professional training, “and 
the prestige of these alternative routes is such that thousands of young 
people prefer to take them rather than go to the university.”22 That system, 
however, did not suit Nigeria. According to the report,
In a country where these alternative routes are missing or 
carry less prestige, the British university system is too inflex-
ible and too academic to meet national needs. We think it is 
unlikely that in Nigeria these alternative routes will, in the 
foreseeable future, acquire the prestige which universities al-
ready have. Accordingly, a much greater diversity of demand is 
likely to be made on Nigerian universities than on their British 
counterparts.23
The report revealed its admiration for the American system of higher edu-
cation when it identified the American land-grant universities as models 
for the diversification of university studies in Nigeria. According to the 
report, “the land-grant universities of the United States have had to fulfill 
functions similar to those which Nigerian universities are now called upon 
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to fulfill, and the best of them have done so without in any way surren-
dering their integrity.”24 Although the report did not impose either the 
American or the British system of education on Nigeria, it argued that 
“neither kind of university should be exported unchanged to Nigeria; but 
both kinds have something to teach this country, and the lessons to be 
learnt from America include diversity and flexibility.”25
To promote mass access to university education, the Ashby Commission 
recognized the importance of scholarship awards. In the past, lack of funds 
had prevented many bright students from accepting places offered them by 
UCI. According to Kenneth Dike, the principal of the college, the uni-
versity asked more than 101 students who had failed to pay their fees to 
withdraw at the end of the 1959/60 session.26 The Ashby Commission thus 
recommended “that grants should be made from regional or federal funds 
to all students who are accepted for admission to Nigerian universities and 
who are not able to pay for their university education themselves.”27
Fourth, the commission was sensitive to the role of educational op-
portunities and facilities in promoting national cohesion. When Nigeria 
attained independence in 1960, the question of unity and balanced edu-
cational development for the equitable training of personnel, earlier sub-
ordinated to academic standards during the colonial period, assumed great 
importance. The commission envisaged that federal appointments would 
continue to generate controversy because the North was disadvantaged in 
terms of available high-level personnel as compared with other regions. The 
North did not stand a chance if strict academic merit determined appoint-
ments at the federal and regional levels of government. Therefore, the rec-
ommendation to establish a university in the North served to provide more 
opportunities for northerners to catch up with the South. Acknowledging 
the existence of strong regional loyalties as well as inter-regional rivalry, the 
commission warned: “It would be a disaster if each university were to serve 
only its own region.”28 The report called for a uniform admission policy 
for all the universities, based on merit without discriminating against any 
region or ethnic group, but cautioned that
the borders between Regions must never become barriers to the 
migration of brains. Nigeria’s intellectual life, and her econ-
omy, will suffer unless there is free migration of both staff and 
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students from one Region to another. We know that we are 
echoing the convictions of Nigerian leaders when we say that 
one of the purposes of education in this country is to promote 
cohesion between her Regions. Universities should be a power-
ful instrument for this purpose: it is their duty to respond.29
Fifth, since the funds required for university expansion were enormous, the 
commission suggested that, for the country to meet the ambitious targets 
contained in the report, Nigerians must be prepared to accord education 
first priority; to make sacrifices for it as well as to seek external assist-
ance. The report noted that the proposal was a “stupendous undertaking” 
and therefore “Nigerian people will haveto forgo other things they want 
so that every available penny is invested in education. Even this will not 
be enough. Countries outside Nigeria will have to be enlisted to help with 
men and money. Nigerian education must for a time become an inter-
national enterprise.”30
Sixth, the commission recommended the establishment of two inter-
regional institutions to ensure the successful implementation of govern-
ment policies. The first was the National Universities Commission, whose 
function was to secure and distribute funds to universities, co-ordinate the 
activities of the universities, and provide cohesion for the whole system 
of higher education in the country. The second was the Inter-Regional 
Manpower Board, which was charged with the duty to continuously re-
view the labour needs of the country and to formulate programs for ef-
fective staff development. Since the 1960 Constitution granted autonomy 
to the regions, these bodies were designed to co-ordinate the activities of 
all the universities to ensure uniform development.
The Ashby Commission’s proposal was based on the need to in-
vest in mass education for economic development and nation-building. 
As the report noted, “it would be a grave disservice to Nigeria to make 
modest, cautious proposals, likely to fall within her budget, for such pro-
posals would be totally inadequate to maintain even the present rate of 
economic growth.”31 By broadening its terms of reference to include the 
need for primary, secondary, technical, and teacher education, the com-
mission recognized the pyramidal structure of education, with all levels of 
the pyramid being connected. Its vision for education ultimately became a 
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blueprint for educational development in Nigeria. Throughout the 1960s, 
government was mindful of the commission’s proposals as they aimed to 
reshape the direction of societal change; to correct the educational imbal-
ances between the North and the South; to diversify the university educa-
tion system; and to expand, improve, and democratize university facilities 
and opportunities. By attempting to reconfigure and reconceptualize the 
inherited system of higher education to serve Nigeria’s postcolonial needs 
for a high-level labour force, economic and technological development, and 
national integration, the Ashby report presented a strategy for Nigeria’s 
circumstances in the 1960s and beyond.
While the federal government considered the ramifications of the 
Ashby report submitted to it in September 1960, the Eastern Region went 
ahead to open the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN) on 7 October 
1960. The university started with the faculty of arts, but enrolment surged 
when broad and wide-ranging courses in the faculties of agriculture, ap-
plied sciences, and vocational studies were offered.32 Dr. George Johnson, 
the first acting principal of the university, noted that the purpose of cur-
riculum diversity was to “develop professional and practical curricula which 
produce citizens who are broadly educated and at the same time equipped 
with specialized knowledge which will enable them engage in productive 
work in a rapidly changing society.”33
Since the Eastern Region founded UNN by taking advantage of the 
provision of 1954 as well as the independence constitution (which placed 
higher education on the Concurrent Legislative List), the Western Region 
pressed ahead with its plan to establish a regional university. As far back 
as 1958, the Action Group had been quite critical of the elitist character 
of UCI, and the regional government wanted an institution that would 
symbolize its idea of a university.34 However, Ashby’s report did not recom-
mend the establishment of a university in the region because UCI, though 
a federal university, was located in the west and was expected to meet the 
higher education needs of the entire region. Given the fact that the region 
had made plans since 1958 to establish a university in the area and the min-
ority report authored by Onabamiro favoured more than one university in 
each region, the region forged ahead with the idea of a regional university 
despite the majority report, citing regional interests as a motivating factor.
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Although UCI was located in the Western Region, government of-
ficials in the region argued that the institution catered to broad national in-
terests. They therefore sought to establish another university in the region 
that would serve only regional interests. The idea of a regional university 
was, perhaps, an attempt to afford the region full control of one university, 
a privilege that they anticipated the other regions would soon enjoy. Thus, 
in 1960, the government of the Western Region set up a university plan-
ning committee and later appointed a team that studied the systems of 
higher education in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Israel. Since the 
constitution permitted regional ownership of institutions of higher educa-
tion on their own financial responsibility, the federal government did not 
stop the region from pursuing its plan. Subsequently, the region passed 
legislation authorizing the setting up of the University of Ife.
The ethnic/regional rivalries that had been a common feature of 
Nigeria’s political life since the British created the three regional gov-
ernments in 1939 manifested in the Western Region’s quest to own a 
university. In the white paper released in 1960, the government accused 
the Ashby commission of neglecting it in its recommendations for new 
universities in Nigeria. It noted that while the commission recommended 
the establishment of universities other regions, it failed to do the same for 
the Western Region. The sentiments expressed in the white paper clearly 
revealed the intense mutual suspicion and ethnic rivalry that character-
ized inter-regional relations in Nigeria, especially when it presented the 
likely implications of not owning a university. According to the paper, the 
Eastern Region would own
its own Regional University, as well as continue to enjoy its 
quota of admissions into the University College, Ibadan. The 
Northern Region might also have a new University College in 
Kano, the Ahmadu Bello College, as well as continue to enjoy 
its own quota of admissions into the University College, lbadan, 
with the consolation, of course, that students from this Region 
might also be admitted into the Federal University Institutions 
in other parts of the Country.35
3: The Ashby Commission, Regionalism, and University Education 79
The allusion to a quota system (an affirmative action policy) of admission, 
supposedly applied to UCI as part of the justification for establishing a 
regional university in the Western Region, was both erroneous and propa-
gandistic. The institution, in fact, did not have a quota policy for the re-
gions following the 1952 report of the Inter-University Council. Indeed, 
the driving force behind the Western Region’s plan to establish a univer-
sity was to prevent other regions from surpassing it in training workforce. 
Protecting the interests of the region in the context of regional competition 
was a fundamental driving force, and it was evident in the white paper’s 
concluding remarks:
The Government has seriously considered the present position 
and the new situation that might arise, and regards it as its 
duty to take the proper measure to safeguard the interest of the 
people of Western Nigeria in the provision of facilities for high-
er education. It is in order to meet the challenge of the situation 
that the Government has decided to build a new university.36
Implementing Ashby’s Report
The federal government accepted the recommendations of the Ashby 
Commission in 1960 “in principle as a sound analysis of the present pos-
ition, and [declared] that their recommendation, with some amendments, 
should constitute the basis for the development of post-School Certificate 
and Higher Education in Nigeria for the next ten years.”37 In announcing 
this conclusion, the federal government proclaimed its determination to 
pursue an energetic policy of higher educational development and the 
promotion of nation-building and the economic development of the na-
tion. As the government declared, “Nigeria must aim to make and sustain 
an educational effort more than three times as great as is already being 
made now.”38 To achieve this, it proclaimed its readiness “to play its full 
part in the implementation of these proposals [hoping that] … Regional 
Governments will be willing to shoulder their share of the financial burden 
of implementing the proposals.”39
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Where the federal government found the commission’s recommenda-
tions to be somewhat conservative, it favoured a more radical approach. For 
instance, it extended the proposals by recommending a target enrolment of 
10,000 students as against the 7,500 suggested by the Ashby Commission.40 
In addition, it stated government readiness to raise the number of sixth 
form streams to 350 in order to increase the number of students prepar-
ing for the Higher School Certificate (HSC) or the General Certificate of 
Education (‘A’ Level) to over 10,000.41 The paper also accepted the Western 
Region’s plans to establish a university.
The endorsement of the Ashby report was a turning point in the 
development of higher education in Nigeria; it formed the basis for the 
launching of the First National Development Plan (First NDP) for the 
period between 1962 and 1968. Education planning, for the first time in 
the country’s history, was made to constitute a strategic part of national 
development planning. Prior to this plan, there was no comprehensive 
development plan. The colonial development plan was limited to the 
development of the agricultural sector only in terms of promoting some 
cash crops and the building of transport and communication systems; it 
neglected industrial, human resource development and nation-building. 
The overall national educational goal, as articulated in the First NDP, was 
the “democratization of education at all levels, and for all Nigerians, ir-
respective of their geographical location, religious persuasion, and age.”42 
The plan further declared that Nigeria’s “virile population has scarcely yet 
been developed to a degree sufficient to alleviate the poverty of the bulk 
of the people.”43 For the period of the First NDP, the government ear-
marked a total expenditure of £45 to £65 million for the implementation 
of the federal and regional governments’ programs in the education sector. 
This amount, which represented about 60 per cent of the total expenditure 
for the First NDP, was enormous. However, the federal government was 
hoping to attract external funds to support this ambitious plan.44
To finance its expensive educational goals – and in fulfillment of the 
Ashby Commission’s suggestion – the federal government sought external 
financial support. External donors committed an estimated amount of £10 
million for university education in Nigeria from 1960 to 1964 in the form 
of foundation grants for research, endowment, and buildings. For instance, 
USAID provided over £1 million to UNN, the initial principal and first 
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two vice-chancellors (G.M. Johnson 1960–64, and Glen Taggart 1964–
66), and thirty professors and teachers biennially, with equipment and 
technical assistance especially in the central administration and agricul-
ture. Furthermore, the Rockefeller Foundation supported agricultural and 
medical research and staff development at Ibadan; the Nuffield Foundation 
supported research facilities; the Carnegie Corporation supported educa-
tion projects and institutes of education in the universities that emerged 
in 1960s; and the Netherlands government allocated grants to develop the 
faculty of engineering at UNN. UNESCO provided general assistance at 
Lagos, especially in the school of business administration, in collaboration 
with USAID; and the West German government awarded scholarships to 
students at various universities.45 This external generosity demonstrated the 
commitment of Western countries to consolidate their hold on Nigeria in 
its fight against communism.
To ensure the realization of Nigeria’s needs for a trained labour force, 
and acting on the recommendation of the Ashby Commission, the federal 
government composed the National Manpower Board (NMB) and the 
National Universities Commission (NUC) in 1962. It appointed Dr. T.M. 
Yesufu, a senior labour officer in the Federal Ministry of Labour, as the 
secretary of the NMB. The board’s responsibility was to “determine peri-
odically the nation’s man-power needs in all occupations, and formulate 
programmes for effective man-power development throughout the federa-
tion through university expansion, scholarships, and fellowships.”46 Ideally, 
the recommendations of the NMB would have shaped the development 
plan, but the federal government launched the First NDP before forming 
the NMB. The shortage of high-level personnel was a central causative 
factor. In his speech at the first meeting of the NMB on 4 December 1962, 
the minister of economic development noted that “it has taken so long to 
constitute the Board because of a number of difficulties, one of which em-
phasizes the importance of your work: namely, that qualified persons were 
not easily available for appointment to the specialist post in the manpower 
Secretariat.”47 During the third meeting of the board, the minister reiter-
ated the problem when he stated that “there are critical shortages in capital 
formation and high-level manpower. The two are intricately intertwined: 
capital is needed for manpower development but capital will be wasted if 
there is no adequate manpower to make optimum use of it.”48
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In line with the Ashby report, the federal government also set up the 
NUC under Okoi Arikpo as the executive secretary and charged it with the 
duty, among others, “to inquire into and advise the government on finan-
cial needs both recurrent and capital of university education in Nigeria.” It 
was also required “to consult with the universities and other relevant bodies 
to plan the balanced and coordinated development of the universities in or-
der to ensure that they are fully adequate to meet the national needs.” The 
commission was to “receive annually a block grant from the federal govern-
ment and allocate it to universities with such conditions as the commission 
may think advisable.”49 The federal government’s prioritization of higher 
education in the First NDP and the emergence of both the NMB and 
NUC testified to the importance it attached to the expansion of university 
education in Nigeria. As Bello Salim aptly observed, the implementation 
of the Ashby report “started Nigeria’s march towards general access to uni-
versity education.”50
Furthermore, in keeping with the commission’s suggestions, the gov-
ernment of the North under the leadership of its first premier, Ahmadu 
Bello, invited a delegation from the Inter-University Council for Higher 
Education Overseas in April 1961 to seek their advice on the proposed uni-
versity for the region. The delegation observed that besides providing the 
much-needed labour force, establishing a university in the North would 
stimulate all forms of education in the region, and it stressed the need 
for extra-mural studies to guarantee a supply of university candidates.51 
Following the advice of the delegation, the House of Assembly passed the 
law that established the Provisional Council for the proposed university in 
November 1961, and in June 1962 it established Ahmadu Bello University 
(ABU), located in Zaria. The North funded ABU, although the federal 
government gave the university the old site of the Nigerian College of 
Arts, Science, and Technology in Zaria, which was valued at £2.6 mil-
lion. Formal lectures began on 4 October 1962 with 400 students spread 
through the faculties of Arts and Education, Pure Science, Social Science, 
Technology, and Agriculture and Forestry.
Acting also on the recommendations of the Ashby Commission, the 
federal government sought help from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in planning the 
University of Lagos. The UNESCO advisory committee for the 
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establishment of the University of Lagos, appointed in June 1961, submit-
ted its report in September of the same year. The report favoured opening 
the university with faculties of medicine, law, and commerce as well as 
faculties of arts, science, education, and engineering,  and the Institute 
of African Studies. It also recommended the development of evening 
classes in all faculties, especially those of law and commerce.52 In April 
1962, the federal parliament passed a law establishing the University of 
Lagos (UNILAG), and, on 22 October 1962, the university opened with 
a student population of 100.53 Since it was a federal university, the federal 
government provided 100 per cent funding for UNILAG. Similarly, on 
24 October 1962, the University of Ife, Ile-Ife, established by the Western 
Region, opened with 244 students. The region wholly funded Ife, although 
the federal government gave the university the site of the old Nigerian 
College of Arts, Science, and Technology, valued at £1.5 million. The stu-
dents were admitted into five faculties: agriculture, arts, economics and 
social science, law, and science, including pharmacy. Later courses in med-
ical sciences, education, and agricultural engineering were added to the 
curriculum.54
By 1962, two years after independence, five universities had emerged 
in Nigeria, including UCI, which in 1962 severed its relationship with the 
University of London to become an autonomous degree-awarding institu-
tion called University of Ibadan (UI). The three regions owned and fi-
nanced their respective universities at Nsukka, Ife, and Zaria, while the 
federal government owned and financed the universities in Lagos and 
Ibadan. During the 1961/62 session, there were 3,235 students were in 
all Nigerian universities, the highest enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa.55 
The determining factors for the establishment of regional universities 
were political and regional interests. The regions determined what kind of 
universities they wanted and where they were located. While the federal 
government yielded to the ambitions of the regions, it was equally acting 
in accordance with the conviction that education would open the road to 
social and economic development as well as respect for the regions whose 
power the constitution recognized. 
With the increase in the number of universities, it became necessary 
to set up a forum for the vice-chancellors of these institutions to come 
together and discuss issues of common concern. That forum, called the 
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Committee of Vice-Chancellors (CVC), was founded in 1962 on the in-
itiation of K.O. Dike. Fashioned after the Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
of the United Kingdom, which was a powerful non-statutory body, the 
CVC, as defined by Dr. Jubril Aminu, was “an informal, non-statutory 
body set up by the Universities to advise themselves on matters of mutual 
interest.”56 The forum brought vice-chancellors together in a loose, non-
statutory organization with moral power based on the consensus of the 
members in order to make decisions for the smooth and uniform develop-
ment of universities. However, its decisions were advisory; the federal and 
regional governments were not bound by them because there was no force 
of law to back them. Nevertheless, the CVC became a formidable force 
in shaping and influencing government policies on university education 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century, notably in the 1970s – as 
shown in chapter 4.
Like the CVC, the NUC had no statutory power. It was an adminis-
trative unit in the Cabinet Office and thus functioned in an advisory cap-
acity and lacked power to enforce its decisions, especially as the regional 
governments jealously guarded their autonomy over their universities. This 
rendered the NUC ineffective in fulfilling the aims and objectives the gov-
ernment envisaged. In carrying out its duties, however, the NUC visited 
all universities between October 1962 and May 1963.57 At each university, 
the commission had discussions with members of the governing councils, 
the senates, the deans of faculties, the non-professional academic staff, the 
administration, the non-academic staff, and the students. The commission 
submitted its report in 1963 to the federal government. The report ad-
dressed university funding and enrolment issues. First, it proposed that the 
federal government should be responsible for 50 per cent of the total recur-
rent and capital expenditure of the three regional universities at Nsukka, 
Ife, and Zaria, while federal universities in Lagos and Ibadan should con-
tinue to receive 100 per cent subsidies.
Second, based on the projection of student numbers submitted by 
various universities, the commission projected an enrolment of 10,000 
full-time students by 1967–68, spread according to the following order of 
disciplines: agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 1,250 students; pure science, 
2,830; veterinary science, 300; medicine, 1,000; engineering, 2,000; arts, 
1,420; and others (business, social studies, and management), 1,000.58 The 
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suggestion for higher intake in science courses represented the view of the 
Ashby Commission as well as the need for the universities to respond to 
government desire for rapid economic development. The NUC report noted 
that since the sixth form facilities did not adequately train potential uni-
versity candidates, it was necessary to offer preliminary courses in Nigerian 
universities, especially for science courses, to provide opportunities for all 
Nigerians. At the same time, it stressed that the government should con-
tinue to expand the sixth form facilities in Lagos and the regions.59
Furthermore, the commission acknowledged the increasing demand 
for university education among Nigerians but observed that at every uni-
versity it visited “a large number of candidates competing for admission 
into university are insufficiently equipped for it.”60 According to the report, 
many students who secured admission into university had inadequate fi-
nancial resources to complete their education: “they start on a degree course 
with just enough money to carry them through one session in the hope that 
once they are in the university a scholarship or bursary would be made 
available to them. When this hope fails, they leave the university without 
completing their course and their place is wasted.”61 The commission there-
fore recommended automatic scholarships for all indigent students.
The federal government released its white paper in 1964, detailing its 
decisions on the NUC report. In the paper, it decided to give the three 
regional universities 50 per cent of their capital grant of £17.63 million. 
While UNN and Ife received 30 per cent of their recurrent grant of £30 
million, ABU received 50 per cent. Justifying this disproportionate alloca-
tion, the federal government noted that “75 percent of students in ABU 
came from outside the North whilst the North had not at present got as 
many students in other universities and that was likely to be the position 
for some time to come.”62 Besides, it noted that the financial relief for the 
North would enable it to “make available more funds for the provision of 
sixth forms in secondary schools and thus increase the number of potential 
entrants in Northern Nigeria.”63 The white paper accepted the NUC re-
port on awarding scholarships to all students and on enrolment in science 
courses but added that, out of the projected student population of 10,000, 
“7,580 should be taking courses in pure and applied sciences in view of the 
shortage of qualified Nigerians in those fields of study.”64
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The financial allocations in favour of the North demonstrate the feder-
al government’s awareness of the low number of high-level personnel from 
the region and its willingness to address it in the interests of promoting 
national unity. The data on registered high-level personnel by region show 
that the North, despite its large population, had the lowest number: the 
North, 54 (4.3%); the Federal Territory, 79 (6.3%); the East, 468 (37.0%); 
the West, 499 (39.5%), and the Mid-West 162 (12.8%).65 These data show 
the regional imbalance that would remain a source of tension between the 
South and the North.
Why did the federal government favour courses in science and tech-
nology? The federal government’s decision to train Nigerians in science and 
technology was a manifestation of the trend of thinking in the 1960s. The 
political elite and some scholars believed that the wonders of the Western 
world emanated from the sciences. Therefore, to sustain independence as 
well as justify it to Nigerians, the government hoped to train Nigerians in 
relevant skills vital in modernizing the economy. As a Nigerian scholar, 
Biobaku noted, “a developing country must modernize its economy in or-
der to ensure growth and make its independence a reality.”66 The key, of 
course, was the provision of educated men trained in all disciplines but 
most importantly in science and technology. Moreover, university educa-
tion was, unavoidably, in the frontline of government’s efforts at modern-
ization, and, as such, the emphasis on personnel training in science and 
technology served as a constant reinforcement of the need for investment in 
university education and the expansion of opportunities. In a convocation 
speech at UI in 1962, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the governor-general of Nigeria, 
gave this advice to graduating students: “In a technological age, the men 
who shape our destinies are men who create, and creation does not happen 
behind the desk or at the telephone but in the workshops of the firm, the 
laboratory and the virgin bush.”67
Azikiwe was not alone in linking higher education to the practical 
needs of Nigerian society. Balewa had also noted that the federal govern-
ment emphasized science education to provide Nigerians with the kind 
of education that would produce citizens who “know how to think; and 
knowing how, do it.”68 He stressed that the best test of Nigerian univer-
sities would be in the “success with which they help the community to 
build the education they need to cope with their changing needs.”69 The 
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pronouncement of these leaders underscored the importance the federal 
government accorded to science education because of its place in facilitat-
ing the economic and technological development of the country. Yet the 
lingering educational legacy threatened the realization of mass university 
education and science education in the 1960s.
Colonial Legacy
Meeting the goal of economic development and nation-building in Nigeria 
through a policy shift towards mass education was farfetched in the 1960s. 
Indeed, the prevailing admission practices, inadequate sixth form facilities, 
insufficient and politicized scholarship awards, and regional political rival-
ries, as well as national conflict and the civil war undermined that goal. 
Thus, educational practices were in many cases reminiscent of colonial 
traditions. While political leaders professed their determination to realign 
postcolonial universities to meet specific national needs, their actions, just 
like those of colonial administrators, were often divorced from their words. 
In a sense, the elitism that characterized colonial higher education largely 
remained.
The admission practices of Nigerian universities, with few exceptions, 
followed the pattern of those of UCI in colonial Nigeria. In terms of ad-
mission requirements, the universities of Ibadan, Ife, Lagos, and Ahmadu 
Bello admitted candidates with the A-Level qualification or its equivalents. 
Candidates were required to pass five subjects at the General Certificate of 
Education (GCE), two of which had to be at Advanced Level, or four sub-
jects, three of which had to be at Advanced Level. Students usually took 
these exams after completing a two-year program in secondary schools 
that had sixth forms; they were typically admitted by direct entry, spend-
ing only three years at university. These four universities also provided op-
portunities for concessional admission, which was available for candidates 
fresh from high school. Such candidates were required to have passed the 
GCE (Ordinary Level) in five subjects, including English and mathemat-
ics. They also sat for an entrance examination, and, if successful, took a 
one-year preliminary course before proceeding to a degree course. Those 
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admitted by this method were primarily in the sciences, medicine, and 
technology, due to insufficient enrolment in those courses.
The University of Nigeria, Nsukka, retained the same admission policy 
as that which obtained in UI, Ife, Lagos, and ABU in terms of direct entry 
requirements and course duration. In addition, students admitted by en-
trance examination took four years to obtain a degree in most subjects, 
excluding engineering, which took five. However, UNN differed from the 
others by requiring a minimum entrance qualification of passes in six sub-
jects at GCE Ordinary Level (or five credits in the West African School 
Certificate), provided that students passed these subjects at one sitting and 
included a language and either mathematics or an approved science subject. 
The primary entrance qualification into Lagos, UI, Ife, and ABU was quite 
similar to that required for entrance into United Kingdom universities, 
whereas UNN’s policy resembled the policy governing admission to uni-
versities in the United States of America. It was largely because of UNN’s 
flexibility that its student enrolment rivalled those of UI, a much older 
institution. In fact, in the 1964/65 academic session, student enrolment at 
UNN was 2,482 while in other universities the numbers were lower: UI 
(2,284), ABU (719), Ife (659), and UNILAG (659).70
One of the main driving forces behind the idea of concessional admis-
sion in UN, Ife, Lagos, and ABU and the Ordinary Level requirement 
at UNN was the lack of a sufficient number of sixth-form schools and 
teachers, especially in the science subjects. This situation clearly resulted 
in a huge shortage of students qualified for university education, especially 
in the sciences. Statistics from 1962 to 1968 reveal that students in the 
humanities outnumbered those in other fields, including the sciences.
These numbers fell below government expectations. The labour force 
projections indicated that at least 60 per cent of Nigeria’s work force should 
have received at least a basic training in science and technology. As shown 
in Table 3.1, the enrolment situation was almost reversed, with an average 
of almost 60 per cent of students in the universities admitted in the liberal 
arts or social sciences. This statistic showed that the postcolonial curricu-
lum reform had not yet met the expectations of the federal government, 
and a survey conducted by Fafunwa in 1964 confirmed the general dissatis-
faction of Nigerians with the prevailing system of education.71 Disturbed 
by the report of this survey, the Joint Consultative Committee at its 1964 
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Table 3.1: Enrolment by Discipline.







Source: Annual Review of Nigerian Universities: Academic Year 1967–68 (Lagos: Federal Ministry 
of Information, 1968), 27.
bi-annual meeting scheduled a national conference in 1965 to discuss the 
problem and come up with a national philosophy to guide educational de-
velopment. But due to political unrest and the eventual outbreak of war, 
the conference date was postponed indefinitely.
Why did the universities’ enrolments fail to satisfy government’s ex-
pectations? K.O. Dike, the vice-chancellor of University of UN, stated 
that, besides the lack of adequate funds, which frustrated the introduction 
of courses in the applied sciences, such as engineering and food technology, 
the government’s efforts to encourage the study of sciences at the primary 
and secondary school levels were inadequate. The result was that the ma-
jority of university applicants sought courses in the humanities. To meet 
the admission target in the sciences, Dike believed that government should 
begin at the primary and secondary school levels, for
until that is done, it would be difficult, indeed unrealistic, to 
accord the applied sciences the degree of emphasis that is now 
being demanded, no matter how strenuously the universities 
may be urged to alter their emphasis. If the schools persist in 
turning out a majority of students whose training is literary, the 
universities cannot turn out technologically minded students 
from such material.72
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The sixth form was increasing being perceived by Nigerians as a blind copy 
of the British system and was thus blamed for the insufficient preparation 
of candidates for higher education in science disciplines. Most countries, 
except the United Kingdom and the former British African colonies, fol-
lowed a four-year university course, which required passes in an examina-
tion at the Ordinary Level or its equivalent. Countries such as the USSR, 
the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and New Zealand required 
a good secondary school certificate and/or a pass in a university entrance 
examination.73 Nigerian universities, except UNN, however, maintained 
an admission policy that required passes at Advanced Level GCE. Only 
in secondary schools with sixth forms could students prepare to take the 
advanced level exam. At independence, there were few such schools, which 
was why the Ashby Commission recommended their expansion to ensure 
an adequate supply of candidates for university education. Although the 
number of sixth formers qualified for direct entry into universities increased 
rapidly from 289 in 1960 to 1,190 in 1966, “university places available out-
paced sixth form production by at least four times.”74 Six years after releas-
ing the report of the commission he chaired, Eric Ashby regretted the 
commission’s decision on sixth form:
It may turn out that this was an unwise decision. The conse-
quences are already unfortunate: a valuable opportunity to 
provide flexibility in the educational system has been lost, and 
one university [UNN] has found it advisable to circumvent the 
rigidities of the British pattern of schooling by admitting stu-
dents at O level.75
Because the sixth form constituted a bottleneck to university expansion, 
the call to abolish it grew. Arikpo, the secretary of NUC, pointed out that 
the sixth form system was not in the best interest of Nigeria on either 
economic or educational grounds. He noted that the “inability to recruit 
qualified teachers, and the shortage of capital and recurrent funds, placed 
severe limitations both on increasing the number of sixth forms, and on 
improving those that already exist.”76 Similarly, an editorial in the West 
African Journal of Education stated that the heavy capital and recurrent cost 
involved in sixth form expansion was unjustifiable, especially “at a time 
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when the staffing of the whole secondary school system cannot be regarded 
as satisfactory.”77 It stressed that the “time has now arrived for a systematic 
evaluation of the sixth form and its place, if any, in the total educational 
system.”78
In response to the growing campaign against the sixth form, the fed-
eral government set up a commission under the joint auspices of the NUC 
and the CVC to “review the place of the sixth form as preparation for 
university admission and for entry to other vocations” and to determine 
whether or not “the sixth form as now constituted does provide a satisfac-
tory preparation for university admission.”79 The commission was required 
either to make recommendations for its improvement “both in quantity 
and quality (content, structure and breadth) [or] to recommend alternative 
measures for the preparation of University entrants so as to maintain high 
academic standards in Nigerian universities.”80 In its report, submitted in 
1967, the commission observed that “there were not enough sixth form stu-
dents at the HSC level to feed the universities and the universities had to 
rely on private students who sat for the GCE Advanced Level and school 
leavers from the fifth form who took the School Certificate examination.”81 
The commission noted that “the sixth form as presently organized is waste-
ful and uneconomical” and therefore called for its abolition as an integral 
part of the secondary school.82 However, the commission advocated the 
temporary maintenance of concessional admission into universities, espe-
cially in the sciences, to remedy students’ deficiencies. This, it suggested, 
would be in the interest of national needs as long as “there continues to 
exist an insufficient supply of inadequately qualified entrants in the field of 
science and technology.”83 Until the 1970s, this recommendation was not 
implemented, largely due to the civil war.
Another factor that affected access to universities was the candidates’ 
financial constraints. Data on government scholarship awards from 1960 
to 1965 reveal that the federal government sponsored 895 students in the 
five existing universities; the regional governments, 1,245 students; other 
bodies, 1,042; and private students, 3,525. This brought the student popu-
lation in all Nigerian universities to 6,707.84 Compared to the demand for 
places, however, this number was small. It was ironic, as Dike observed, 
that in a land crying out for trained men and women with governments 
that established more universities to meet this national emergency, these 
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governments were “unwilling to award automatic scholarships to deserv-
ing students to enable them accept places offered them at Ibadan.”85 For 
instance, during the 1962/63 session in UI, as Dike shows, 921 students 
gained admission but only 670 accepted the offer, mostly due to financial 
reasons. About 40 per cent of them were private students, and, according to 
Dike, judging from experience, many of them “may not pay their fees and 
therefore run the risk of expulsion.”86
The most formidable obstacle to the postcolonial goal of using mass 
university education to forge a united Nigeria as well as advance economic 
development was the country’s unending inter-regional power tussle, 
which began in 1914 and has grown in intensity ever since. The university 
system was not immune to the national crisis that engulfed the country 
from 1964 to 1969. Since 1960, the fear of domination and deprivation had 
strained the relationship between the three regions. It was partly due to 
this fear that the independence constitution upheld the regional autonomy 
established during the colonial period. The first civilian administration in 
Nigeria, often termed the First Republic, operated a parliamentary system 
of government and a decentralized federation. That system emphasized 
regional autonomy as a way of allaying fears of domination and depriva-
tion. Yet, national issues were purely viewed from parochial regional lenses. 
For instance, the first census conducted in postcolonial Nigeria in 1962 
was cancelled due to heated controversy and accusations of falsifications 
in many areas. The second exercise, which took place in 1963, suffered the 
same fate. Although the census result was officially accepted, the South 
viewed the population of 25.86 million allocated to it and 29.80 million 
for the North as an insidious attempt by the North to gain national pol-
itical advantage. Since population determined federal financial allocations 
and the number of political seats allocated to each region at the federal 
legislature, it was not surprising that census results would be a subject of 
high interest and debate.87 Worse still was that the lingering crisis follow-
ing the disputed elections of 1964 and the alleged massive corruption of 
political leaders at the federal and regional levels resulted in a military coup 
in January 1966 in which mostly prominent northern politicians, including 
Prime Minister Balewa, were killed. An Igbo major, Kaduna Nzeogwu, 
led the coup.
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Although the coup was unsuccessful, the North was apprehensive of 
southern domination, as Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo, who 
was the top-ranking military officer, became the head of state. Northern 
misgiving was confirmed when Aguiyi-Ironsi’s government adopted a 
unitary system of government for the country, a system that stripped the 
three regions of their autonomy. The new government identified educa-
tion as a source of disunity and thus promulgated Decree No. 1, dubbed 
the “Unification Decree,” which, among other things, aimed at reapprais-
ing educational policies to ensure high and uniform standards throughout 
the country as well as to re-orient universities to serve the genuine needs 
of the people.88 The North, which had been educationally disadvantaged 
since the colonial period, had held strongly to political power at the federal 
level and maintained autonomy at the regional levels as a tool to overcome 
its educational imbalance. Aguiyi-Ironsi’s centralization posture terrified 
northerners. As Welch and Smith put it:
Despite its size, the North feared the southern regions. This 
fear sprang largely from the limited educational and economic 
opportunities in the region. Preference for recruitment into the 
Northern Civil Service was given [to] Northerners, even with 
lower educational qualifications. Abolition of such preferences 
would close the major avenue by which Northerners could ad-
vance themselves.89
Largely inspired by the fear of losing the autonomy and potential priv-
ileges northerners enjoyed (including in university education), another 
coup, spearheaded by northern military officers, overthrew Aguiyi-Ironsi’s 
regime on 29 July 1966, six months after that regime came to power. 
Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Gowon, one of the leaders of the coup 
that saw the brutal assassination of Aguiyi-Ironsi, became the new head of 
state. Gowon suspended Aguiyi-Ironsi’s unitary decree; a move the Igbos 
interpreted to mean that there was no basis for Nigerian unity. Colonel 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the East refused to accept 
Gowon’s accession to power. The nation-building agenda of postcolonial 
Nigeria seemed threatened. To address the problem, Gowon convened 
the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in September to discuss a political 
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arrangement in Nigeria that would be acceptable to all the regions. The 
North, which pushed for a confederal system along with the Eastern 
Region at this conference, later supported a strong federal system along 
with the Western Region. The Eastern Region remained alone. Efforts at 
reconciliation, which occurred at many meetings, in and outside Nigeria, 
failed; worsened, of course, by the indiscriminate killing of Igbos in the 
North. About 80–100,000 Igbos were killed in the North between May 
and September 1966 in the wake of the Nzeogwu-led coup.90 Gowon’s in-
ability to end the revenge killing of Igbo people in the North caused the 
Igbos to lose faith in the nation-building project, thereby providing the 
grounds for the Eastern Region to contemplate seceding from the country.
The financial and administrative autonomy enjoyed by the regions 
played a critical role in the political tension that engulfed Nigeria. In 1960, 
oil revenue contributed only 1 per cent of federal government revenue. It 
jumped to 18 per cent in 1966.91 Since the Eastern Region, which was the 
custodian to majority of Nigerian oil reserves, threatened secession, the 
federal government realized the revenue implications and thus moved to 
reduce the powers of the regions.92 Mainly in order to weaken the attempt 
at secession, as well as to curry the support of minorities in the regions, 
the federal government promulgated the decree titled States (Creation 
and Transitional Provision) Decree No. 14 of 1967.93 This decree divided the 
country into twelve states. Before the decree, there were four regions, the 
Northern, Eastern, Western, and Midwest (created in 1964). With this 
decree, six states were created out of the Northern Region (North Central, 
North Eastern, North Western, Kano, Benue-Plateau, and Kwara); three 
were carved out of the Eastern Region (East-Central, South Eastern, and 
Rivers); two were formed out of the Western Region (Lagos and Western); 
and the Midwest Region became the Midwestern State.94 Ojukwu resisted 
these geo-political changes, arguing that it was the responsibility of the 
regions to create states. These changes, however, did not prevent Ojukwu 
from pursuing the region’s secessionist agenda. On 30 May 1967, Emeka 
Ojukwu proclaimed the independent Republic of Biafra. Swiftly the fed-
eral government declared war on the former Eastern region. A civil war 
ensued, lasting from 1967 to 1970. The nation-building project that mass 
education policies aimed to affirm was tested and failed. Various scholars 
3: The Ashby Commission, Regionalism, and University Education 95
have acknowledged the devastation of the war and its impact on virtually 
all the future political decisions in Nigeria.95
The civil war had implications for educational expansion. The nation-
building agenda of mass university education failed as it did not prevent 
the war. The war diverted funds that would have aided educational growth, 
disrupted academic activities, especially in the east where school activities 
stopped, and further worsened the lingering regional competition and mis-
trust. Nowhere was the regional conflict more manifest, at least in the late 
1960s, than the controversy surrounding the establishment of the Indigent 
Students Scheme. The scheme, initiated in 1967 by Obafemi Awolowo, 
was designed to address the financial hindrances to mass university edu-
cation. In Blue Print for Post-War Reconstruction, Awolowo, who was the 
federal commissioner for finance and deputy chair of the federal executive 
council, stated that Nigeria was still “deficient in high-level manpower” 
partly because there were talented Nigerians who are “unable to obtain sec-
ondary as well as university education, simply because their parents are too 
poor to find the money.”96 To remedy this situation, the federal government 
decided to provide money to those who were “unable to pay their fees.”97
The implementation of the policy made the North uncomfortable. 
Northern leaders perceived the program as a deliberate ploy by the South 
to use the country’s national resources to sustain its lead in education. This 
caused resentment in the North, even among intellectuals. Ibrahim Tahir, 
a lecturer at ABU, argued against the scheme on the ground that it benefit-
ed one ethnic group in the South more than others.98 Northern opposition 
to the scheme reached a crescendo when the vice-chancellor of Ahmadu 
Bello University, Ishaya Audu, called on the federal government to scrap 
the scheme and replace it with a loan scheme because only five students 
from the North benefited from it as opposed to numerous students from 
the South.99 Commenting on the statement credited to Audu, the Indigent 
Student Association of the University of Ibadan said that it was “iron-
ical that some intellectuals who had attained their present academic status 
through virtually free primary, post-primary and all higher learning now 
rejected the way by which they climbed.”100 The student body declared that 
Audu was “arousing Northern movement against the South.”101 Although 
the federal minister of education, Wenike Briggs, dismissed Audu’s state-
ments as “unfortunate” and reiterated the government’s support of the 
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scheme, the federal government still went ahead and cancelled the scheme 
in 1969.102 Since the head of state, Gowon, came from the North, it took 
little effort to persuade him to scrap the policy presumably to demonstrate 
his sympathy for the North.
Nigeria’s postcolonial mass education policy of decolonizing the elitist 
British legacies in Nigeria’s higher education made great progress in terms 
of enrolment (at least when compared to the colonial period). Yet it failed 
to satisfy rising demands for university education, let alone facilitate eco-
nomic development and national unity. Between 1959 and 1969, student 
enrolment in Nigerian universities jumped from 939 to 9,695 students, 
excluding those at UNN, which was closed during the civil war.103 That 
was a huge figure, even surpassing Ashby’s proposed figures. When the 
Ashby Commission submitted its report in 1960, Nigerians perceived it as 
proposing a radical increase. However, the actual development of schools 
exceeded Ashby’s recommendation of 7,500 students. Yet, in terms of the 
percentage of Nigerian in universities, the number was disappointingly 
low. While only 0.2 to 0.3 per cent of northerners were in the existing 
universities, for the rest of the country it was 0.5 to 0.6 per cent.104
Although the period marked a significant improvement over the elit-
ist British pattern, it also revealed a failure to accommodate the increas-
ing demand for university education. For instance, at the University of Ife, 
while 10,518 students sought for admission between 1966 and 1969, only 
1,924 were successful. At the University of Ibadan, while 14,048 students 
applied for admission between 1964 and 1970, only 2,882 secured places.105 
Similarly, educational expansion did not translate to high enrolment of stu-
dents in the science and technology courses as anticipated in the first NDP. 
Moreover, even though government officers, policy-makers, and other pro-
ponents of change emphasized applied sciences and vocational subjects, 
the actual implementation of this policy, with the exception of UNN, did 
not support their pronouncements. In reality, there were fewer demands 
for graduates in the sciences compared to the humanities, law, and lib-
eral arts. It seemed that politicians were interested in producing graduates 
to fill positions in the regional and federal civil service regardless of the 
course of study. Therefore, candidates made demands for liberal courses 
to which the universities responded. In addition, prominent Nigerians in 
leadership positions, including Azikiwe and Awolowo, were not scientists. 
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The kind of role models they provided favoured arts, humanities, and law. 
Also, high-level positions in the civil service went ‘crazy’ for BA holders 
and occasionally BSc holders. There was an unfounded notion that the 
best administrators were those who majored in liberal arts, social sciences, 
humanities, and law. Naturally, Nigerian parents pushed their children to 
emulate their leaders and follow their academic path.
The absence of an effective demand for science and technology courses 
also resulted from the fact that the government, as Dike argued, failed to 
invest in secondary school education in order to produce the required can-
didates for science courses. Moreover, the sixth form, inherited from the 
British, continued to hinder access. Even though the geographical spread 
of universities was intended to promote national unity, the implementation 
of some educational policies such as the Indigent Students Scheme clearly 
exposed the animosities that existed between the North and the South. 
Worse still, the civil war not only truncated the process of nation-building 
but also halted the expansion of educational facilities and opportunities. 
Given these problems, policy-makers and other Nigerians alike felt that 
the aims and objectives of university education remained unrealized. The 
1960s therefore witnessed what Adaralegbe described as
a constant babble of voices as educators, parents, government 
functionaries, the laymen, scholars, and the press (with con-
flicting ideas) speak of the ills of our educational system and 
particularly the inadequacy of the school curriculum to develop 
individual Nigerians and the nation at the rate and tempo to put 
us on the World map.106
Towards Centralization 
The desire for a centralized and uniform coordination, expansion, and re-
form of universities was one of the major legacies of the civil war. That 
desire encouraged Gown to set up two commissions whose recommenda-
tions, apparently shaped by the experience of the civil war, dictated the 
country’s future educational direction, especially in the 1970s. The first 
commission was asked to review the country’s revenue allocation formula. 
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One of the implications of the creation of twelve states in 1966 was the im-
portance of changing the pre-existing revenue allocation formula in which 
the former regional governments had considerable financial autonomy. In 
light of the new military posture favouring a more centralized control of all 
the states in the country, the federal government was compelled to set up a 
committee in 1968 to examine and suggest changes to the existing system 
of revenue allocation in the country. The committee, headed by I.O. Dina 
and dubbed the “Dina Committee,” submitted its report in 1969. Basing 
its recommendations on the need to maintain unity, it requested the fed-
eral government to take custody of the revenue hitherto controlled by the 
former regions. The report stated:
The existence of a multiplicity of taxing and spending author-
ities with regard to the same revenue source or expenditure 
function not only generates major administrative problems, but 
also reduces the effectiveness of any fiscal coordination effort. 
This weakness is particularly manifest under planning condi-
tions which require a positive integration of development plan-
ning and fiscal administration. The logic of planning renders 
invalid the dichotomy between public finance and development 
finance, and demands that revenue allocation be seen as an inte-
gral part of the later. Once it is accepted that the overwhelming 
social urge is for accelerated economic development as a major 
prerequisite for expansion of welfare services, then the point 
must be sustained that financial relations become only mean-
ingful in the context of integrated development planning.107
In this spirit, the report proposed that all Nigerian universities be financed 
100 per cent by the federal government.108 State officials, who wanted to 
have some degree of autonomy in financial matters, expressed strong op-
position to the committee’s recommendations. At their meeting in 1969, 
the commissioners of finance of all the states rejected the report.109 Yet, as 
shown in chapter 4, and against the objections of the states, the commit-
tee’s recommendations guided the federal government’s post-1970 socio-
economic policies, including university control and expansion.
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The next attempt by Gowon to reposition education in order to realize 
its objectives was made in 1969. Since fighting had subsided during the 
civil war, the federal government through the chief federal adviser on edu-
cation and head of the Nigerian Educational Research Council (NERC), 
S.J. Cookey, summoned a National Curriculum Conference (NCC) to 
study, among other things, the problems of higher education in Nigeria and 
search for solutions with a view to repositioning it to satisfy Nigeria’s needs 
and expectations.110 Initiated by a group of highly influential American-
educated Nigerians, including Babs Fafunwa and Adeneji Adaralegbe, 
co-sponsored by the federal government and some international organiza-
tions, and chaired by Cookey, the NCC was held in Lagos in September 
1969.111 The NCC attracted more than 150 participants, including experts 
and professionals, as well as representatives of trade unions, farmers, town 
unions, women’s organizations, religious bodies, teachers’ associations, 
university teachers and administrators, youth clubs, businesspersons, and 
government officials. The NCC was not for education specialists alone; the 
broad spectrum of participants represented the end users of education. As 
Cookey observed, “it was necessary also to hear the views of the masses of 
people who are not directly engaged in teaching or educational activities, 
for they surely have a say in any decisions to be taken about the structure 
and content of Nigerian education.”112
The mood in the country was one of dissatisfaction with the prevail-
ing system of education. The federal commissioner for education, W.O. 
Briggs, captured that mood by admitting the failure of the current educa-
tional system but then reaffirmed government support for mass education, 
science education, and education for national unity. According to Briggs, 
mass education was crucial so that “the masses of our people to understand 
the modern world in which they live, and take a lively, active and apprecia-
tive interest in the wonderful discoveries and inventions of man not only 
our youths but also adults.”113 Regarding science, Briggs stressed that the 
present system of education had failed “because it has tended to produce 
an educated class of ‘pen-pushers,’ and because it did not lay the founda-
tions of economic freedom by providing the manual skills and expertise for 
successful industrial and agricultural development.”114 As he argued, “one 
of the consequences of this modern age of technology … is the rising tide 
of automation.”115 Thus, for Nigeria “to meet the needs of the machines 
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age, our workers must be flexible and versatile so as to be able to cope with 
the supervision, operations, repair, and maintenance of complicated and 
delicate equipment.”116 Furthermore, Briggs stressed that education was 
supposed to teach the principles of citizenship in order to promote national 
unity. He asked, “Could a better system of education have prevented it 
[civil war]? Can education remove its causes in our society and ensure sta-
bility? My answer to this question would be yes, for good education would 
include in its programme training for citizenship.”117
The federal government received the report of the conference in 
October 1969. Unlike the Ashby report, the document sought for the abo-
lition of the sixth form, which Cookey described as “a blind copy of the 
British system; too narrow and inflexible.”118 In its place, it recommended 
a 6-3-3-4 system of education as provided in America. This involved six 
years of primary school; a two-tier system of secondary schooling divided 
into a three-year junior high school and a three-year senior high school 
with a direct transition to a restructured four-year university course.119 The 
document also emphasized the need to “educate [Nigerians] on a mass 
scale,” and unlike the Ashby Commission, proposed free education at all 
levels “to all those who can benefit from it.”120 The report further cautioned 
that the modern Nigerian university should not remain an ivory tower any 
longer, even if it wished to do so; instead, the “Nigerian university must 
serve as an agent and instrument of change in bringing the fruits of mod-
ern technology and our rich cultural heritage to as many Nigerians as pos-
sible.”121 Even more important in light of the ethnic tension that caused the 
civil war, the report recommended that universities should take part in the 
process of national development and serve as a catalyst for national unity 
and change.122
The major themes of the conference were educational expansion, 
self-reliance, national unity, and economic development. In calling for a 
restructuring of the Nigerian educational system along the lines of the 
American system, the report reflected the particular and active American 
influence of its conveners and sponsors. Since 1960, the American sys-
tem of education had continued to be attractive to Nigerians.  The British 
system, earlier held in high regard, increasingly lost its appeal. The cli-
mate that produced the recommendations reflected sensitivity to America’s 
lead in landing the first man on the moon on 20 July 1969. This event 
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dramatically heightened Nigeria’s admiration of American degrees, and, as 
captured by E.O. Fagbamiye, “If the award of such degrees would ensure 
a technological break-through for Nigeria, many Nigerians would gladly 
support such awards.”123
Conclusion
The 1960s witnessed a noteworthy shift towards educational expansion 
following the recommendations of the Ashby Commission’s report and 
motivated by the politics of economic development and nation-building. 
Five autonomous universities emerged, geographically spread to promote 
(though unsuccessful) national unity; scholarship awards (though inad-
equate) were extended by the various governments; science education was 
emphasized (without results); and the curriculum was diversified, leading 
to an increase in student population to 9,695. The smooth implementa-
tion of the massification program during this period was compromised by 
regional rivalries, financial constraints, the sixth form, the low demand for 
science courses, the military overthrow of the civilian government, and the 
civil war. The experience of the civil war, however, set the tone for the post-
civil war expansion of university education, ushering in the second attempt 
at mass education in which rebuilding the country’s economy and national 
spirit became an overriding social policy.
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Centralization of Universities and 
National Integration, 1970–79:  
The Legacy of the Nigerian Civil War
The universities should be a vehicle for the promotion of nation-
al consciousness, unity, understanding and peace.… Education 
is a recognized factor of unity in a nation, but unfortunately we 
still have within our nation educational disparity which tends 
to undermine the desires and efforts to achieve true unity; be-
cause there can only be true unity where educational opportun-
ities and resultant facilities, amenities and benefits are evenly 
distributed. 
– Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976
Introduction
Most postcolonial African countries wrestled with the problem of uniting 
members of their pluralistic societies in what Emile Durkheim calls a con-
science collective. Social solidarity within a society, as Durkheim notes, is 
possible “if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homo-
geneity by fixing in the child, from beginning, the essential similarity that 
collective life demands.”1 At its independence in 1960, Nigeria was a state 
devoid of a national identity. As many studies have shown, the diverse 
ethnic groups within Nigeria had divergent and conflicting interests, often 
4
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claiming different heritage, language, and culture.2 The British indirect 
rule system of administration that entrenched separate ethnic and regional 
identities worsened the historical rivalries and hostilities among the coun-
try’s nationalities. These problems crystallized in the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967–70). The war highlighted the rivalries that characterized Nigeria’s 
pluralistic society and questioned the viability of the ‘nationalists’ project. 
Yet, it rekindled the federal government’s determination to explore ways of 
uniting the country’s diverse groups together as a nation, one of which was 
by closing the educational gap existing between the North and the South.
Given the bitter experiences of the war, the overriding emphasis of 
the postwar social programs, including education, was, understandably, to 
keep the country together. The end of the civil war on 12 January 1970 
was thus a turning point in the country’s educational history; it marked 
a rebirth of the Nigerian nation and ushered in a new era typified by the 
implementation of far-reaching educational programs. Notably, the ques-
tion of national unity and integration based on balanced educational de-
velopment featured prominently in the mass university education experi-
ments of the 1970s. The ideal of a nation, reinforced after the civil war, 
formed the philosophical foundation for post-1970 push for massification 
of university education. The military head of state, Yakubu Gowon, set the 
nation-building tone in his victory speech at the end of the war when he 
affirmed his administration’s desire to foster national “reintegration, recon-
ciliation, and reconstruction,” requesting Nigerians to help “rebuild the na-
tion anew.”3 Since the government could not affirm a non-existent collect-
ive conscience, it was prepared, among other things, to use mass university 
education policies to create one – an essential step in nation-building.
Throughout the 1970s, therefore, the successive military governments 
of Gowon (1966–75), Murtala Mohammed (1975–76), and Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1976–79) assumed an exclusive control of university education as 
a strategic tool to facilitate national unity and economic development. This 
historic shift in the country’s educational development had more to do with 
the legacy of the civil war and the federal government’s desire to assert con-
trol over the nation state. In a sense, the shift in the nature of the Nigerian 
state caused a major shift in the country’s educational management.
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Continuing Elitism
The civil war exacerbated the existing shortages in university places, inter-
rupting the goal of mass university education. It affected all levels of educa-
tional activities, especially in the eastern states where educational facilitates 
were destroyed. At the end of the war, the federal government anticipated 
a real explosion in the numbers of qualified candidates seeking university 
education, which, according to Gowon, called “for expansion of existing 
institutions either in size or in numbers and, possibly, both.”4 Gowon be-
lieved that such expansion was necessary in order to supply the skilled 
personnel required to champion economic development.5 The statistics of 
student population in the existing universities in Ibadan, Nsukka, Lagos, 
Zaria, and Ife were marked by a dearth of university places, domination 
by southerners, and low enrolment in the sciences. In 1970, only 14,468 
students were studying in all the universities. When compared to Nigeria’s 
population, estimated at about 51 million, the number was statistically in-
significant. The facilities at the existing universities were grossly inadequate 
to accommodate increasing demand for places. For instance, out of the 
7,000 applicants in the 1969/70 session, only 1,500 secured admissions.6 
In addition, students from the South, who constituted more than 75.6 per 
cent of the total student population, dominated the universities; and less 
than 46 percent were in the science courses.7 These numbers fell below gov-
ernment expectations. In fact, the inadequate access and the need to satisfy 
the educational needs of its indigenes compelled the Midwestern State to 
found the Institute of Technology in Benin. The planning of this institute 
began in 1967 but was suspended due to the civil war. It eventually opened 
on 23 November 1970 with 108 students, only to be become the University 
of Benin when the National Universities Commission granted it the status 
of a university on 1 July 1971.8
The primary factor that determined and limited student admission was 
the lack of facilities (classes and hostels) to accommodate demand and the 
increasing incidence of multiple admissions. The supply of university places 
was insufficient even when the number of potential entrants based on pass-
es in the Advanced Level examination increased from 6,739 in 1970 to 15, 
363 in 1975.9 For example, in the 1970/71 session, out of 8,926 candidates 
that applied to the University of Ife, the university admitted only 1,179, 
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even though 4,311 applicants were qualified. In the University of Ibadan, 
10,036 candidates applied for admission in 1970/71, 4,682 were qualified, 
but 1,383 were offered admission.10 In his welcome addresses to new stu-
dents, the vice-chancellor of the University of Lagos, J.F. Ade Ajayi, noted 
that “the gap between the demand for and supply of university places [was 
a] widening gap, which makes it necessary to accord special congratula-
tions to those who have succeeded against odds to secure admission to the 
university.”11 He further observed that
the transition from school to University in this country is no 
longer smooth; it has become a stormy and capricious passage 
that gives would-be students and their parents far more worries 
than the transition from Elementary to Secondary School.12
It was due to its determination to expand access to university education 
for economic development and national unity that the federal government 
launched the Second National Development Plan (Second NDP) that 
emphasized education. The plan proclaimed to transform Nigeria, among 
others things, into “a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens.”13 
As the plan noted, the federal government faced a choice to either pro-
vide university education to all Nigerians “for its own sake, as a means of 
enriching an individual’s knowledge and developing his full personality 
… or to prepare people to undertake specific tasks and employment func-
tions which are essential for the transformation of their environment.”14 
However, as the Second NDP acknowledged, “Nigeria should in her stage 
of development, regard education as both.”15 The plan sought to restore 
facilities and services damaged or disrupted by the civil war but desired 
to develop and expand education at various levels in order to attain higher 
admission ratios while at the same time reducing the educational gap in 
the country. Owing to the civil war, the UNN in particular suffered from 
“severe deterioration of existing faculties, academic and public buildings, 
student hostels and staff houses; serious environmental degradation; and 
inadequate space for academic activities, recreational facilities.”16 Therefore, 
the Second NDP allocated large funds for the rehabilitation, reconstruc-
tion, and expansion of its facilities and those of other universities. It was a 
prelude to federal takeover of universities.
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Federal Control of University Education
The three successive military governments in the 1970s upheld a central-
ized control of university education as a strategic tool to both facilitate 
access and forge greater national integration. This posture marked a radical 
departure from the early 1960s when the three regions controlled much 
of their fate with minimal federal interference. Despite regional control of 
education, the educational gap between the North and South, which began 
during the colonial period, remained a source of tension between the two 
areas. By the 1970s, that gap, as the federal commissioner of education, 
A.Y. Eke, revealed, was so wide that
roughly speaking, for every child in a primary school in the 
northern states there are four in the southern states; for every 
boy or girl in a secondary school in the north there are five in 
the south. And for every student in a post-secondary institution 
in the north there are six in the south.17
Gowon had unsuccessfully called on all the universities to close this gap by 
assuming a national outlook in their admission policies. He stressed that 
the success of universities would be contingent on “the extent to which 
[they] can meet the needs and aspirations of the society which they are 
established to serve.”18
The federal government’s move towards centralization of university 
education effectively began in 1967. In that year, the creation of twelve 
states from the four regions created a new dimension to the university 
question. States without universities began to campaign for one. But in 
1970, six states out of twelve had universities. Ahmadu Bello University 
was located in the North Central State; the University of Nsukka in the 
East-Central State; the University of Lagos in the federal capital city of 
Lagos; the universities in Ibadan and Ile-Ife in the Western State; and the 
University of Benin in the Mid-Western State. The six remaining states 
– North-Eastern State, North-Western State, Kano State, Benue/Plateau 
State, South-Eastern State, and Rivers State – had none. Of the six states 
without universities, four were located in the former Northern Region, 
an area marked by low enrolment in university education and considered 
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educationally disadvantaged. These states embarked on vigorous plans to 
establish their own universities. Ownership of a university was considered 
a symbol of state pride. Given the level of ethnic rivalry, an unregulated 
establishment of universities carried the potential of exacerbating the 
existing tensions and straining local resources. As noted in the Ibadan edi-
torial of July 1970:
The real danger [lies] in the creation of State institutions which 
will be inward-looking and inbreeding.… [The] isolation of the 
youth of each state of the Federation into their State Universities 
will not make for the much needed unity of the country. There 
exists the fearful danger that both students and their teachers 
will remain within their States and that a new type of “tribal-
ism” will develop.19
Resisting the proliferation of state universities while consolidating and ex-
panding the facilities in the existing universities seemed the right course of 
action. In its delegation to Nigeria in 1970, the Inter-University Council 
(IUC) condemned plans by some Nigerian states to establish their own 
universities. IUC urged the federal government through the CVC to 
strengthen the existing universities to enable them meet the demands for 
admission as well as to provide quality education rather than spending 
limited resources to fund new universities.20 The federal government was 
also worried about the negative impact of an uncoordinated establishment 
of universities on both the academic standards and government finances. 
Given the shift in the nature of the country towards a unitary system of 
government, Gowon felt that the central control of universities was vital in 
the process of nation-building. The Dina Committee had recommended 
to the federal government in 1969 to take custody of all the revenue in 
the country as well as the universities that were hitherto controlled by the 
regions. Although the four regions protested, Gowon went ahead to imple-
ment most of the recommendations of the committee. In the biography 
of Gowon, Eliagwu notes, “The Dina Report was rejected by the states 
essentially because of its political assumptions.… Gowon did not raise dust 
over the issue, but quietly implemented most aspects of this report through 
the back door.”21 Given the fact that it had assumed full responsibility for 
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financing prisons, public safety, and scientific and industrial research, the 
federal government control of higher education seemed unstoppable.
Gowon’s determination to remake Nigeria into a unitary state was re-
flected in two successive decrees that stripped the states of their financial 
autonomy. Before the military took over in 1966, as many studies have 
shown, the regions played a dominant role in their respective areas, espe-
cially in finances and education.22 Decree No. 13 of 1970 allocated majority 
of federally collected revenue to the federal government which in turn allo-
cated to states based on need, often measured by population. The derivation 
principle that characterized revenue-sharing in Nigeria since the 1950s was 
suspended. In 1971, the federal government further promulgated Decree 
No. 9, which transferred rents and royalties of offshore petroleum mines 
from the states to the federal government.23 The federal government now 
had massive resources at its disposal, resources that would enable it to play 
a much more decisive and influential role in the country’s social and eco-
nomic policies.
Quite notably, the increase in the number of states to twelve weakened 
the powers of the states relative to the federal government. Many of the 
states became increasingly dependent on grants from the federal govern-
ment for such basic needs as administration, a situation that continued 
when Murtala Mohammed regime created seven more states in 1976.24 
The states were in no strong financial position to resist the federal gov-
ernment’s encroachment. Cash-strapped, some states often sought federal 
takeover of some of their responsibilities, as demonstrated in 1973 when 
the East Central State and Mid-West State requested the federal govern-
ment to take over their universities.25 Gowon’s march to centralization was 
on course. In a speech in 1972, he declared his support for
a planned and conscientious national plan for university de-
velopment … since the states are not financially strong enough 
to finance their universities, and since the ability of the federal 
government, itself, to finance them is not always taken into ac-
count in planning new universities.26
Gowon took his first major step towards federal control of university edu-
cation in 1972 when he suspended the constitutional provision with respect 
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to higher education. He announced the decision of the Supreme Military 
Council to assume “full responsibility for higher education throughout 
the country,” further stating that “education, other than higher education, 
should become the concurrent responsibility of both the Federal and the 
State Governments, and be transferred to the concurrent legislative list.”27 
This change placed higher education on the Exclusive Legislative List. It 
was a significant amendment of the 1963 Constitution. The 1963 constitu-
tion had placed higher education on the Concurrent Legislative List, which 
granted power to both the federal and regional governments to legislate 
on higher education matters. It also placed primary and secondary educa-
tion on the Residual List category, which meant that only the regional 
governments could legislate on them. The 1972 declaration reversed this. 
By implication, the federal government arrogated to itself the sole right to 
establish universities and to legislate on all matters concerning their fur-
ther expansion. This step, dictated by regional bickering that led to the 
civil war, paved the way for the future centralization and nationalization 
of the university system in line with the federal government commitment 
to foster national unity. As Eke states, “instead of remaining the parochial 
or regional subject it had previously been, education is now a matter of im-
mense national consequence to all the citizens of Nigeria.”28
Nigeria’s postwar national goals as outlined in the Second NDP was 
based on building national unity, a strong and self-reliant nation and 
democratic society with a dynamic economy and equal opportunity for all 
citizens.29 Since the federal government acknowledged education as fun-
damental in realizing those objectives, there was therefore the need for 
a national philosophy and policy on education. The Seminar on a National 
Policy on Education (SNPE) provided that. On the directive of the federal 
government, and mainly based on the report of the proceedings of National 
Curriculum Conference (NCC) of 1969, the federal and state ministries of 
education drafted a new education policy in 1972.30 The National Council 
on Education (NCE), a council of commissioners of education, considered 
the draft at its meeting in December 1972 and proposed a national seminar 
where Nigerian educators and other interested and knowledgeable persons 
would discuss it. NCE appointed the then head of the National Universities 
Commission (NUC) and a former Permanent Representative of Nigeria to 
the United Nations, S.O. Adebo, to chair the SNPE.31 Gowon was the 
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first Nigerian leader to involve Nigerians on a massive scale in the de-
sign of future educational programs, as shown in the number of people 
who participated in the 1969 Curriculum Conference as well as the 1973 
SNPE. This contrasted sharply with the 1960 Ashby Commission, where 
only three Nigerians participated in its deliberations. The large section of 
the Nigerian population invited for these conferences was part of Gowon’s 
public relations campaign to win popular acceptance of his regime while at 
the same time involving the end-users of university products in curriculum 
development as a means of meeting society’s needs.
Addressing regional imbalance in education and using mass educa-
tion to promote national unity was a compelling need for government for 
which the seminar must respond. As Adebo put it, “Imbalance in educa-
tional opportunities results in imbalance in economic opportunities which 
in turn adversely affects our national unity with the consequences that we 
all know. Surely, the time has come to deal firmly with this problem, and 
to give all it takes in financial and other terms to solve it.”32 Among the 
issues discussed at the seminar were university ownership and centraliza-
tion, control and administration of educational institutions and democ-
ratization of education in order to correct imbalances. The report of the 
seminar provided the philosophy that guided educational development 
throughout the 1970s, and, in many instances, beyond. It defined Nigeria’s 
national purpose in the context of the role of education in helping to build 
and nurture the nation and recommended the expansion, centralization, 
and democratization of access to university education in order to promote 
national unity and economic development. It suggested that the “goal of 
free university education must always be kept in view.” The objectives of 
Nigerian higher education, as the seminar articulated, include the acquisi-
tion, development, and inculcation of the proper value-orientation for the 
survival of the individual and society, the development of the intellectual 
capacities of individuals to understand and appreciate their environment, 
the acquisition of both physical and intellectual skills which will enable 
individuals to develop into useful member of the community, and the ac-
quisition of a detached view of the local and external environment.33 The 
report restated and endorsed the five main ingredients of the Second NDP, 
which included, among others, the fostering of “a land of bright and full 
opportunities for its citizens.” Addressing the issue of disunity and rivalry, 
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and echoing the 1972 UNESCO report, the seminar declared that educa-
tion should promote “learning to live, not simply learning to pass exam-
inations,” and to “develop in our youths a sense of unity, patriotism, and 
love of our country.”34 Above all, it advised the government to ensure a 
geographically equitable distribution of university facilities as a means of 
achieving national unity.35
The idea to employ university education to achieve national unity 
seemed cogent, especially after the experience of the civil war. If Nigerian 
youth – presumed to be future leaders – from various ethnicities received 
equal access to all Nigerian universities, every ethnic group would feel con-
fident that it would have equal access to the national wealth. Besides, this 
would provide the youth a good opportunity to understand one another 
and build up friendships. Furthermore, if students learned about one an-
other’s culture and lived in areas outside their home states, they would 
most likely become broad-minded and tolerant. This reasoning motivated 
the federal government to establish Unity Schools (federally owned high 
schools) and introduce the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973. 
The Unity Schools were designed to bring young adolescents of diverse 
ethnicity together to interact and grow up together in order to create a solid 
foundation for national unity. For the first time in Nigerian educational 
history, the government used the quota system of admission into these fed-
eral schools. The aim was to correct the educational imbalance between 
the South and the North by generating enough candidates for university 
admission, especially from the disadvantaged states. Similarly, the intro-
duction of the NYSC compelled Nigerian university graduates under the 
age of thirty years to provide a twelve-month period of continuous service 
outside their home state. No Nigerian graduate was offered a job in the 
public sector without completing this national service. The government 
planned the program to expose graduates to the modes of living of the 
people in different parts of the country with a view of removing prejudices, 
eliminating ignorance, and confirming at first hand the many similarities 
among Nigerians of all ethnic groups.
Realigning the country’s universities as an agent of nation-building, 
as SNPE outlined, became the slogan of the administration. After what 
Gowon described as “the widest consultations” with various government-
al and non-governmental institutions on the SNPE’s report, the federal 
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government accepted the recommendations in November 1973 while it 
finalized discussions on the ambitious projects that would be included in the 
next plan: the Third National Development Plan (Third NDP).36 Luckily, 
however, the country’s unexpected economic boom of 1973–74, occasioned 
by the Yom Kippur War, which began on 6 October 1973 in the Middle 
East, boosted the government’s ability to engage in far-reaching university 
expansion. Although Nigeria had made appreciable income from oil since 
1970 when it joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), oil only became the country’s major foreign exchange earner and 
contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the 1973 war.37
With enormous financial resources from oil revenue at its disposal, 
the federal government launched the Third NDP in 1975, which outlined 
grand plans to expand agriculture, industry, transport, housing, water sup-
plies, health facilities, education, rural electrification, community develop-
ment, and state programs. The impact of oil wealth was clear. While the 
First NDP and the Second NDP allocated a capital expenditure of N2.2 
billion and N3.0 billion respectively, the Third NDP earmarked an ex-
penditure of N30 billion.38 The potential expansion of the productive base 
of the economy required skilled labour to staff the expanding economy, 
placing university education at the centre of accomplishing government ob-
jectives. The objectives of the university educational program for the Third 
NDP period were “to expand facilities for education aimed at equalizing 
individual access to education throughout the country … to consolidate 
and develop the nation’s system of education in response to the economy’s 
manpower needs [and] … to make an impact in the area of technological 
education.”39 In pursuit of these objectives, the plan expressed its resolve to 
expand facilities in the existing universities, establish four new universities, 
and increase student enrolment from its current level of 23,000 to 53,000 
by 1980. To that end, it allocated a total capital expenditure of N251.856 
million to education. 40
The Third NDP was a bold step in the government effort to accelerate 
the pace of economic and social change in Nigeria. It represents, as Gowon 
argued, “a major milestone in the evolution of economic planning in this 
country. It is undoubtedly the most ambitious development effort ever at-
tempted in Nigeria.”41 Gowon was optimistic that the “full implementa-
tion of the plan should ensure a radical transformation of the Nigerian 
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society.”42 Economic development and nation-building were at the centre 
of Gowon’s plan to revitalize the universities. This vision of universities, 
as Gowon stressed, “reflect not only the considerably increased resources 
now available to us but also the government’s determination to translate 
the country’s vast potential into a permanent improvement in the living 
condition of all Nigerians.”43 Since the oil wealth coincided with domestic 
pressure for university expansion, the federal government seized the mo-
ment to engage in unprecedented expansion of access, designed not only to 
provide a workforce to manage the expanding economy, but also to assuage 
regional, state, and ethnic demands.
Following Gowon’s centralization posture and empowered by the 
country’s oil wealth, the federal government took over all the state uni-
versities (Benin, Ife, and Zaria) in August 1975. Though the Third NDP 
approved the establishment of four universities, the federal government 
established seven in 1975. The new universities were deliberately sited in 
the so-called disadvantaged states, five in the North (Jos, Ilorin, Sokoto, 
Kano, and Maiduguri) and two among the minorities in the South (Port 
Harcourt and Calabar).44 With thirteen universities under federal control, 
financial allocations to universities increased, now administered by the 
newly reconstituted NUC. The federal government had recomposed the 
NUC by Decree No. 1 of 1974 and extended its powers to ensure ordered 
control and expansion. The NUC, as previously constituted, was unable 
to perform its role properly because higher education was a joint respon-
sibility of both state and federal governments. Since the federal govern-
ment assumed full responsibility for higher education, NUC became the 
government’s instrument for executing its vision of a centrally coordinated 
university system. The new NUC was empowered to draw “periodic mas-
ter plans for the balanced and coordinated development of universities in 
Nigeria … [and the] establishment and location of new universities as and 
when considered necessary.” More importantly, the NUC was required to 
advise the government on the “financial needs, both recurrent and capital, 
of university education in Nigeria” as well as to receive block grants from 
the government for allocation to the universities “in accordance with such 
formula as may be laid down by the Federal Executive Council.”45
In keeping with its expansionist policy, the total budget for universi-
ties, put at N39 million in 1970/71, increased to N320 million in 1976, 
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leading to expansion of facilities and higher student enrolment. Student 
enrolment rose from 14,468 in the 1970/71 session to 40,552 in 1976.46 
This development, as Alex Gboyega and Yinka Atoyebi noted, “marked the 
decisive turning point when university education became available to the 
masses in Nigeria.”47 However, enrolment would have greatly increased if 
the federal government had redirected the capital grants meant for the new 
universities to expand facilities in the existing universities as IUC advised 
in 1970. Political considerations, more than sustainable expansion of ac-
cess, dictated the founding of the new institutions. The federal control of 
universities and equitable geographical distribution aimed at appeasing the 
educationally disadvantaged states. As J.F. Ade Ayayi and others observed, 
“It was the oil revenues that incited the federal government to create not 
only a national system of higher education, but also education as a whole, 
under the federal control as a factor of reconciliation and unification after 
the civil war.”48 There was little consideration of the long-term maintenance 
of those institutions. Besides, despite Gowon’s efforts to ‘massify’ univer-
sity education, admission problems continued to slow down enrolment and 
expansion of university education.
Quota System and Admission Reform
The demand by northerners for a quota system that would guarantee access 
to university education for their indigenes was well known.49 The question 
of quotas was not new in the 1970s. It originated in the 1950s when the 
North advocated for an admission policy that would promote increased 
admission of its residents in the University College, Ibadan. However, the 
IUC had firmly opposed it and insisted that academic merit was the sole 
criterion for university admission. The federal government’s white paper on 
the Ashby Commission report reaffirmed IUC’s position in 1961. Thus, 
throughout the 1960s, students secured admission to universities based on 
academic merit alone, which favoured the more educationally advanced 
South. In the early 1970s, the northern states intensified their call for 
some sort of quota system to reserve admission spots for their residents 
in the existing universities. For instance, the former military governors 
of the northern states under the platform of Interim Common Services 
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Agency (ICSA) wrote to Gowon in September 1971, drawing attention to 
the fact that students from the northern states constituted less than 2 per 
cent of the total student population in the federal universities of Ibadan 
and Lagos. They asked the federal government to expand the preliminary 
courses in these universities and to give preference to students from the 
North in university admissions.50 Given the bitter experience of civil war, 
the government began to reconsider its thinking on the merits of a quota 
system, naturally provoking a great deal of discussion and debate.
Because employment opportunities in Nigeria were few and highly 
competitive, the South, with higher educational and professional attain-
ment, occupied most of the available jobs. In a public address at Ahmadu 
Bello University, Zaria, in 1972 Gowon had expressed his administration’s 
commitment to “tackle and settle, if possible, once and for all a number of 
vital and controversial issues among which are the question of educational 
imbalance and the quota system of admission.”51 Gowon noted, however, 
that a long-term sustainable approach to overcome the educational imbal-
ance was not through a quota system of admission into universities but 
through strengthening primary and secondary school education in the af-
fected states in the North. According to Gowon, if that approach were 
taken, the states would over time produce enough qualified candidates for 
university admissions and job opportunities.52
Equity was the key to national unity, and Gowon recognized this. 
Despite his disapproval of the quota system, he admitted that in the inter-
est of national unity a short-term solution was crucial. He affirmed that 
the “fears and anxieties of these relatively educationally backward areas 
are genuine and it would be irrational to dismiss those fears and anxieties 
as unfounded.”53 Gowon was from the North and was sympathetic to the 
plight of the educationally disadvantaged northern states. Yet, given that 
the South would perceive a quota system as discriminatory and that it 
would create national tension, Gowon was cautious. Still for the affected 
states, as Gowon noted, “unless they are able to provide enough graduates 
of their ethnic or state origin now, they will be denied what they regard 
as an equitable share of employment opportunities in the country.”54 As 
far as those states were concerned, “they are not unduly interested in the 
long-term solution; they want immediate solution and answers.”55 Because 
individual universities controlled admissions, Gowon could not effect 
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immediate changes but rather cautioned them “to do a lot more than they 
are doing at present to reflect the federal structure of this country in their 
student admission.” He also warned that if they fail “we have to accept 
that the quota system would be the only method that will provide some 
opportunities for the educationally backward areas to be represented in the 
universities.”56
The incidence of multiple admissions that plagued the university sys-
tem in Nigeria not only further dimmed admission prospects of northern-
ers but also undermined the federal government’s goal of mass university 
education. Since 1948 when UCI was established, there was no central 
admission body in the country. Individual universities admitted students. 
The absence of admission coordination into Nigerian universities resulted 
in multiple admissions with many unfilled spaces in universities. Multiple 
admissions occurred when students received admission offers from many 
universities and/or departments in a university. This situation, which began 
in the 1960s, occurred because individual universities independently oper-
ated different admission criteria, advertised separately, and conducted sep-
arate admission exercises. To increase their chances of admission, many 
candidates applied to many universities or to multiple departments within 
the same university. Top candidates frequently received multiple admission 
offers from many universities and/or departments, resulting in a multipli-
city of admissions. Ultimately, such candidates would accept one admission 
offer.
The ideal admission practice was that when candidates reject admission 
offers and inform the university early enough, the affected university would 
offer admissions to other equally qualified applicants who did not receive 
initial admission offers due to limited spaces. However, many candidates 
failed to inform the concerned institutions or did so too late. T.M. Yesufu, 
the vice-chancellor of the University of Benin, noted that “by the time the 
universities are aware that their original offers would not be honored it is 
too late to admit those who would otherwise have accepted and utilized the 
places available.”57 In fact, universities could only ascertain the total num-
ber of students who accepted admission after the matriculation exercise. At 
this point, it would be too late to admit new sets of qualified students. Even 
after matriculation, some students could still withdraw if they received late 
admission into faculties or universities of their choice. They would often 
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accept the first offer because they were unsure of gaining admission to their 
first choice of university or course.58 What deprived many qualified can-
didates of university admissions each year and prevented the universities 
from meeting their enrolment targets were incidences of multiple applica-
tions, multiple acceptances, uncertainty as to whether a candidate would 
accept admission offers, and uncertainty as to whether those who accepted 
admission offers would actually register.
The vice-chancellor of the University of Lagos, Ade Ajayi, drew atten-
tion to the incidence of multiple admissions when he highlighted the in-
ability of his university to meet its enrolment target. He revealed that the 
student enrolment targets for science, engineering, and environmental 
design in 1976 session were 130, 175, and 70, respectively. In the science, 
241 students were offered admission but 78 registered; in engineering, 
130 were offered admission but 54 registered; in environmental design, 
54 were offered admission but 44 registered.59 The deficit was not peculiar 
to the University of Lagos; it affected all the universities in the country. 
Altogether, the deficit at Ibadan, Nsukka, Zaria, Ife, Lagos, and Benin 
was 9.8 per cent in 1970–71; 11.2 per cent in 1971–72; 13.8 per cent in 
1972–73; 11.8 per cent in 1973–74; 8.0 per cent in 1974–75; and 6.9 per 
cent in 1975–76.60
Applicants from the South benefited and at the same time suffered 
from the incidence of multiple admissions. Because they were often the 
most qualified, they secured placement in many universities but at the same 
time obstructed others who were on the margin of admission. An analysis 
of the distribution of candidates admitted into two or more universities in 
the 1974/75 session revealed that, out of the 766 candidates offered two or 
more admissions, most (31%) came from the Western State, followed by 
the East-Central State(23.12%), and the Mid-Western State (16.71%), all 
in the South.61 Thus, southern candidates, who had maintained a lead in 
university population, accounted for more than 70 per cent of multiple ad-
missions. Any meaningful explanation of this, according to Aderinto, “will 
have to do with intense determination of the candidates from the southern 
states to obtain university education. To them, a university degree was an 
‘International meal ticket.’”62
To address the admissions problem, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
in 1974 set up a panel of two experts, comprised of L.R. Kay, Secretary, 
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Universities Central Council on Admissions of the United Kingdom, 
and W.H. Pettipiere of the Ontario Universities Applications Centre of 
Canada. The report submitted by the two experts on 31 May 1975 recom-
mended the setting up of a central admission board to coordinate admission 
to all Nigerian universities.63 However, the CVC did not implement this 
proposal. By asking the two experts to make recommendations “without 
prejudice to existing individual standards and traditions of the various uni-
versities,” it was apparent that the CVC preferred to preserve the universi-
ties’ power to admit their own students. Thus, according to B.A. Salim, 
when the experts recommended a central admission system, it “touched 
on a sore side [which universities] saw as a breach of that fundamental 
clause which sought to preserve the status quo (University Autonomy on 
Admissions).”64 In addition, since the study and the recommendation of 
the expatriate committee was a non-governmental affair, the federal gov-
ernment was not compelled to order the CVC or, more appropriately, the 
NUC, to implement the proposal.
The federal government was displeased with the admission practices 
of universities. As expressed in the Third NDP, it blamed the universi-
ties for adhering “too rigidly to restrictive admission policies which in the 
light of current realities are overdue for a drastic revision.”65 In a speech at 
the formal inauguration of the newly reconstituted NUC on 10 July 1975, 
Gowon reinstated the government’s intention to direct education admis-
sion to serve the mission of nation-building. According to him,
The Government is determined to boost the educational oppor-
tunities of every Nigerian. Education will be made to respond 
to the needs and the aspirations of the nation and its people. In 
the field of Higher Education in particular, the tremendous in-
crease in opportunities will have to be accompanied by a realis-
tic reappraisal of entry qualifications into our Universities so as 
to render these increased opportunities for University education 
accessible to a greater number of aspiring Nigerians.66
As it prepared to address the admission issue, Murtala Mohammed, a 
northerner, overthrew Gowon’s administration on 29 July 1975 in a mil-
itary coup. Mohammed accused Gowon’s administration of corruption 
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and indefinite postponement of earlier plans to hand over government to 
a civilian regime in 1976. To justify his intervention, Murtala blamed past 
leadership that “either by design or default, had become too insensitive to 
the true feelings and yearnings of the people.”67 In order to satisfy what 
he perceived as the true yearnings of Nigerians, Murtala immediately set 
1979 as the deadline to hand over control to a civilian government. In addi-
tion, he created seven states in February 1976, bringing the total number 
of states to nineteen.68 Murtala was convinced that the creation of more 
states in Nigeria would enhance the country’s future political stability. In 
a way, the politics of the state creation was analogous to the demand for 
more universities. Both were made often to maximize the opportunities of 
partaking in sharing the country’s wealth controlled by the federal govern-
ment. One way to guarantee this was for states to train their own high-level 
workforce at the university level. Since universities existed in twelve out 
of the nineteen states, the seven remaining states were bound to demand 
their own universities, for, as the Inter-University Council observed, “The 
cohesion of the Nigerian State depends on Lagos [the seat of power] listen-
ing to these voices.”69
As anticipated, Mohammed’s regime took up the admission issue that 
Gowon initiated. For instance, during the 1974/75 academic year, the 
northern states with more than 50 per cent of the country’s total popula-
tion, accounted for only 5,764 or just fewer than 22 per cent of the national 
total university residents of 26,448.70 This unequal access to university 
education made the northerners uncomfortable because university educa-
tion was perceived to confer greater benefits on the recipients and greater 
access to national resources or ‘cake’ by Nigerian ethnic groups. According 
to T.M. Yesufu, “A federal or confederal country, in which some sections 
feel inferior and dominated because of educational imbalances, tends to be 
inherently unstable. Equal educational opportunity tends to ensure equal 
employment opportunities.”71 The advantage of equal educational oppor-
tunity was that
it develops and diffuses unifying cultural and social traits, a 
sense of intellectual camaraderie and mutual complementar-
ity; it promotes identity of perspectives and interests with re-
gard to national issues; promotes mutual personal and group 
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understanding, a sense of equality and justice; and creates [a] 
bond of national unity.72
Once in power, Mohammed quickly set up the Committee on University 
Entrance (CUE), headed by M.S. Angulu in December 1975.73 He charged 
the committee to study the problems of admission and make recommenda-
tions on how to remove “all the bottlenecks limiting entry,” promote the 
“liberalization of admissions,” and to review the entry requirements of the 
various universities in order to ensure uniformity.74 This was the first time 
that the federal government had backed a reform of university admission 
since 1960. The terms of reference of the CUE reflected the urgency and 
seriousness of the problem of multiple admissions. Besides, it highlighted 
the federal government’s willingness to liberalize admissions for the sake of 
regional equality and mass access. Although Mohammed’s regime ended 
on 13 February 1976 when Lt. Col. B.S. Dimka assassinated him in an 
abortive coup, Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner who replaced him, prom-
ised to continue with his programs amid concerns from northerners.
Uncertain about the step the new southern head of state would take 
to close the educational gap between the North and the South, northern 
states increased their pressure on the federal government to take action in 
reforming the admission process. One of the most ardent lobbyists was 
Jubril Aminu, a northerner, who was the executive secretary of National 
Universities Commission and a member of the CUE. Aminu used his in-
fluential position to agitate vigorously for equal representation of all ethnic 
groups in the existing universities. In a fifty-three-page paper that he ad-
dressed to the federal government, Aminu lamented:
The four old states of East Central, Lagos, Midwest and West 
exercise an alarming monopoly of enrolment into the University 
system. These four states, with a combined population of about 
one third of the whole country, have for long had a dispropor-
tionate advantage in higher education. Even recently, in the 6 
old Universities the four states had 75.6 per cent, 71.4 per cent, 
72.9 per cent, 68.3 per cent and 69.4 per cent of the enrolments 
in the academic years 1970/71, 72/72, 72/73, 73/74, 74/75, 
respectively.75
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Southern states, as Aminu noted, also dominated student population in 
science courses. He showed that the four old states located in the South 
dominated 80 per cent of the enrolment in medicine and pharmacy, 77 per 
cent in engineering and technology, 75 per cent in pure science and agri-
culture and forestry, as well as 75 per cent in education, 60 per cent in law, 
and 56 per cent in public administration in the year 1974/75 session. Based 
on these statistics, Aminu declared that, in relation to their population, the 
northern states suffered most. He warned that the future of Nigeria rested 
in the hands of southern states “since they have enjoyed a long monopoly 
of highly skilled manpower development in all disciplines, and since the 
situation is not improving.”76 Aminu insisted that the criteria for univer-
sity admission “must only be uniformly applied if they are fair and just 
from first principles; namely, if all started the competition from the same 
line.”77 Even though Gowon established all the seven new universities in 
the educationally disadvantaged states, Aminu noted that “this action by 
itself would never solve the problem of imbalance without concomitant 
changes in the admission policies.”78
To increase the opportunities and the eligibility of the students from 
the underprivileged areas, Aminu suggested, among other things, that the 
federal government should introduce “the system of quota admission.” In 
addition, he insisted on “a sixty per cent quota admission for the twelve 
states, on population basis into the new universities; and fifty per cent 
quota admission for the twelve states, on population basis, into the existing 
universities.”79 Additionally, he requested that the government establish the 
urgently needed remedial centres in all the ten disadvantaged states of the 
former North, as well as Rivers and Cross Rivers states. While he urged 
the federal government to take responsibility for the entire financial burden 
of establishing these centres, he stressed that the centres should be under 
the complete control of the state governments, including the admission 
policies. The federal government, Aminu advised, should approve these 
proposals in order to lay a solid foundation “for unity and for contentment” 
among Nigerians by removing “all sources of strife – imminent or poten-
tial.”80 In carrying out this task, Aminu stated that the federal government 
“needs to offer no apologies, and the Committee on University Entrance 
needs to have no hesitations in recommending.”81
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Aminu was an influential advocate of admission reform. In 1976, fol-
lowing some of the recommendations contained his letter, the federal gov-
ernment announced the establishment of schools of Basic Studies in each 
of the ten states in the North (with the exception of Kwara), and the two 
states in the South considered educationally disadvantaged. The federal 
government financed each school, but states controlled them, including 
the admission policy. Each school, affiliated to the six older universities, 
was to prepare its students for admission to the universities. Although the 
federal government did not approve a quota system, it directed each of the 
six older universities to guarantee admission to the successful graduates 
of each school of Basic Studies affiliated with it. By implication, candi-
dates from the remaining states would be considered on merit for whatever 
vacancies might exist thereafter. The federal government further directed 
each of the seven new universities to establish a remedial course within 
its system for students from the same disadvantaged states who might be 
deficient in some of the general or special university entry requirements. It 
insisted that students admitted to such courses would matriculate into the 
university straight away and any vacancies left after admission should go to 
candidates from the remaining states.82
Presumably influenced by Aminu’s campaign, the head of state, 
Obasanjo, summoned a special meeting with the Committee of Vice 
Chancellors and officials of the NUC on 18 September 1976.83 At the 
meeting, the head of state addressed, among others, the issues of admis-
sion into Nigerian universities, especially as it affected candidates from the 
educationally disadvantaged areas of the country and low enrolments in 
science disciplines.84 Obasanjo bluntly blamed Nigerian universities for 
maintaining aristocratic seclusion and remoteness from the society they 
were meant to serve, a fact he considered “a big constraint in the expansion 
programme of all our universities because all other universities tended to 
follow the example of the University of Ibadan.”85 He cautioned that, since 
the federal government had committed large sums of money to the univer-
sities, it expected them to “reflect the true Nigerian character both in their 
intake, the content of the courses offered, and their physical environment.”86
Comments such as these fuelled the fear that the federal government 
desired to impose a quota system in university admission. The federal com-
missioner for education denied it. As he stressed, instead of introducing a 
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quota system, it was the desire of the federal government to see “a more 
pragmatic formula for admission into our universities that will reflect the 
federal nature of this country and that will redress the chronic imbalance 
without necessarily reducing standards. I must say categorically that no 
quota system is envisaged.”87 The commissioner also pointed out that the 
government had established schools of basic studies to remedy the imbal-
ance in the availability of qualified students for admissions. Apparently, 
the commissioner was diplomatic in his appraisal of the situation. It was, in 
a sense, unlikely for the universities to produce a “more pragmatic formula” 
to admit students without fundamentally changing the prevailing admis-
sion system based on merit. Yet, because southerners who had resisted 
quota policy controlled administrative positions in most universities, and 
because individual universities controlled admission, they were prepared 
to sabotage the implementation of a quota system. Aminu recognized this 
factor when he stated that “Senates [responsible for admission] are very 
conservative bodies which jealously guard what they call university auton-
omy and academic freedom. But neither of these can over-ride national 
unity and harmony.”88 Tactically, the government favoured the setting up 
of a central examination body as a prelude to the eventual imposition of a 
quota system. Under this arrangement, the power of universities to admit 
would be constrained by the new body controlled by the federal govern-
ment. Concerned that the establishment of a central admission body would 
strip them of their power to select their students, the CVC requested the 
government to give them the opportunity to comment on the awaited re-
port of the University Entrance Committee before approving it.89
While awaiting the report on admission reform, Obasanjo’s adminis-
tration announced some radical university education policies that aimed at 
not only closing the educational gap between the North and the South but 
also facilitating mass university education. In his speech at the convocation 
ceremony of the University of Ibadan on 17 November 1976, Gowon an-
nounced his government’s decision to make university education, includ-
ing technical secondary school and post-secondary school, tuition-free and 
boarding-free; subsiding students’ cost of food by 50 per cent. Obasanjo had 
launched the Universal Primary Education Scheme (UPE) on 2 September 
1976, which made primary education free and compulsory in the country. 
Extending free education to post-primary and post-secondary education 
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was revolutionary and unprecedented. With the increase in the number of 
universities as well as free tuition, Obasanjo believed that
more Nigerians will continue to have the benefit of higher edu-
cation until a stage was reached where no section of this country 
would find itself on the defensive in the quest for and attain-
ment of knowledge.90
Following the recommendation of the Committee on University Entrance 
(CUE), which submitted its report in 1977, the federal government moved 
swiftly to establish a central admission body.91 Since the deliberations of 
the CUE were spiced with a lot of rancour caused by the contentious issue 
of using a quota system, the committee avoided making a recommendation 
on that subject. Instead, it recommended the introduction of remedial 
programs for the educationally less-developed states. In February 1977, the 
commissioner of education summoned a meeting of the CVC and NUC 
during which he announced the setting up of a single body to embrace the 
functions of the two bodies that CUE had proposed. It was named the 
Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), and Professor O.O. 
Akinkugbe and M.S. Angulu were appointed chairperson and registrar of 
the board, respectively.92
With the creation of JAMB, admission to the universities became 
centralized and nationalized. Henceforth, students were to gain admis-
sion through either the University Matriculation Examination (UME) or 
Direct Entry. UME was open to those who possessed a School Certificate/
WASC with five credits obtained at not more than two sittings, includ-
ing English language for arts subject students and mathematics for science 
subject students. It was also open to teachers with grade II certificates with 
a minimum of five credits, and candidates who did not possess these re-
quirements but had registered for the November/December 1977 GCE ‘O’ 
Level or June 1978 SC/GCE. Such candidates, who would have to await 
the outcome of their performance on these exams, would be eligible for 
university admission if they ultimately fulfilled the conditions stated above. 
For direct entry admission, candidates were expected to possess a General 
Certificate of Education (GCE) ‘A’ Level in at least two subjects relevant 
to the intended course of study; National Certificate of Education (NCE) 
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for courses in education; International Baccalaureate; and the Interim Joint 
Matriculation (IJMB) conducted by Ahmadu Bello University.93
JAMB was founded to ease access to university education, but soon it 
became a source of tension between the North and the South. Empowered 
by Decree No. 2 of 1978 to “control of the conduct of matriculation exam-
inations for admissions into all Universities in Nigeria [and determine] ma-
triculation requirements and conducting examinations,”  JAMB conducted 
its first UME in 1978.94 Although the heads of each university were mem-
bers of the board, they resisted it. The CVC at the special meeting with 
the head of state in September 1976 had requested to have the opportunity 
to make an input on the recommendations of the CUE before govern-
ment’s approval. On the contrary, the federal government went ahead to 
announce the establishment of JAMB in 1977. Feeling slighted, and given 
that the CVC had rejected the recommendations for a central admission 
body in 1974 by two experts, the university vice-chancellors, dominated 
by southerners, opposed JAMB. “To the universities,” according to Salim, 
“the Board was government’s tool for reduction of the universities auton-
omy and bringing in the quota system through the back door.”95
Opposition to JAMB intensified when it released the first UME re-
sults in April 1978. In the conduct of its first exams, JAMB recorded many 
administrative difficulties. The UME was conducted in one day, and many 
candidates missed the exam due to poor organization and communica-
tion. Under the caption “Thousands did not sit for JAMB,” the Nigerian 
Tribune noted that a good number of candidates missed the examinations 
because of the late arrival of the examinations papers, noting that most of 
the centres marked for the examinations were non-existent.96 As it was a 
yearly exam, candidates who missed or failed the exam would have to wait 
for one year before retaking it. These administrative lapses rendered the 
exam ‘chaotic,’ as the first JAMB Registrar, Angulu, later admitted, and 
prevented many students from gaining admissions in the 1978/79 session.97 
This raised questions about the ability of the new board to handle entrance 
exams successfully. The New Nigerian editorials consistently called for a 
review of the JAMB decree to transform it into a clearinghouse to avoid 
multiple admissions.98 Blaming the problem on the haste with which the 
board was established, Adeyemo Aderinto argued: “If there is any lesson to 
be learnt from the JAMB episode, it is the fact that setting up ill-prepared, 
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ill-designed super-structures, however well intentioned, would not achieve 
the perceived objectives.”99
Worse still was the fact that the educationally disadvantaged states 
realized to their dismay that the board did not make much difference to 
their admission prospects. Of the 113,162 candidates who applied for ad-
mission in the 1978/79 session, fewer than 20,000 candidates came from 
the ten northern states.100 In spite of the population of the North, this 
number was small when compared with the total number of applications 
received. While only 2,776 students from the North gained admission, 
11,641 students from the South were successful.101 The affected states 
blamed the board for admitting fewer students from their region. But ac-
cording to JAMB registrar, the operation of JAMB in its first year did not 
affect the “disadvantaged states more adversely than in the past as has been 
alleged.” In fact, he showed that the number of candidates who gained 
admission during this period was an improvement from the past.102
The JAMB-generated tension continued to affect ethnic relations. 
Students in the northern universities who had hoped to secure automatic 
admissions to universities after their preliminary studies were disappointed 
because universities followed JAMB guidelines (merit) in offering admis-
sion. An admission crisis in the University of Jos highlights this issue. In 
the university, Professor G.O. Onuaguluchi, a southerner and the vice-
chancellor of the university failed to carry out the decision of the university 
council that required him to admit students from the educationally dis-
advantaged states who satisfy minimum requirement and fill the remaining 
vacancies on merit.103 A commission of enquiry on the 1977/78 admissions 
exercise condemned the admission committee for using a higher pass mark 
in JAMB to eliminate candidates from the disadvantaged states. Although 
the federal government meant well when it initiated this discriminatory 
policy in 1976, it lost sight of the legitimate claims and aspirations of stu-
dents from other states.104
Disappointed with JAMB, students from the North blamed southern-
ers, embarked on violent protest, and demanded the abolition of the board 
in February 1979. This resulted in the closure of all the universities in the 
North. As reported by West Africa, the JAMB debate divided Nigerian 
students along ethnic lines, with southerners favouring JAMB and north-
erners determined to wipe it out. According to the paper, the southern 
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press soon attacked “the demonstrating students, and [supported] the prin-
ciple that university admissions be based only on exam-proven academic 
achievement (which they still dub ‘merit’) – a principle that will obviously 
favor the better resourced South.”105 The controversy that marked JAMB’s 
first exam threatened to undermine the nation-building agenda for which 
the body was established.
Recession of 1978
The federal government had attempted to address the issues affecting the 
expansion of university education by establishing more institutions, spread-
ing the institutions evenly in the country, providing free university educa-
tion, and establishing a central admission body. With the drastic decline 
in oil revenue in 1978, the government could not fulfill its liberal educa-
tion policies. Since oil revenue accounted for over 93 per cent of Nigeria’s 
revenue and over 95 per cent of its foreign exchange, the decline affected 
the country’s GDP, which declined by 5.7 per cent.106 In his 1978 budget 
speech, Obasanjo noted that “although petroleum remained the great-
est contributor to the economy, its share in the national income declined 
slightly. [Therefore] … the 1977/78 Budget had to be a strict one both in 
terms of government having to cut down its programmes and also in terms 
of sacrifices which were being demanded from all Nigerians.”107
While the oil boom had fuelled university expansion policies, the 1977 
decline in oil revenue led to policy reversal. Consequently, the federal gov-
ernment introduced austerity measures while it borrowed Nigeria’s first 
huge loan of US$1 billion from the international capital market.108 The 
impact of the government’s belt-tightening measures on financing social 
services, including the universities, was immediate; government reduced 
subventions to universities and reintroduced some fees to enable universi-
ties to generate revenue. It revised hostel accommodation charges upwards 
at N90.00 per session of thirty-six weeks or N30.00 in a session of three 
terms and the feeding fees upwards from 50 Kobo per day to N1.50 per 
student per day (for three meals).109 Although the federal government intro-
duced these fees in order to ease its financial burden in funding university 
education, it was not clear that student fees were really the problem. A 
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Daily Times editorial noted that fee changes did not address the root of the 
universities’ financial problems, stating that it “did not amount to a clear, 
consistent, and coherent policy statement on the financing of higher educa-
tion.”110 It further cautioned that, instead of assuming the responsibility of 
student housing and accommodation, which saddled the government and 
university authorities with avoidable non-academic problems, they
ought to put some bite into their off-campus policy, so that they 
become non-residential in the shortest time possible. They need 
to achieve that objective in order to be able to address them-
selves to the more important question of how to offer university 
education to a maximum number of students.111
The unintended consequence of proliferation of universities in the 1970s 
was that these universities constituted a heavy burden on the government’s 
dwindling resources. According to Eniola Adeyeye, the existing thirteen 
universities involved separate and financially demanding administrative 
structures and personnel. He wondered why the federal government had 
not established fewer universities “with expanded facilities including scat-
tered colleges all over the country such that a single university, like the 
University of Cairo could graduate annually tens of thousands of much 
needed graduates to man key posts in all the sectors of the economy.”112 
Conversely, Jubril Aminu, the executive secretary of the NUC, defended 
the government’s position on expansion. For him, “those who criticize 
the establishment of more universities will do well to find out the views 
of the large, usually silent, majority in the country. If the people want 
more universities, they are entitled to more universities and they deserve 
what they get.”113 This thinking is deficient in long-term strategic think-
ing and reflected, quite disappointingly, the mindset of those who advised 
the government on university expansion. Even with the establishment of 
thirteen universities, the total number of students they absorbed remained 
very low. For instance, in 1977, out of more than 90,000 applicants, only 
47,499 secured admissions. Universities, accustomed to receiving massive 
grants from the federal government, responded to the economic downturn 
by devising cost-saving measures to survive. For instance, the university 
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authority at UNN stopped the feeding of students during the 1977/1978 
session and introduced a policy of “Pay-As-You-Eat.”114 
The NUC even intervened by setting up the Committee on University 
Finances (CUF) in 1977 to propose restructuring measures for the uni-
versities.115 The terms of reference of the CUF recognized the country’s 
current economic meltdown and the need for the universities to make 
adjustments.The CUF’s report, submitted in May 1978, showed, among 
other things, that the rate of growth in student population and the expan-
sion in academic activities out-stripped the rate of development of teaching 
facilities. It addition, it noted the prevalence of overcrowding in student 
hostels due to inadequate living accommodations for students; inadequate 
staff housing forcing the universities to spend too much money on rented 
accommodation; and inadequate meal subsidies provided for students.116 
In a way, these problems affected student enrolment as well as the quality 
of education obtained in these universities.117 While the committee urged 
the government to raise the amount of grants to universities, it also warned 
university administrators not to embark on new capital projects without 
prior approval from the NUC, cautioning them to build a simpler structure 
“with greater emphasis on maximum utility at minimum cost.”118 However, 
the government did not increase subventions to the university, and the 
hopes of expanding access to universities seemed truncated.
Obasanjo’s abolition of tuition fees and reduction in boarding and 
lodging charges in 1977 led to sharp increases in student enrolment from 
40,552 in 1976 to 47,499 in 1977, and increases in government’s financial 
commitments to the universities. However, it also led to a huge drop in 
local revenue in fees generated by the universities from N10.4 million to 
N4.7million.119 Faced with a decline in oil revenue, financial grants to the 
universities declined, and the deficit in NUC recommendations and actual 
grants to universities in 1977/78 session was over N24 million.120 As a re-
sult the “physical facilities [were not] developed at a sufficiently rapid rate 
to meet the demands for university places.”121 Due to inadequate accom-
modations, congestion and squalor worsened in Nigerian universities with 
the accompanying social problems.
Unable to provide adequate funds for universities and aggravated by 
the poor living conditions of university students, the Obasanjo govern-
ment attempted to reintroduce tuition fees and hike boarding and lodging 
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fees. These policies were unpopular, forcing universities to emerge “as 
centers of vigorous protest and often violent confrontation against the 
authorities.”122 In May 1978, the National Union of Nigerian Students 
(NUNS) embarked on a violent, massive protest. The federal government 
immediately closed down all the universities, banned NUNS, and expelled 
its president, Segun Okeowo, together with other student leaders.123 Two 
vice-chancellors of the most affected universities, Professor Iya Abubakar 
of ABU and Professor J.F. Ade Ajayi of the University of Lagos, were 
relieved of their positions. The stage was now set for a showdown between 
the military and university intelligentsias. More notably, the Nigerian 
Association of University Teachers (NAUT), a hitherto conservative asso-
ciation that emerged in 1965, metamorphosed into a formidable opposition 
group, renamed Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in 1978. 
Henceforth, ASUU assumed a leadership position in the struggle against 
Obasanjo’s harsh social policies and those of future regimes.124 ASUU ap-
pearance seemed timely because it was
the period of the beginning of the decline in the oil boom, 
when the country faced the consequences of the failure by its 
rulers to use the oil wealth to generate production and a social 
welfare system. Military dictatorship had eroded deeply the 
basic freedoms in the society. Academic freedom and university 
autonomy were casualties of military dictatorship. The funding 
of education, and so of universities, became poorer. The factors 
required a changed orientation of the union of academics, from 
1980.125
Conclusion
The military administrations of Gowon, Mohammed, and Obasanjo 
adopted a federal system of higher education in the 1970s primarily due to 
the centralized organization of the military, the strong financial strength 
of the federal government, and the need for forge national unity and de-
velopment. Using education to foster a united nation was tricky in Nigeria, 
as it was in other pluralistic African societies. Remi Clignet’s study of 
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educational development in postcolonial Cameroons, Ghana, and the Ivory 
Coast shows that although education acted as an important agent of social 
change it did not eradicate traditional ethnic tensions.126 Studies on Nigeria 
have shown that education could exacerbate existing tensions by producing 
disproportionate rewards among groups.127 In a sense, such an experiment 
was “a two-edged sword cutting either for or against national integration.”128 
For Nigeria, the goal of nation-building through federal university control 
and management seemed unsustainable, as mounting criticism continued. 
This is because, according to Nwuzor, the federal government policy was 
an “ad hoc measure necessitated by circumstances and military action.”129
Federal agencies such as JAMB and NUC naturally came under attack 
from the universities, not only as symbols of federal government ineffi-
ciency, but also as agents of discrimination and suppression. NUC was 
perceived as a body that arrogated authority over universities.130 In fact, in 
the wake of the Mohammed Commission following university students’ 
unrest in May 1978, a number of university officials assaulted NUC staff 
for encroaching on their autonomy. Despite the unprecedented expansion 
of access to university education in the 1970s, the goal of nation-building 
and economic development remained farfetched, as policies were often 
viewed from ethnic/regional lenses. According to Nwuzor,
It is obvious that uniformity, even for balanced development 
and nation unity, is a very difficult problem in a pluralistic soci-
ety like Nigeria. Such a policy carries the possibility, as already 
the case in Nigeria, of being interpreted by some as ‘leveling 
down’ where the declared intension is to ‘level up.’ Public mon-
opoly of management and control of education without the 
means to meet demand and a policy of equality for all is another 
contradiction.131
While the goal of uniting Nigeria’s pluralistic societies in a collective con-
science proved elusive, remarkable achievements were recorded in univer-
sity expansion. While the number of universities grew from six in 1970 to 
thirteen in 1979, enrolment surged from 14,468 in the 1970/71 session to 
57,742 in the 1979/80 session.132 Nonetheless, given Nigeria’s population, 
estimated at 68 million in 1979, this number was statistically insignificant. 
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Its significance, however, lay in the fact that while enrolment grew from 
1,360 in 1960 to 9,695 in 1969, it jumped to 57,742 in 1979. 
Another major turning point in the country’s educational development 
was in 1979 when Obasanjo handed over power to a democratically elected 
government. The new constitution that came into force removed legislation 
on higher education from the exclusive legislative list and placed it on the 
concurrent list. Accordingly, both the federal government and the nine-
teen states now had equal powers to control higher education. The federal 
government’s monopoly on university education ended. This significant 
shift in the country’s educational experiment had great consequence for 
the third push for mass university education policies, 1979–83.

135
The Second Republic and the  
Burden of Expansion, 1979–83:  
Free Education, Science and 
Technology, and the Quota System
Introduction
The 1979 constitution ushered in a new civilian administration called 
the Second Republic. The constitution introduced a United States-style 
presidential system to replace of the parliamentary system adopted dur-
ing the First Republic (1960–66). It also ended the exclusive federal con-
trol of university education since 1970. Both federal and state assemblies 
were now empowered by the constitution to make laws “with respect to 
the establishment of an institution for purposes of university, professional 
or technological education.”1 To facilitate nation-building, the constitution 
enshrined the principle of federal character based on a quota system in the 
federal civil service appointments, a system that was later introduced in uni-
versity admission.2 The intention was to prevent domination by one or more 
states, ethnic groups, or sections at the federal level. Chapter 2, Section 3 
of the 1979 constitution adopted quota system (affirmative action) in em-
ployment as a principle of state policy. It declared that the composition of 
the government of the federation and its agencies and operations would 
5
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be carried out in a manner as to “reflect the federal character of Nigeria 
and the need to promote national unity.”3 The overall strategy was to use 
the system “to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall 
be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or 
other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.”4 Most 
significantly, the constitution enshrined the doctrine of free education as 
state policy by undertaking to provide, among other things, free university 
education “as and when practicable.”5
Inspired by the constitutional changes and emboldened by the in-
creased oil revenue of 1979, politicians made free education and education-
al expansion a crucial point in their campaigns. The five political parties 
that were registered when the Obasanjo’s military government lifted the 
ban on political activities in 1978 prioritized education.6 Even though the 
political parties were divided along regional and ethnic lines, they shared 
a similar commitment to free education. The UPN, led by Awolowo, pro-
posed free education at all levels. It promised to cancel all loans granted 
to students, abolish all lodging fees for student hostels, and increase the 
national subsidy for student feeding.7 Similarly, the NPN, under Makaman 
Bida, pledged to eradicate illiteracy throughout Nigeria and promote the 
learning of science, culture, and qualitative education. Waziri Ibrahim’s 
GNPP vowed to work towards free and high quality education at all levels. 
The NPP under Nnamdi Azikiwe made similar declarations on educa-
tion.8 However, none of the parties articulated strategies for financing their 
ambitious and expensive educational promises. They trusted in the ‘endless 
flow’ of oil revenue.
On 1 October 1979, Shagari and the nineteen state governors assumed 
the positions of first executive president of Nigeria and executive governors 
respectively, marking a new beginning for Nigeria after thirteen years of 
military dictatorship. Given his party’s emphasis on free and high quality 
education as well as the country’s desire for social change, Shagari used 
his first nation-wide broadcast to make a commitment to educational ex-
pansion and economic development. Shagari declared that Nigeria needed 
“more schools, more playing-fields and numerous other supplies and equip-
ment, all of which are involved with the increase in enrolment.”9 He noted, 
however, that the main problem was “how to make education accessible 
to all, given the … inadequacy of teachers and educational facilities.”10 Of 
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course, much money was required to conduct Shagari’s educational agenda. 
Oil revenue had been unstable since 1975, but, by 1979, the Gulf War 
between Iran and Iraq led to an increase in Nigeria’s revenue. This increase 
gave Shagari’s administration the confidence to pursue its ambitious cam-
paign promises, the most prominent of which included educational expan-
sion and free education.
In keeping with the country’s vision of economic development and 
nation-building, Shagari’s administration established seven universities of 
science and technology, introduced affirmative action policy, initiated the 
National Open University scheme, and involved the states in educational 
expansion. This chapter shows that the early 1980s were marked by an 
accelerated push for mass university education. It argues that central to 
understanding university education policies in the mid-1980s are the un-
certainties of the country’s oil revenue, the unrealistic and unsustainable 
expectations of the masses for free and equal access to higher education, the 
recklessness with which educational expansion was pursued, and the sud-
den economic downturn due partly to corruption of governmental officials.
National Open University and Universities of 
Technology
Since 1960, enrolment in Nigerian universities had been hampered by a 
combination of factors, including limited facilities to accommodate demand 
and exclusion of mature students, homemakers, and the handicapped. 
Following his promise of mass education, President Shagari introduced a 
bill on National Open University (NOU). The government intended NOU 
to address these problems. The concept of NOU was, unmistakably, at the 
centre of massification of university education. It derived from the object-
ives of making higher education accessible to those denied the opportunity 
at earlier stages of their lives. The objectives of the NOU, as envisioned by 
the federal government, were to provide programs, which would be flexible 
and responsive to changing circumstances. Such a university would
run at the degree and post-graduate levels as well as for diploma, 
certificate, enrichment and refresher courses to meet the needs 
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of university students who will include working adults willing 
to combine work with learning, housewives, handicapped per-
sons, and also young men and women who must have minimum 
qualifications for admissions as determined by the Senate of the 
University.11
On 1 May 1980, Shagari set up a Presidential Planning Committee on 
NOU and appointed Professor G.J. Afolabi Ojo to head it. The committee 
had the task of coming up with proposals on the nature of the university in 
the “context of Nigerian higher education, the administrative and academic 
structure of the University, the technical support services, staff establish-
ments, relationships with other universities and related bodies within and 
outside the country, and also relationships with the mass media.”12 In its 
report, the committee suggested that the teaching methodology would be 
a combination of correspondence materials, radio and television, sound 
and videotapes suitable for use in transistorized equipment, face-to-face 
teaching at local study centres, and written assignments.13 This approach 
was intended to reach a much wider audience than the existing traditional 
universities. However, given the unreliable and poor state of Nigeria’s com-
munication infrastructures, the provision of university education through 
this medium, particularly when the services were outside the control of the 
university, was challenging. Ojo hoped that in view of the wide range of 
teaching techniques to be used by the university, plans would be made to 
ensure that the university’s dependence on some technical support services 
was “reasonable, feasible and reliable. Such essential technical support ser-
vices include printing, radio, television, post and telegraphs, and computer 
facilities.”14
Similarly, the unavailability of modern communication equipment in 
many rural areas was another problem that would affect the coverage of 
NOU. The vast majority of Nigerians, especially in rural areas, lacked easy 
access to radios and television sets. The Planning Committee stressed that 
finding a way to reach those Nigerians was necessary for the success of 
NOU. The committee therefore recommended that “such media resources 
should be provided at local study centers where they can be operated with 
the assistance of technicians and where generators can be used to supply 
power if and when the supply from the National Electric Power Authority 
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is unavailable.”15 The absence of communication infrastructures and steady 
power supply in most of the rural areas and their unreliability in the urban 
areas presented serious challenges to the NOU project. One way of over-
coming these challenges, which would have been within the powers of 
NOU, was through the postal system. To deal with the slow or non-deliv-
ery of letters and parcels to students of the NOU, the Planning Committee 
suggested that the NOU should rely on an independent courier system to 
be managed by the university itself, which would relay learning materials 
to students. However, this strategy would have inevitably increased the 
cost of study at the NOU, making it inaccessible to many people. Given 
these uncertainties, it was not surprising that the Senate turned down the 
Open University Bill at the second reading on 16 September 1981, even 
though the House of Representatives had passed it on 16 July 1981.
Although the Senate had vetoed the National Open University Bill, 
Nigerians continued to mount pressure on the senators to pass it. For in-
stance, a Daily Times editorial of 13 December 1982, strongly called on 
the Senate to pass the Open University Bill to help thousands of young 
Nigerians who desired opportunities for university education. The paper 
declared that “Senators as elected representatives of the people cannot af-
ford to kill a bill which will be beneficial to thousands of the electorate.”16 
Although the senate eventually passed the bill, the university did not be-
come operational because in 1984 the new military government suspended 
it, citing lack of adequate facilities as their major reason.
The infrastructural problems that raised doubts over the wisdom of 
establishing a NOU highlighted the poor state of science and technology 
in the country even after years the government pronounced commitment 
on the subject. Because of the critical role of science and technology in the 
smooth functioning of the proposed NOU as well as facilitating economic 
development, Shagari administration moved quickly to pursue his plans 
to establish seven universities of technology. These universities, he stated, 
would be located in states without universities. The thirteen existing uni-
versities operated in twelve out of the nineteen states, so the federal gov-
ernment proposed to situate the new universities in the seven states without 
university facilities, i.e., Bauchi, Gongola, Niger, Imo, Ogun, Benue, and 
Ondo.17 The idea of locating the proposed universities of technology in 
these states was designed to foster national unity through fair geographical 
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spread of university amenities. It was also meant to help champion the 
drive to scientific and technological advancement of Nigeria’s economy. 
The vice president, Alex Ekwueme, stated that this decision, “while pla-
cing prime focus on the development of technologies for the country, will 
also ensure proper distribution of university institutions and location of a 
federally operated university in each geo-political state of the country.”18
The government’s determination to privilege science and technology 
was based on the need to train relevant personnel to execute the techno-
logically oriented programs it had embarked upon. Of high priority were 
projects such as the modernization of agricultural development (dubbed the 
Green Revolution), steel development, petro-chemical technology, urban 
and rural electrification, and the development of a new federal capital in 
Abuja. The workforce required to execute the programs were as follows: 
engineers, construction and allied trades, 36,820; agriculturalists, scien-
tists, engineers and veterinary surgeons, 12,790; medical and paramedical 
personnel, 82,366; accountants, 58,185; and legal practitioners, 5,185.19 To 
meet the technological human resource needs of the country, the govern-
ment strongly believed that more specialized universities were needed.
The previous military administrations had made a series of pronounce-
ments supporting science and technology without backing them with rel-
evant policies. Shagari wanted to be different. Following the advice of the 
acting executive secretary of NUC, Abel Guobadia, the federal govern-
ment decided to phase the founding of seven universities within a four-year 
period. The first phase was between 1980 and 1981, when it would set up 
universities of technology in Bauchi, Benue, and Imo states. While uni-
versities in Gongola and Ondo states were planned to emerge during the 
second phase, 1981/82, the remaining universities would be established in 
Niger and Ogun states during the third phase, 1982/83.20 To facilitate the 
immediate opening of these universities, the federal government not only 
appointed vice-chancellors for the first-phase universities but also requested 
the NUC to organize a national conference of experts.21 Held in December 
1980, the conference focused on how to realize the government’s vision of 
producing highly skilled workers in science and technology. In his opening 
address at the seminar, the vice president noted that the proposed universi-
ties were not just “an expansion of university opportunity: they were dif-
ferent from the traditional universities which we [Nigeria] inherited from 
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our colonial past.”22 Echoing the long-standing government commitment 
to decolonize higher education by moving away from dependency to real 
independence, he asked: “How much can … [Nigeria] afford to depend on 
the importation of technological goods and expatriate personnel for our 
building and construction, transportation and communication and other 
services?”23 The vice president implied that the new universities of technol-
ogy would answer that question and besides provide “leadership to indus-
trial and technological development in the country.”24
The report issued at the end of the seminar emphasized the need for the 
proposed universities to offer academic and professional programs leading 
to the award of diplomas, first degrees, postgraduate and higher degrees in 
planning, adaptive, technical, maintenance, developmental and productive 
skills in the engineering, scientific, agricultural, medical, and allied pro-
fessional disciplines.25 In addition, the report favoured the introduction of 
the following major academic programs: Management Sciences, Science 
Education, Environmental Science and Fine Arts, Earth, Mineral and 
Natural Sciences, Agriculture and Agricultural Technology, Engineering 
and Engineering Technology, Health Sciences and Technology, Pure and 
Applied Sciences, including Biotechnology. The report also recommended 
the maintenance of admission through JAMB and the retention of entry 
qualifications as obtainable in the existing universities. However, given the 
specialized and demanding nature of courses in the universities and the 
importance government attached to quality, the report stipulated that can-
didates with ‘O’ Level certificates should spend five years instead of four 
while those with ‘A’ Level certificates should spend four.
Unfortunately, the report failed to address adequately the more critical 
issue of how to fund and improve science education at the secondary school 
level in order to ensure a steady supply of students for the proposed special-
ized universities. This problem had been largely responsible for low enrol-
ment in science subjects since the 1960s. The seminar report merely noted 
that since there were many potential students who would be interested in 
these universities “if adequate facilities are made available, each university 
should aim at initial intake of about 250 students and thereafter increase as 
facilities permit.”26 The huge cost of establishing seven new universities of 
technology aimed at admitting only 250 students seemed odd, especially 
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when the faculties of applied science and technology in the regular univer-
sities remained underfunded.
Given the underfunding of the existing universities since 1978 and 
the uncertainties of oil revenue, the quality of training expected at the 
proposed universities caused some considerable concern to stakeholders. 
The concern was that these universities would end up producing amateur 
scientists. Professor G.O. Olusanya, the director of studies at the National 
Institute of Strategic Studies, Kuru, articulated this when he praised the 
government for emphasizing science and technology but warned against 
establishing universities of technology for political popularity. According 
to him,
what we need today are men who can match theory competently 
with practice and a great deal of money would to be expended 
to achieve this. It must be remembered that the constant and 
genuine complaints about the products of our Engineering and 
other professional faculties and schools is that most of their 
product are mere textbook engineers and professionals. Unless 
these problems are clearly articulated and properly resolved, all 
we shall be doing is engaging in wishful thinking.27
Responding to increased doubt over its commitment to provide adequate 
funds for science education and educational expansion, the federal govern-
ment reaffirmed its commitment in a budget speech delivered by Shagari at 
the joint session of the National Assembly on 24 November 1980. In that 
speech the president expressed the hope that the improved revenue from oil 
sales would help his government meet its obligations to the education sec-
tor. According to him, “The prospects for the economy in 1981 are good. 
The 1980 success will, I believe, constitute a launching pad for further 
achievement.”28 Based on the mistaken hopes of steady revenue from oil, 
and in order to meet its long-term objective of human resource develop-
ment, the federal government launched the Fourth National Development 
Plan (Fourth NDP) in 1981. The plan, which covered the period between 
1981 and 1985, had a program of N82 billion, the largest since plan-
ning began in 1960. It also projected student enrolment of over 103,000 
in the federal universities by the 1984/85 session.29 In addition, the plan 
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envisaged a capital expenditure of N2.2 billion on education, representing 
about 5.5 per cent of projected total federal government capital investment 
during the period. The planned expenditure for universities was N1.25 bil-
lion, representing 56.6 per cent of the total investment in the sector. This 
allocation disproportionately favoured universities, but the plan observed 
that unlike other levels of education, the development in the universities 
was constrained due to budgetary stringencies since the third plan period. 
It stressed that this situation “did not augur well for the growth of the 
universities especially in areas concerned with academic programmes and 
research. Moreover, the level of demand for university places has increased 
beyond proportions.”30
The large financial allocation to university education under the Fourth 
NDP sought to consolidate and expand the existing university facilities.31 
However, the plan had hardly taken off before the parameters on which the 
federal government based its revenue expectations changed dramatically 
following the collapse of the international oil market, beginning in 1981.32 
Although the plan operated amidst a grave threat to the economy, the fed-
eral government still maintained its commitment to university education. 
Eager to keep campaign promises and retain his popularity, the Shagari 
government went ahead to establish three new universities of technology 
in Bauchi, Benue, and Imo states in October 1981 (and four others later) 
largely through external borrowing.
Quota System and the Challenges of Nationhood
In line with the federal principle enunciated in the 1979 constitution and 
eager to close the educational gap between the North and the South, 
Shagari reopened the contentious quota system in university admissions. In 
spite of introducing of free education, the enrolment of students from the 
educationally disadvantaged regions remained low. Admission statistics for 
1980 revealed that, out of 17,729 students offered admission, only 4,068 
were from the North. To achieve the objective of ensuring geographical 
balance among the various geopolitical components, the federal ministry 
of education issued guidelines on the implementation of a quota system 
for university admission to JAMB in September 1981.33 The quota system, 
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like affirmative action in the United States of America, aimed at ‘democ-
ratizing’ access to university by easing admission competition for under-
represented groups in Nigerian universities.
The new admission guidelines, which would be implemented by the 
Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (a central admission body created 
in 1978), stipulated four criteria for securing admissions. First, it reserved 
40 per cent of yearly admissions for Academic Merit. Universities would 
determine this criterion by ranking candidates based on their scores in the 
University Matriculation Examinations (UME). In other words, 40 per 
cent of the entire applicants in a year who scored highest were selected for 
various courses. The second criteria, Educationally Disadvantaged States, 
reserved 20 per cent of yearly admission for candidates from states such 
as Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Gongola, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, 
Niger, Plateau, Rivers, and Sokoto.34 Twenty per cent of students from 
those states who scored a minimal average pass mark prescribed by the 
JAMB would secure admission.
The third criterion, called Catchment Area, reserved 30 per cent of ad-
mission for students from the immediate vicinity of an educational facility, 
which, in most cases, were the geographical or socio-cultural areas near to 
the institution. As with the second criterion, 30 per cent of students from a 
university’s catchment areas with minimum pass marks received admission 
offers. This criterion was designed to help such students from surround-
ing states enjoy preferential treatment in admission.35 The fourth criterion 
was Discretion, which reserved 10 per cent of admission to be based on 
the circumstances of the applicant. Benefiting students must meet JAMB’s 
minimum pass mark, but individual universities admitted students under 
this category using different yardsticks without necessarily ranking the 
candidates. The new guidelines, however, did not change the basic quali-
fying requirements for university admissions, which included minimum 
passes in some prescribed ‘O’ Level subjects.
As an illustration, if the JAMB pass mark in a given year was 200 
points, candidates who scored 200 or more were likely to secure admis-
sion. If 300 candidates whose scores ranged from 200 to 330 points sought 
100 available places in history, only forty students with the highest points 
would be admitted under academic merit. Although students who scored 
below 280 passed the entry exam, they could still lose admission under 
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merit. However, such candidates could still secure admission if they met 
any other quota criteria. Since candidates from educationally disadvan-
taged states received 20 per cent of the allocation, history would fill the ad-
mission quota by ranking relevant candidates by their scores and selecting 
twenty students. Similarly, thirty students from the catchment area of the 
university would be selected after ranking them by their scores. Finally, 
the university administrators would select the remaining 10 per cent of the 
students without necessarily following a ranking format, bringing the total 
number of students to 100 – though all the selected students must score 
above 200 points. The quota system, which had been resisted for so many 
years, was finally incorporated into the admission requirements of Nigeria.
It was easy for Shagari to introduce the quota system because the fed-
eral government controlled all the universities in the country as well as 
the central admission body, JAMB. Shagari’s approach was quite demo-
cratic although quite diplomatic as well. Wary that the south would reject 
it, other criteria such as Academic Merit, Educationally Disadvantaged 
States, Catchment Area, and Discretion were included to blunt the impact 
of a quota system. Northerners, who had detested JAMB since its establish-
ment in 1978 because it offered admissions to students solely on academic 
merit, welcomed this change because it accommodated their interests. The 
government was both sensitive to the North’s peculiar interest without 
discriminating against the South or well-qualified students. In reality, a 
well-qualified student had a better chance. If not admitted on Academic 
Merit, such students could still gain admission through Catchment Area 
and Discretion admission criteria since selection would be based on rank-
ing. In comparison, a less qualified student had fewer chances.
In reality, however, it was possible that qualified students from the 
South, who applied to a university in North, could to be denied admis-
sion. For instance, following the example above, if a student from the 
South scored 259 points, he would not secure admission under merit be-
cause the cut-off point was 280. In addition, since he was not from one 
of the educationally disadvantaged states as well as catchment areas, he 
would still be denied admission. Unless the student could influence the 
university authority to grant a discretionary admission, which was usually 
tricky, he might end up losing admission that year.36 At the same time, a 
less qualified candidate with lower points (for example, 201) from one of 
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the educationally disadvantaged states could secure admission. A notable 
example was T. Fagbulu, a candidate from Edo state who, despite scoring 
high in the exam, was denied admission because he came from an edu-
cationally advantaged state. Fagbulu unsuccessfully protested through a 
legal action, thus highlighting citizens’ engagement with government poli-
cies. As the National Concord newspaper wrote: “An ambitious 16-year old 
fearing for his future, has taken on [the government] … over the quota 
system of admission into universities.”37 The counsel for the complainant 
begged the court “to declare as unconstitutional, null and void, the policy 
of admission as practiced by JAMB.”38 Similar cases existed but the federal 
government maintained its position.
Like the establishment of JAMB, the introduction of the quota system 
under Shagari, a northern, generated misgivings. Many southerners per-
ceived it as a strategy to help the northerners while halting the educational 
advancement of the South. According to J.M. Kosemani, an educationist, 
the quota system was an “aggravated parody and a fraud on the nation, 
designed to kill initiative in some areas and encourage mediocrity in other 
areas.”39 Similarly, T. Megaforce, a political commentator, suspected that 
the new admission policy was a deliberate attempt to stem the tide of edu-
cational advancement in the South so that the North could catch up.40 
More striking was the criticism from Michael Angulu, the first registrar 
of JAMB, who stated that the quota system was anchored on cheating, the 
cheating of states in the south. In an interview with Newswatch, he pointed 
out that he came from one of the most educationally backward states in 
Nigeria [Benue], but he, together with three other candidates from the 
same region, had gained admission into University of Ibadan in 1957. He 
revealed that the number of candidates of northern origin who demanded 
higher education before and after independence had remained compara-
tively low, which partly inspired the introduction of a quota system in 
1981.41 Nevertheless, he stressed that it would have been much better if 
the federal government went out of its way to strengthen the lower levels of 
education in the North over a period.
[For] that would be cheating the rest of the country but in the 
end; I think it is a fairer cheating than the quota system. I think 
it will be better for the federal government to spend extra money 
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over and above the allocation to states to strengthen education 
in those places so that after a period, they will be in a position to 
compete with everybody else. Now, this is likely to cause less re-
sentment than what is now generally called the quota system.42
The idea of a Nigeria divided into the educationally advantaged and dis-
advantaged states constituted the main source of controversy in the new 
admission policy. The federal government seemed to ignore the factors that 
disadvantaged the northerners in the first place. One of the main founda-
tions rested with the political will of state governors in the South to com-
mit large resources to education. The trend began during the colonial per-
iod when southern politicians embarked on universal education schemes 
while their northern counterparts dragged their feet. Compared to their 
northern counterparts, the southern governors allocated huge amounts to 
fund all levels of education.43 Given this pattern of expenditure, increased 
numbers of southerners were in primary and secondary schools and later 
sought university admissions in greater numbers.
The federal government’s desire to use the quota system to forge na-
tional unity seemed counterproductive. It did not enjoy the support of all 
Nigerians, mostly southern states. They believed that students of northern 
origin were given unfair advantage by exclusively granting them automatic 
admission since they came from educationally disadvantaged states – a 
privilege their counterparts from the South did not enjoy. Thus, the ap-
plication of education policy aimed at uniting Nigerians had a negative 
impact on the notion of unity and patriotism. According to T.M. Yesefu, 
a former vice-chancellor of the University of Benin, a Nigerian who was 
deprived of an educational opportunity after meeting the qualifications 
for entrance because he came from the so-called educationally advantaged 
state, “has had the tenets and principles of a united Nigeria, demonstrably 
transformed into a mockery, if not totally and irrevocably destroyed within 
him.”44 As he further noted, “no amount of singing the national Anthem, 
nor voluble recitation of the Pledge, would ever again make him a complete 
Nigerian. Henceforth, he is native of his state first, and being a Nigerian 
becomes secondary.”45 To the beneficiary of the quota system, the effects, 
though unintended, would be the same. According to Yesefu, “the practice 
would have the same resultant effect on the student who, because he came 
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from the disadvantaged state benefited from the admission exercise.”46 
Having enjoyed special benefits because of state of origin, “his first loyalty 
would be to the state which apparently gave him the rare opportunity, not 
the Federal Government.”47 Given this scenario, the goal of national unity, 
which the policy aimed to achieve, seemed undermined. It was not surpris-
ing, therefore, that states, especially those in the South began a push to 
own their own universities.
State Participation in Higher Education
For bright students from the South to increase their chances of securing 
admissions, they were better off applying to neighbouring universities 
where they were at least certain to secure admission either on merit or 
catchment area criteria. Many states and students in the South felt alien-
ated. Reactions were immediate. The affected states moved swiftly toward 
founding their own universities. Indeed, one of the consequences of fed-
eralization of university education since 1975 and of placing higher edu-
cation on the concurrent legislative list in 1979 was the agitation by the 
nineteen states to own universities. One of the major projects prominent 
on the minds of every state governor when they came to power in 1979 
was to establish a university. This action always enhanced the reputation 
of the governor as an effective leader. Under the 1979 constitutional ar-
rangement, both the state and federal government were granted the power 
to legislate on the establishment of institutions of higher learning. With 
prompt exercise of this power, Anambra and Bendel states had established 
state universities Anambra State University of Science and Technology and 
Bendel State University, Ekpoma respectively in 1980.
Perhaps determined to overcome the limited opportunities for state 
residents evident in the quota system and eager to fulfill campaign prom-
ises of free education for all, other southern states pressed ahead with their 
university dreams, often with limited resources. In Imo State, which had 
recorded the highest number of university applicants, the gap between de-
mand and supply was wide. In response to his electoral promise, the Imo 
State Governor, Sam Mbakwe, made a strong case for the establishment 
of a university to provide opportunities for qualified residents, hitherto 
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denied opportunities in the federal universities. According to him, out of 
the 113,162 candidates who took the entrance exam in the 1978/79 session, 
“Imo State had 19,702 candidates, but only 2,126 or about l0% of them 
was offered admission. Therefore, we need our own University.”48 In addi-
tion, during the 1979/80 session, the number of applicants from Imo State 
increased to 20,485, but again, only 2,334 candidates successfully secured 
admission.49 Before Mbakwe, other prominent Imo residents had made a 
similar case. For instance, earlier in 1978, Jaja Wachukwu, a former minis-
ter of foreign affairs, speaking at a press conference, noted that the federal 
government’s decision to centralize the establishment of universities had 
stifled Imo State. He stated that Imo State had the greatest number of 
post-primary school products yearning for university education yearly. As 
he stressed, “no state has a better case for a new university than Imo State 
because it produces more students ripe for university education than any of 
the newly created states.”50
Criticism from states without universities had continued to grow since 
the early years of Shagari administration. The senate debated the rising de-
mand for state universities, even contemplating to transfer the control of all 
the universities to the state governments. Professor Akintoye proposed that 
the federal government should grant money to the seven states – Ondo, 
Niger, Gongola, Ogun, Imo, Bauchi, and Benue.51 “A university was need-
ed,” Abubakar Barde, governor of Gongola State, told the local College of 
Preliminary Studies in Yola “due to the hardship [indigenes] encountered 
in seeking admission to the country’s universities.”52 Such sentiments were 
common in Nigeria during the early 1980s.
In view of the limitation imposed on the students from the education-
ally advantaged states in the federal universities and the desire for state 
governors to fulfill electoral promises in order to remain relevant polit-
ically and to exercise their constitutional power, which permitted states 
to establish their universities, the following state universities emerged 
in 1981: Imo State University, Etiti (now Abia State University, Uturu), 
and Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Port Harcourt. 
Two more following state universities, Ondo State University, Ado Ekiti, 
and Ogun State University, Ago-Iwoye, emerged in 1982, followed in 
1983 with the establishment of Lagos State University and Cross River 
University. By 1983, there were twenty-eight universities in the country. 
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The movement to establish universities at the state and federal levels, ac-
cording to Adamolekun, “appears to be inexorably in the direction of uni-
versity education for the masses.”53 However, these universities emerged in 
an atmosphere of severe economic constraints, which shows that politics 
dominated educational considerations. In their desire to score political ad-
vantages, governors of these states committed more of their increasingly 
scarce resources to university education. Given the fact that revenue from 
oil began to decline in 1981, state universities became financial burdens to 
the states’ meagre resources.
Economic Meltdown of 1983
The proliferation of federal and state universities was bound to weigh 
heavily on government finances. As early as 1981, the federal govern-
ment, worried about the heavy cost of supporting free education in the 
face of dwindling national income, set up the Onabamiro Commission 
on Alternative Sources of Funding.54 Focusing on higher education, the 
commission recommended the sharing of education funding among the 
three branches of the government – local, state, and federal – with educa-
tion taxes to be levied on all. It urged the government to abandon its free 
education policy and to re-introduce fees at all education levels. The recom-
mendation was echoed in the report of the Presidential Commission on 
Salary and Conditions of Service of University Staff (otherwise called the 
Cookey Commission), which condemned the proliferation of universities 
in Nigeria and advised the government to build fewer centres of excellence. 
The recommendation of the Onabamiro Commission seemed econom-
ically sound, but, given the country’s mood, it was politically unrealistic. 
Implementing it would have been political suicide for the Shagari regime 
largely because Nigerians had been made to believe that access to educa-
tion could be free. As Jubril Aminu noted: “It is doubtful if any civilian 
government would wish to entertain the commotion that would follow any 
attempt to reintroduce tuition fees or to increase charges in our educa-
tional institutions.”55 In fact, many Nigerians rejected the proposals of the 
Onabamiro and Cookey’s commissions, believing that it “tilted the balance 
somewhat in favor of university education for an elite.”56 Despite the efforts 
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of both states and federal government to expand access to university, uni-
versity education remained essentially elitist. Although student population 
rose to 116,822 in 1983, demand continued to outstrip supply, as shown in 
Table 5.1.57
Although the government intended the quota system to facilitate and 
equalize access to universities, the South still dominated educational op-
portunities between 1979 and 1983. In the 1979/80 session, the number 
of applicants from the former Northern Region was 15,449 and 23.1 per 
cent were offered admission. During the same period, 97,989 students 
from the South applied for admission and 75.7 per cent gained admission. 
The statistics remained the same during the 1982/83 session when out of 
26,747 northern students who applied for admission, 22.7 per cent received 
admission offers; 177,618 students in the south applied and 76 per cent 
gained admission.58
In the area of science and technology, universities did not make 
significant progress. For instance, between 1975 and 1979, the combined 
average output of agriculturalists and technologists in all the Nigerian 
universities accounted for only 14 per cent of the yearly total of graduates. 
During this period, the percentage of students in the faculties of 
Agriculture, Engineering, Architecture, Medical and Natural Sciences 
were few compared to those in the Humanities, Social Sciences, Law, and 
Education. 55 per cent of students were in Nigerian universities in 1980 to 
study in the Arts and Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, a trend that 
continued up to 1983.59 As a result, up to 1983, Nigerian universities trained 
a yearly average of only thirty scientists and engineers. This number did not 
Table 5.1: Students’ Applications and Admissions.
Period Applied Admitted Percentage
1980/81 145,837 20, 429 14
1981/82 180, 685 22, 460 12.4 
1982/83 191, 583 19, 897 10.07 
Source: The Guardian, 8 September 1984, 8.
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meet the government target of training sufficient personnel to execute the 
technologically oriented programs it had embarked upon.
In spite of the federal government’s desire to train more scientists and 
engineers, the demand for science courses was low because science edu-
cation at the secondary-school level was not given a high priority. Thus, 
most universities relied on remedial programs to train candidates to fill 
up the admission quota in the sciences. This practice, however, did not 
address the root of the problem. As Professor M.J.C. Echeruo, the first 
Vice-Chancellor of Imo State University remarked,
if I was given a million naira today to admit one hundred re-
medial students into Imo State University, I would immediately 
donate the money to ten good secondary schools in this state 
and I can assure you that they will produce more than enough 
sound and qualified university applicants for this country at a 
fraction of what it would cost the university.60
The logic of Echeruo’s position as he noted was: “Good education is best 
established early in life. It costs less to do so anyway.”61 Similarly, displeased 
with the low enrolment and output of science-oriented students in the 
University of Lagos, the vice-chancellor, Professor Akin Adesola, stated in 
his 1983 convocation address that Nigeria “cannot build [its] technological 
pyramid from the top without due regard to the nature, structure and 
strength of the base – the Primary and Secondary Education systems.”62 It 
is surprising that a government that committed itself to science and tech-
nology by building federal universities of technology and allocating huge 
amounts to university education under the Fourth NDP, failed to pay equal 
attention to science education at the secondary school levels.
Any hopes of addressing the problems in the education sector dimmed 
with the economic recession that became severe in 1983. The over-reliance 
of government on oil revenue and the instability of the international mar-
ket took a toll on government social programs, including university educa-
tion. The price of oil, which was at its peak in 1980, slumped in 1982.63 
Consequently, the federal government revenue declined considerably. The 
level of oil production averaged 1.75 million barrels per day by 1981 while 
an average of 2.3 million barrels per day was used in the projections for the 
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Fourth National Development Plan. The combined effect of falling prices 
and production levels was to drop export earnings from oil from N4.199.7 
million in 1980 to N10.529.5 million in 1981.64 The resultant economic 
crisis of the 1980s worsened and dramatically affected the external sec-
tor. For example, between 1981 and 1983, the average monthly import 
bill was US$2.0 billion while exports averaged US$1.5 billion. Nigeria’s 
foreign debt increased from N3.3 billion in 1978 to N14.7 billion in 1983. 
By 1983, the nineteen state governments had run up a combined debt of 
N13.3 billion. The ratio of debt service to exports climbed from 9.0 per 
cent in 1981 to 18.5 per cent in 1982 and 23.6 per cent in 1983. Arrears 
on letters of credit accumulated, and in 1983, some US$2.1 billion of such 
debts had to be refinanced over a thirty-month period.65 The existing uni-
versities suffered from underfunding arising from the economic meltdown. 
National newspapers in Nigeria confirmed the financial strain of Nigerian 
universities when it reported increases in hostel fees and cancellation of 
bursary awards, among other things.66
The seriousness of the economic crisis became unmistakable when 
the Committee of Vice-Chancellors convened a seminar to discuss the 
apt and relevant subject of “Nigeria: The Universities, the Nation, and 
the Economic Recession.” In his keynote address, the vice president, Alex 
Ekwueme, compared the recession of the 1980s with world economic 
slumps of the early 1930s. He argued that the recession was not peculiar to 
Nigeria; it was a worldwide phenomenon, affecting mostly African coun-
tries.67 Furthermore, Ekwueme argued that the Nigerian governments 
during the era of oil boom in the 1970s were unmindful of the trap set 
by the industrialized countries, which lured them into indiscriminate and 
heavy borrowing which brought the country’s external debt to $15 billion 
in 1983.68
Ekwueme, however, neglected to mention that just as the military gov-
ernment in the 1970s undertook ambitious projects based on unrealistic 
revenue expectation, the civilian government in the early 1980s suffered 
from a similar mentality. The 1983 economic recession revealed the pecu-
liar extravagance that characterized civilian administrations at both federal 
and state government levels. The Fourth NDP stated as its policy objective 
“the building of new [universities],” but it was apparent even to a layman 
that it would be cheaper and more cost-effective in the long run to expand 
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facilities in the existing universities to cope with increased demand than 
to build new ones. Instead of taking that route to expanding access, the 
civilian regime established seven new federal universities and eight state 
universities and upgraded five advanced colleges of education to university 
degree-awarding institutions.69
Why would the federal and state governments found fifteen new 
universities within a short period of four years when the existing ones 
were inadequately funded? The probable answer was politics, for educa-
tion easily became vulnerable to mass politics and pressure. “Politics,” as 
Dan Agabese noted, “remains a strong determinant in the development 
of Nigeria’s social institutions – health, education, transportation.”70 Since 
the 1979 Constitution empowered states to own universities, governors 
“saw universities as amenities and so opted for mushrooming them.”71 The 
politicians had failed to read the economic signs of the time. Instead of 
operating the political system with the economic discretion of statesman-
ship, “they thrived in personal aggrandizement.”72 Official corruption and 
mismanagement of resources may account partly for the low funding of 
universities as well as the economic downturn. Corruption was a dominant 
issue in the execution of social and economic policies of the civilian regime, 
laying the foundation for future economic difficulties. As Ray Ekpu noted, 
since “the leadership was patently unpatriotic, mentally and morally bank-
rupt, the system was used and misused in building a concrete grave for the 
burial of Nigeria.”73 Politicians were more interested in the kickbacks they 
would receive from contracts awards than the actual execution of projects, 
including university projects.74
Instead of expanding facilities in the existing universities to accom-
modate more students, they expended resources to build new universities, 
each with its own jumbo bureaucracy without significant increase in school 
population. As Achike Okafo argued: “if we are inclined to proliferate the 
country with universities, we must be prepared to provide what it takes 
to make them proper universities. That is the inescapable truth.”75 There 
was no evidence of a long-term plan for the future sustainability of the 
government’s massification policies. In a paper presented at the National 
Conference on Education Since Independence, N.A. Nwagwu, a profes-
sor at the University of Benin, noted that what passed as policy-making 
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in education in Nigeria was “often a mere attempt to rationalize political 
decisions and actions hastily and expediently conceived and executed.”76 
The federal government pursued politically attractive projects such as 
establishing a federal university in every state, commissioning iron and 
steel plants, and indiscriminately awarding contracts to build the new fed-
eral capital at Abuja. Faced with the fall in oil revenue, the federal and 
state governments secured foreign loans to carry out their ambitious social 
spending, anticipating an oil-price recovery that never came. The collapse 
of crude oil prices in the world market and the government’s inclination 
to external borrowing in order to prosecute its programs demonstrated 
that politicians of the Second Republic failed to learn useful lessons from 
the educational policies and programs of their military predecessors. They 
could hardly claim that “Nigeria’s economic recession, obvious to vigilant 
observers since 1976, would not materially affect their calculations and 
over-generous promises in the manifestoes for the 1979 elections.”77 By 
first abolishing fees and then fixing boarding and lodging charges in most 
of the educational institutions, governments lost enormous sources of rev-
enue for education. More importantly, they lost the participatory spirit of 
Nigerians in education. In 1978, the attempt to increase boarding charges 
from 15 kobo to 50 kobo per meal cost Nigerians countless lives from stu-
dent riots. Similarly, in 1981, effort to remove rice from the menu of one 
university claimed the lives of two students. Thus, the federal government 
avoided potential social upheavals, as Jubril Aminu had noted.78
The civilian governments failed to realize that there were limits to 
expansion and that it was impossible to expand indefinitely without a 
sustainable means of funding. They ignored the wide gap between policy 
and implementation, between wishes and realities. The free education 
policy under the military in the 1970s led to unrealistic expectations from 
Nigerians who hoped to obtain education without making sacrifices. This 
mindset was heightened under the civilian government of Shagari when 
the pursuit of massification was accelerated without adequate long-term 
strategic planning. Nigerians, for political reasons, were “encouraged to 
believe that Government can do anything and everything for them.… 
Therefore, everyone wants education and, of course, see no reason why they 
have to pay for it.”79 With the large number of secondary school gradu-
ates, salary structure and qualifications for work, which placed emphasis on 
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university education as the gateway to the upper social and economic strata, 
the increased provision of public and private grants, and government doc-
trine of free education and the need for trained workforce, the demand for 
university education remained phenomenal during the Second Republic. 
Unfortunately, in 1983 Nigeria was “caught in the web of recession just 
when [it was] … still at the threshold of mass university education.”80
Given the reality of Nigeria’s ailing economy in 1983, the question 
was whether Nigeria would meet its financial obligation to satisfy demands 
for “free mass university education.”81 Shagari, who was inaugurated on 1 
October 1983, for a second term in office, thought otherwise. He declared 
that Nigeria’s “economy can simply not survive if we insist on living the 
styles we had been living in 1981 and part of 1982” and he cautioned that 
the government “cannot go on with a spending spree which is beyond the 
absorptive capacity of the economy.”82 The gloomy picture of the economy 
became apparent when the president acknowledged in his 1984 budget 
speech, delivered on 29 December 1983, that the country is going through 
an economic recession. Among the measures to revive the economy, as the 
president enumerated, were “reduction of public expenditures, diversifica-
tion of revenues sources, privatization of government parastatals and com-
panies, generation of more revenue through imposition of new or higher 
fees for public services, securing a World Bank structural adjustment loan 
as well as an IMF balance of payment loan, and payment of re-scheduled 
short-term debts.”83
Conclusion
What makes the history of university education between 1979 and 1983 
significant is the manner in which the federal and state governments seized 
the opportunity provided by the 1979 Constitution to expand the univer-
sity system. The federal government was committed to accelerated decol-
onization of the British elitist system of higher education when it provided 
free university education to all Nigerians and unsuccessfully attempted to 
open a National Open University. It also engaged university education in 
the service of rapid economic development when it established seven uni-
versities of technology. In addition, when it introduced the quota system 
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of admission in 1981 and located the new universities to satisfy regional 
interests, the federal government expressly identified itself with the no-
tion that equal opportunities for university access was vital in promoting 
greater national unity and closing the educational gap between the South 
and the North. However, since state governments, particularly those in the 
South, felt that the quota system deprived many of their indigenes access 
to federal universities, they established eight universities. Yet, the demand 
for university places continued to outrun its supply. Economic depression, 
occasioned by the decline in oil revenues and aggravated by official cor-
ruption and mismanagement of public funds, set in in 1983. In response, 
the federal government decided to suspend its massive spending on social 
services, including university education. Before Shagari could carry out his 
vision, he was overthrown in a military coup on 31 December 1983. The 
struggling economy that the new military government inherited dictated 
their attitudes to social spending, including in university expansion, during 
fourth attempt at massification, 1984–90.

159
Rationalization Policy:  
The IMF/World Bank and Structural 
Adjustment Program, 1984–90
To speak of the expansion of the university system in any way 
now, is to ignore [Nigeria’s] economic indicators. The choice 
must be in favour of the consolidation of means and of excel-
lence as against mindless growth and dissipation of resources. 
– Yahaya Aliyu, 1985
Introduction
The push for mass university education under President Shehu Shagari 
coincided with Nigeria’s economic decline of the early 1980s, which con-
strained further expansion of universities. Funding of existing institu-
tions constituted a heavy burden on the country’s lean resources. As the 
economic situation worsened, the Shagari administration approached the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, but before concluding the 
deal, a coup – led by General Muhammadu Buhari – overthrew the civilian 
government on 31 December 1983.1 Among other things, the coup plotters 
bemoaned the poor state of the economy as well as the educational system. 
According to their spokesperson, Brigadier Sani Abacha (who later became 
president in 1993), Nigeria’s “economy has been hopelessly mismanaged; 
we have become a debtor and beggar nation.… Our educational system is 
6
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deteriorating at alarming rate.”2 The urgent task as the new administra-
tion saw it was to restructure the economy by reconsidering expenditure of 
social services, including on the universities.
Having inherited both an expanded university system and an ailing 
economy, the successive administrations of Buhari (1983–85) and Ibrahim 
Babangida (1985–90) faced a choice either to continue with the ambitious 
social programs of previous administrations in response to social demand 
or to check expansion. They chose the latter. Further establishment of 
universities ceased. Repositioning Nigerian universities to facilitate eco-
nomic recovery and development became a more crucial element of the 
government’s agenda. Rationalization policy, aimed at reducing subsidies 
on social amenities, sharing the cost of education with the public through 
tuition fees, and streamlining university courses to avoid duplication, was 
embraced. This chapter examines university development in the context of 
an economic downturn. It shows how the country’s economic difficulties 
and the involvement of the IMF/World Bank gave rise to the structural 
adjustment dimensions of university policies in Nigeria and resulted in 
the period of restricted expansion of university education, 1984–90. As 
efforts at economic recovery assumed centre stage in the governments’ 
national programs, the goal of using mass university education to foster 
national unity increasingly diminished. Instead, restructuring universities 
to address the country’s economic problems, often neglected by previous 
regimes (in spite of their official pronouncements), gained prominence.
Buhari and the Search for Cost-Saving Measures
Rather than seek IMF and World Bank assistance, as Shagari had at-
tempted in 1983, Buhari sought indigenous, self-directed economic belt-
tightening measures. In carrying out this rationalization policy, the federal 
government squeezed financial spending on social programs, exchange 
rate, trade, and administration. Increases in taxes and drastic cuts in public 
spending were accompanied by losses of jobs in the public sector. In fact, 
more than one million public sector workers lost their jobs within twelve 
months of the regime.3 For Nigeria, it marked a remarkable departure from 
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the extravagant spending that had characterized the preceding govern-
ments, particularly since the 1970s.
Universities were not spared. Since independence, the government 
had been the sole funding source for university education. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that the economic recession would have far-reaching 
implications for the proper functioning of universities. It meant that the 
amount the government was prepared to allocate to education in a given 
year determined exclusively what they received. When the government 
could not meet the financial requirements of the university system, alloca-
tions declined. The impact of reduced funding in 1984 was immediate. 
For instance, the senate of the University of Ibadan resolved to postpone 
indefinitely the resumption date for the 1983/84 session because of what 
it described as a “very serious financial situation facing the university and 
its consequent inability to effectively perform its duties.”4 This scenario, 
as the Daily Times reported, applied to many Nigerian universities in the 
early months of 1984. It was a direct consequence of the vigorous funding 
of university expansion since the 1970s based largely on unreliable oil rev-
enue. The decline in oil revenue and the resultant economic recession in the 
early 1980s, worsened by official corruption as well as the often-neglected 
mismanagement and misapplication of funds by university authorities, led 
to a drastic reduction in university funding.5
Rationalization was an attractive option in Buhari’s efforts to con-
trol the process and rate of expansion based on its own criteria. Between 
December 1983 and August 1985, the Buhari administration took steps to 
manage university expansion while getting the public to share the burden 
of university education. Eager to avert expenses on social programs, the 
federal government revisited the National Open University (NOU) that 
had started operations in February 1984 amid mounting complaints of 
students over poor reception due to poor communication infrastructures.6 
Lacking funds to rectify this problem due to the economic meltdown, the 
federal government suspended NOU on 7 May 1984. The compelling rea-
son was economic: the desire to avoid additional burden on the declining 
financial revenue of the government. As Buhari confirmed in the 1984 
budget speech:
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The administration has given serious consideration to the 
National Open University Programme. Because the infrastruc-
ture to make the programme succeed is either not available or 
inadequate, the government has decided that in the present fi-
nancial situation, Nigeria could not afford the Open University 
Programme.7
Buhari’s crusade to rationalize universities and consolidate them for sus-
tained growth manifested eloquently in its decision to restructure the 
existing federal universities of technology. According to a release issued 
in May 1984 by the Cabinet Office, Lagos, the federal government ex-
pressed its intention to merge four federal universities of technology with 
some conventional universities. The release questioned the rationale behind 
the continued maintenance of seven universities of technology in Nigeria 
“taking into account the need to provide a good quality technological 
education [and] the stark realities and socio-political circumstance of the 
country.”8 It noted, in addition, that the merging of the existing univer-
sities of technology was necessary since they operated at their “tempor-
ary sites, ill-equipped and lack[ed] basic facilities in terms of human and 
materials resources for achieving the objectives for which they were set 
up.”9 Accordingly, the federal government directed the Federal Ministry 
of Education in collaboration with the NUC and the affected universities 
to work out modalities for effecting the merger as well as for rationalizing 
university programs and courses to “create centers of excellence” and make 
them cost-effective and efficient.10 The decision to merge four universities 
reflects the sober disposition of the new administration towards reducing 
government’s financial burden.
In response to the government’s directive, officials of the federal min-
istry of education, the NUC, and the federal university of technology met 
and agreed on 1 October 1984 as the effective date of the merger. They 
also prescribed the merger of four federal universities of technology in 
Abeokuta, Bauchi, Makurdi, and Yola with some conventional universi-
ties while retaining the ones in Akure, Minna, and Owerri.11 The merged 
universities henceforth were to function as campuses of their foster uni-
versities, served by one council, one senate, and one chief executive vice-
chancellor. By this decision, the number of federal universities in Nigeria 
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went down from twenty to sixteen, and, together with state universities, 
there were now twenty-four universities in the country. Although the fed-
eral government justified its decisions on the need to provide good, qual-
ity technological education as well as the socio-economic circumstances of 
the country, given the declining revenue of oil, it was clear that economic 
justification was the most compelling.
Why the federal government chose to merge universities of technology 
instead of conventional universities seemed odd. This is especially so when 
the same federal government had proclaimed its desire to promote econom-
ic development, which would be attained through science and technology. 
The heavy cost of running universities of technology seemed to be a factor. 
However, if reducing the number of universities was the decisive considera-
tion, there was no reason why the government would not administer all 
the Nigerian universities from one campus, just like the California State 
University that had more students scattered in various campuses than all 
the Nigerian universities.12 By merging some universities, the government 
thought it would save money. Ironically, this arrangement did not change 
the status quo as NUC allocated funds directly to the affected universities 
without reducing cost for the government.13
Maintaining a free university education policy, which began in 1978, 
seemed unsustainable in the context of the declining economy. Reacting to 
the heavy cost associated with funding education, the minister of educa-
tion, Ibrahim Abdullahi, complained that free education at the primary 
and secondary school levels throughout the country cost the government 
about N6 billion a year, excluding an estimated N674 million to fund one 
conventional university with 10,000 students.14 The Daily Times editorial of 
7 March 1984 urged the government to debunk the concept of government 
as a free education provider, stating that “the unrealistic idea of getting 
something for nothing has always been sold by politicians as a calculated 
ploy for winning votes, but has remained suspect nonetheless.”15 The bene-
fits of a free education policy to any nation are incontestable, but the cen-
tral issue in 1984 lay in the practical ability of the government to carry it 
through. For the first time, the public began to consider the concept of free 
education on its merits rather than as a political ploy.
In line with it rationalization agenda, the federal government issued a 
directive to the NUC in March 1984 to withdraw its subsidies on student 
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feeding in order to save the government the cost of catering staff, cafe-
teria facilities, and food. The directive mandated federal universities to re-
introduce accommodation fees to help defray the cost of hostel services.16 
Though state universities from their inception had charged minimal tuition 
fees ranging from N250 to N400, it had taken the federal government five 
years to implement the decision that President Obasanjo made in 1978 
to re-introduce fees in the federal universities. Due to unrest in the uni-
versities, that decision was not implemented. The Shagari administration, 
motivated by the desire to fulfill election promises, complicated the fund-
ing problem by establishing more universities and continuing with a free 
university policy amid declining national revenue. Although Buhari intro-
duced feeding and accommodation fees, tuition remained free, an issue his 
administration was eager to confront.
The federal government set up two study groups in 1984: one on fund-
ing of education and the other on curricula and development. The study 
group on funding advised government on a realistic funding of education 
based on the notion that education “should be the responsibility of the fed-
eral, state, and local government and parents, each contributing its share 
and conscious of the prevailing economic situation.”17 The government re-
quested that the group specifically review, among other things, the existing 
arrangements for funding education at all levels and ascertain the extent 
of the financial involvement of the federal, state, and local government, 
and in light of the prevailing economic realities “propose an arrangement 
for funding education which would involve voluntary organizations, com-
munities, individuals, and parents.”18
In its report, the group acknowledged that universities had enjoyed a 
high priority in government spending compared to other levels of educa-
tion during the preceding civilian era. For instance, in 1981, higher educa-
tion alone claimed 65 per cent of the entire federal government recurrent 
expenditure on education, broken into 1.1 per cent for colleges of education 
and schools of basic studies, 6 per cent for polytechnics, and 57.9 per cent 
for the universities. Similarly, during the same year, federal government 
capital expenditure on education showed that higher education consumed 
81.9 per cent. Universities claimed the lion’s share of nearly 90 per cent 
of the allocated amount.19 Identifying with the economic realities of the 
country and responsive to the mindset of the federal government that set 
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it up, the group declared that “the beneficiaries of higher education in 
Nigeria should be partners with government in funding education.”20 It 
recommended payment of fees in all institutions of higher learning, award 
of scholarships to about 10 per cent of new entrants on academic merit, 
especially for students in courses designed for national emergency (e.g., 
tertiary science teachers’ education).21
The curricula committee that Buhari set up reviewed university cur-
ricula with the view of addressing the high level of graduate unemploy-
ment in the country.22 Members for this study were drawn from the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; Employment, Labour 
and Productivity; Manpower Board; and the National Universities 
Commission.23 In its report, the committee called for changes in university 
curriculum that would privilege the funding of science courses. The think-
ing was that since Nigeria lived in an era of global economic recession and 
limited financial resources, one option open to graduate job seekers was 
self-employment. It suggested the overhauling of university curricula to 
reflect the need for self-employment by graduates based on the “changing 
structure of the society.”24 In addition, it called for a limitation on the num-
ber of students in the arts and humanities. The idea was to hold up the rate 
of expansion of university education in those disciplines because it far out-
stripped the rate of employment of graduates. This recommendation was 
based on the assumption that graduate unemployment was the result of the 
over-production of graduates in the arts and humanities, which explained 
why it demanded that
government should through the instrumentality of the National 
Universities Commission (NUC) considerably slow down the 
rate of increase in university student enrolment in the Arts and 
Humanities to not more than 10% per annum in contrast to 
slightly over 20% annual increase recorded during the 1978/79–
1980/81 period.25
The committee stipulated a 60:40 admission ratio in favour of science-
based disciplines. To control expansion, the committee advised the gov-
ernment to ban the establishment of new universities (whether federal or 
state) during the next five years. In addition, the committee called for the 
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phasing out of the following courses from university curricula: classical and 
African religious studies in the universities of Ibadan and Ife; language 
(German, Portuguese, French, and Russian), Arabic, and Islamic studies 
in all the universities offering them; and the newly established law faculties 
in the universities of Ibadan and Ilorin. It insisted that that graduate output 
in law, library studies, geology, geophysics, and pharmacy should be kept 
at the 1983 level, and no other university should start courses leading to 
the award of degrees in law.26 To underscore its bias in favour of science 
courses, the committee urged the government to tie financial allocation 
to the universities to specific courses and projects, particularly in the sci-
ences.27 Finally, it emphasized that the universities should intensify their 
efforts at internal revenue-generating activities such as corporate consult-
ancy services and investments to reduce their financial dependence on the 
government.28 Except for Mrs. O.F. Okusami, who represented the NUC, 
the university community was absent. This was odd, given the fact that 
the committee’s resolutions would not just have a potential effect on uni-
versity education but would be implemented ultimately by the university 
community.
The driving force behind the attempt to reorganize the university cur-
riculum was the mistaken perception that Nigeria’s higher educational sys-
tem was lopsided in favour of liberal courses that were scarcely needed by a 
developing country like Nigeria. The Academic Staff Union of Universities 
(ASUU) faulted this thinking when it asserted that government’s move 
was a “very transparent attempt to cover up the obvious failure of the neo-
colonial economy that Nigeria is operating.”29 This claim on the part of 
authorities, according to ASUU, would only hold water if graduate un-
employment was limited to graduates of arts disciplines and spared gradu-
ates of science disciplines. As ASUU revealed, graduates of all disciplines 
roamed Nigerian streets “wearing the soles of their shoes out in search of 
jobs that are unavailable because of the bankruptcy of the economic system 
which the imperialists imposed on us and which, rather unintelligently, 
are maintained.”30 That unemployment existed among graduates in those 
disciplines most needed for economic development meant that the curricu-
lum review was a misplaced exercise intended to shift the blame onto the 
educational sub-system. As ASUU warned, “enough of these diversionary 
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tactics, this movement in circles, this running after shadows, this avoid-
ance of the heart of the matter.”31
Likewise, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors (CVC) rejected parts of 
the report dealing with phasing out selected courses in some universities. 
Since French-speaking countries surrounded Nigeria, CVC reasoned that 
it was in the long-term interest of the country to emphasize the French lan-
guage. The CVC also noted that many of the recommendations of the group 
were short-sighted, stressing that they were “induced by panic and solely 
on considerations of the present economic situation.”32 In spite of criticisms 
of the proposed curriculum reform, and to underscore its resolve to carry 
on with the rationalization policy, Buhari promulgated Decree No. 16 of 
1985 on Education (National Minimum Standards and Establishment of 
Institutions). The decree empowered the NUC to set minimum standards 
for all academic programs currently taught in Nigerian universities, man-
dating the NUC to undertake periodic accreditation visits to universities 
to determine the viability of programs run in all Nigerian universities, not 
only to ensure maintenance of minimum standards, but also to guide gov-
ernment in allocating funds.
The recommendations made by the committees on funding education 
and curricula understandably followed Buhari’s austerity and stabilization 
measures. The objective was to curtail government expenditures on social 
services, save money to service external debts, and ultimately avoid exter-
nal assistance from world bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Without entering into agreement with the IMF, however, the federal gov-
ernment did not reschedule its debt service payments; it partially serviced 
the debt. With unpaid interest, arrears on external debt built up and the 
stock of debt grew fivefold. Nigeria’s economy, including universities, suf-
fered under the weight of the austerity program.33 High inflation became a 
common economic outcome of Buhari’s economic program while govern-
ment subvention to federal universities declined. With sustained decline in 
the capital and recurrent subvention to federal universities between 1984 
and 1985, universities were compelled to search for alternative sources of 
funding.34 Under the caption “Varsities in Search for Funds,” the Daily 
Times commended the efforts of the universities of Nigeria, Nsukka, and 
Ilorin for embarking on profitable commercial ventures such as univer-
sity bookshops and printing presses, guest houses, pilot bakery projects, 
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commercial farms, gas stations, and consultancy services.35 In 1985, the 
University of Maiduguri launched its consultancy services centre.36
Buhari’s austerity and stabilization measures brought untold hard-
ships, not only to the university system, but also to Nigerians, as inflation, 
hunger, and unemployment continued to rise. His administration failed 
to either restructure the economy or cushion the effects of the govern-
ment’s severe ‘belt-tightening’ programs. Worse still was that he operated 
a command economy with an extensive system of direct controls that sup-
pressed meaningful market activities, discouraging private sector involve-
ment. Import shortages and scarcity of food items led to rising social and 
political discontent. Nigerians groaned under Buhari’s regime, giving an 
incentive to some discontented and ambiguous military officers, led by 
Ibrahim Babangida, to stage a coup that ousted the Buhari regime on 27 
August 1985. The justification for the coup was obvious: “The present state 
of uncertainty and stagnation cannot be permitted to degenerate into sup-
pression and retrogression.”37
Babangida, IMF, and Universities
The economy that Babangida inherited was characterized by huge foreign 
and domestic debts, a rapidly declining per capita income, a high rate of 
unemployment, severe shortages of raw materials and spare parts for in-
dustries, and a high rate of inflation.38 In his first address to the nation, 
Babangida stressed the need to depart from the limited economic policy 
of the ousted regime. As he noted: “It is the view of this government that 
austerity without structural adjustment is not the solution to our economic 
predicament. The present situation whereby 44 per cent of our revenue 
earning is utilized to service debts is not realistic.”39 He therefore promised 
to take steps “to ensure comprehensive strategy of economic reforms.”40 To 
continue to fund university education adequately, as well as other social 
programs, Babangida faced three policy options: (1) maintain the status 
quo (which meant a continuation of the austerity measures without struc-
tural adjustment reforms); (2) accept IMF Structural Adjustment Facility, 
including its conditions; (3) adopt a modified variant of the traditional 
structural adjustment package, designed and implemented by Nigerians.41 
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Weighing its options carefully, the new government still faced the real-
ity that it’s “survival hinged on the availability of revenues, which in turn 
depended upon its ability to negotiate a rescheduling of debt service 
payments.”42
Very early in his regime, Babangida opened a public debate on IMF, 
focusing on whether the government should accept the IMF loan or not. 
Public mood, as expressed in news media reports, called on the govern-
ment to reject the IMF loan. Overwhelming support seemed to be directed 
toward adopting ‘homegrown’ adjustment measures aimed at economic 
recovery. Pretending to acquiesce to public pressure, Babangida declared 
a fifteen-month national economic emergency. 43 As he later elaborated 
in his 1985 budget speech, such a move would allow the country time 
to reflect on the social and economic problems facing the country and to 
seek solution through indigenous efforts. Such efforts, he noted, would 
be “at our own pace and our volition, consistent with our own voluntary 
national interest.”44 In his search for homegrown efforts at national de-
velopment, Babangida found the doctrine of rationalization an attractive 
policy in educational planning and thus revisited the recommendations of 
the committee on curriculum reform that the Buhari administration had 
not implemented before it was overthrown. In an address to members of 
the university community in November 1985, Babangida endorsed ration-
alization policy and emphasized the historic role of the universities in not 
only championing economic development but aiding economic recovery. 
He therefore called on universities not to remain a burden to the state but 
“to examine and reconsider aspects of the administration and financing of 
university education.”45
Contrary to its earlier promises of exploring homegrown economic 
policy, Babangida introduced the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
in June 1986. Even though SAP was a core part of the IMF reform pack-
age, official rhetoric, however, insisted that it was homegrown. In launch-
ing the program, Babangida praised Nigeria’s “international creditors” for 
appreciating the country’s “commitments in the path of agro-structural 
adjustment which we have started for ourselves.”46 He added that the IMF 
recognized and agreed with his “position not to take the IMF loan, and not 
to devalue the naira overnight.”47 Unlike the economic measures adopted 
by the preceding administration, SAP aimed to promote “restructuring 
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and diversifying the productive base of the economy in order to reduce its 
dependence on the oil sector and on imports and achieving in the short to 
medium term fiscal and balance of payments viability.”48 Other objectives 
of SAP were to lay “the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth; and 
reducing the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, 
and improving that sector’s efficiency and enhancing the potential of the 
Private Sector.”49
Notwithstanding official pronouncements, the SAP was far from being 
an indigenous initiative. The major reason for its adoption was to open the 
door to official debt rescheduling, a topmost priority of the government. 
It was not surprising that the federal government soon entered into three 
standby arrangements with the IMF under a five-year plan (1986–91). 
Under the arrangement, agreement was reached on three debt rescheduling 
agreements with the Paris Club of creditor countries: (a) a 1986 agreement 
that rescheduled/refinanced debt worth about US$4.6 billion; (b) a 1989 
agreement that rescheduled about US$5.2 billion; and (c) a 1991 agreement 
that rescheduled about US$3.3 billion.50 Ultimately, the World Bank also 
supported the adjustment program through a US$450 million trade policy 
and export diversification loan.51 One of the major implications of intro-
ducing SAP was that the federal government cut its funding of university 
education since the program required government to reduce spending on 
social services, including education.
The Fifth National Development Plan (Fifth NDP), launched in 1986, 
reflected the character of SAP by requiring governments to avoid further 
establishment of institutions of higher learning, stressing that the existing 
institutions would undergo internal structural reforms intended to improve 
their operational efficiency and effectiveness.52 The Fifth NDP echoed the 
prevailing official government’s mindset; it was austere and less grandiose 
than its immediate predecessor was. This ideological shift had a profound 
impact on all sectors of the economy, especially higher educational institu-
tions that had until then run on a non-competitive and non-profit basis. 
Rationalization, consolidation, and effectiveness – supported by the IMF 
– were the key words of the Fifth NDP, dictating subsequent steps taken 
by the federal government on university expansion.
It must be stressed that the IMF and the World Bank had pushed 
for rationalization of African universities since the late 1970s when many 
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African countries suffered severe economic decline. At the meeting of 
African vice-chancellors in Harare in 1986, for instance, the World Bank 
representatives argued that higher education in Africa was a luxury and that 
African countries were better off closing universities at home and training 
graduates overseas. Since the World Bank understood this call to be pol-
itically untenable, it instead urged African leaders to trim and restructure 
their universities to produce only those skills that the “market” required.53 
Given that the Nigerian economy needed more science graduates to help 
facilitate economic development and recovery, Babangida found the World 
Bank advice attractive. During the Silver Jubilee Celebration and Twenty-
first Convocation of the UNN on December 6, 1986, Babangida stressed 
his government’s preference for science courses because of their crucial role 
in national development. According to him,
while numbers are still important, in this era of science and 
technology, quality has now assumed greater significance [and] 
emphasis would henceforth have to be shifted to science and 
technology, and to quality.54
With SAP in place, the rationalization program seemed unstoppable and 
universities prepared for it. Following a federal government directive on 
the review of the curricula report, the federal ministry of education had 
formed a ministerial committee in February 1986 under the leadership of 
Professor Akin O. Adesola, the vice-chancellor of the University of Lagos. 
The committee was charged with the responsibility of converting into a 
White Paper the recommendations of the study group on curricula for the 
consideration of the minister of education and the federal executive coun-
cil.55 As part of the review of university curricula, and in anticipation of 
rationalization of university programs, the executive secretary of the NUC 
and the chair of the CVC travelled to the UK between 30 March and 
5 April 1987 to “gain a first hand knowledge of the British Universities 
scene and in particular to find out how the universities have responded to 
rationalization and continuous shortage of funds for their operations.”56 
Under the program in the UK, the Thatcher government had cut financial 
allocations to the universities in 1979, almost forcing them to close down. 
However, the universities came back strong through commercialization 
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of their entire operations.57 Managers of university education in Nigeria 
believed that they would gain useful insights from the British experience, 
which would help them to handle Nigeria’s impending rationalization 
policy.
The trip involved a series of meetings, which revealed the potential 
steps Nigerian universities would take to respond proactively to rationaliz-
ation. For instance, at the meeting with the University Grants Committee 
(UGC) on March 30, N.T. Hardyman, the Secretary of the Committee, 
informed the visitors that the initial cuts in the financial allocations to 
British universities were a reduction in the ‘value’ of the grants.58 According 
to him, the British government justified the cuts based on the philosophy 
of making the universities ‘leaner and fitter.’59 As he further recounted, 
the negative result of rationalization was that for the first time since the 
Middle Ages student numbers were cut in British universities. In order to 
allow the universities to survive, the UGC in 1984 came up with a strat-
egy of saving universities from further financial cuts by recommending the 
closure of one or two of them.60 At the meeting with Dr. J.B. Lowe, the 
secretary and registrar of St. Andrews University, it was stated that the 
commercial projects embarked on by the university could serve as a model 
for Nigeria.61 Similarly, Professor Ashford, vice-chancellor, University of 
Salford, stressed the need for vigorous fund-raising through a strong man-
agerial ethos.62 This visit showed that, under rationalization, universities 
would not survive unless they became innovative and less dependent on the 
government for financial support.
The World Bank and the White Paper on University 
Reform
The federal government had invited the World Bank study group to carry 
out a study on how to salvage the deteriorating conditions in Nigerian uni-
versities and advise it on the most cost-effective way of running federal uni-
versities.63 The group conducted its fieldwork in early 1987 and submitted 
its report to the government in October 1987. The report observed that, de-
spite the tremendous expansion of the university system since 1960, higher 
education in Nigeria faced a crisis largely due to the unplanned, ad-hoc 
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expansion of enrolments, universities, and faculties during periods of peak 
oil revenues, resulting in higher overall costs and unit costs. The report re-
vealed two areas of excessive costs: the proportion of expenditures devoted 
to administration, and the high costs of running postgraduate programs in 
all subjects at all universities, even when there were few students in each 
course.64 The study found that Nigerian universities spent about 46–57 per 
cent of their allocations on administration and much less on teaching.65
The World Bank report endorsed the doctrine of rationalization. 
Largely echoing the spirit behind SAP, it recommended the freezing of 
a number of departments and faculties in all federal universities. It also 
urged the closure of all postgraduate programs where enrolments failed to 
reach a cost-effective level; an increase in the number of courses for which 
an economically feasible level of fees can be charged, and the gradual intro-
duction of tuition fees to cover 15 to 20 per cent of the unit recurrent cost. 
To encourage the study of science, it asked the government to charge a 
lower percentage of total costs for students in priority science fields and 
a higher percentage for those in non-priority arts fields as well as 100 per 
cent of direct teaching costs for all postgraduate students. It also requested 
government to charge user fees for housing, schools, water, health services, 
and so forth. Finally, it called for frequent workshops to be conducted on 
how the university system and its functions could be rationalized so as to 
become less of a burden on federal and state budgets, while maintaining or 
even improving quality and effectiveness.66 The report, above all, indicated 
the World Bank’s readiness to grant Nigeria a loan to help it consolidate 
the quality and effectiveness of university education.
Rationalization of universities, as endorsed by the World Bank, was 
a highly discussed issue in 1987. It dominated the proceedings of the 
international seminar sponsored by the NUC, the CVC, and the British 
Council titled, “Management of University Resources.” In his address at 
the seminar, the federal minister for education, Jibril Aminu, highlighted 
the government’s resolve to pursue the policy, indicating that the antici-
pated government white paper on curriculum reform would reflect that.67 
Additionally, all universities, as the communiqué issued at the end of the 
CVC meeting indicated, would be required to draw up plans of ration-
alization of academic programs that would remove duplication of similar 
courses within and between universities and provide modalities for phasing 
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out, where necessary, programs that were neither attractive to students nor 
relevant to the economy.68 It also subscribed to the government’s vision of 
the university as contained in Aminu’s speech and emphasized the need for 
universities to explore alternative sources of funding as well as the need for 
industries to support the rehabilitation of university education.69
After due consultation, the federal government released the White 
Paper on higher education curriculum and development in December 1987. 
The paper reflected both the objectives of SAP and the observations and 
recommendations of the World Bank study group. It expressed the federal 
government’s acceptance of the principle of rationalization as a blueprint 
in developing Nigerian universities “in view of the present economic reces-
sion and the scarcity of funds.”70 The paper endorsed the vigorous pursuit 
and implementation of the 60:40 admission ratio in favour of sciences by 
both federal and state universities because of the importance of sciences in 
technological development. It therefore required universities to submit a 
schedule for achieving that ratio by the year 1990. Despite government’s 
stringent measure, it still wanted the expansion of university education in 
response to public demand. But this time, expansion must be controlled. 
To that end, the white paper approved 2.5 per cent and 10 per cent overall 
growth for older universities and younger universities respectively. In addi-
tion, it approved 15 per cent overall growth for the federal universities of 
technology (FUT), including four campuses/colleges resulting from mer-
ger of four former FUT.71 For state universities, it directed the NUC to 
ensure that they adopt the same principles in their development.
Directing the universities to draw up a plan of rationalization, the fed-
eral government empowered the NUC through Decree No. 16 to regulate 
the establishment of courses and standards in all universities.72 The NUC 
was to determine that by having a “complete inventory of facilities available 
in various faculties and departments of universities … and draw proposals 
for broad areas of concentration [forming] the nucleus of the concept of cen-
ters of excellence.”73 These directives were inspired by economic considera-
tions occasioned by SAP. It provided the federal government the oppor-
tunity to slow down the rate of growth in Nigerian universities, especially 
in the arts. In his address at the 11th Annual Seminar of the Committee 
of Vice-Chancellors on the theme Mobilizing Nigeria’s Education Towards 
Technological Self-Reliance, the president charged the universities to help 
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champion economic development and economic recovery.74 He insisted 
that universities would do that by supporting the government’s policy on 
science and technology and by being mindful of the need for Nigeria to 
take its rightful place in science and technology among advanced countries 
in the twenty-first century. As Babangida stated: 
[Nigeria] cannot continue to depend indefinitely on the ad-
vanced countries for our technological needs. In our attempt 
to achieve self-reliance, we have taken a number of measures, 
one of which is to encourage our universities to restructure their 
programmes to make them more relevant to the needs of the na-
tion. This need to be self-reliant is very pressing now – perhaps 
more so now than it has been at any other time. The economy is 
in a bad shape, occasioned by the international economic crisis, 
and, yet, as a nation, we cannot afford to be left behind in the 
march towards technological advancement.75
The vision of expanding access to science students seemed unrealistic 
unless facilities in the existing university could accommodate them. The 
aggregates data for the entire 1978/79–1984/85 period revealed that, out 
of 1,151,018 who sought university admission, less than 12 per cent se-
cured admission.76 Percentages of admissions spread across disciplines re-
veal shortages of university places in all areas. Education ranked highest 
(18.0%); Arts (17.0%), Science (15.3%), and Social Sciences (14.5%) fol-
lowed it. Engineering and Technology achieved an 11.8 per cent admis-
sion rate while the corresponding figure for Medicine was 11.0 per cent. 
The admission rate for the discipline of Law, which ranked second in the 
level of applications, was only 5.6 per cent or eight out of nine in terms of 
ranking.77 These numbers show that the demand for university places in all 
the disciplines was higher than its supply, and so there was need for more 
places as well as more courses to satisfy demand. In that sense, rationaliza-
tion threatened access to university education. As Festus Iyayi puts it, the 
solutions are far from “programme closures, mergers or concentration with 
their attendant and apparent implications for reduced student enrolment in 
the universities, but the expansion of existing programmes and opening of 
new ones to ensure that a greater level of demand is satisfied.”78 Moreover, 
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government’s insistence on 60:40 for science and arts courses seemed 
doomed to be unsuccessful without addressing the root of the problem 
– funding science education in primary and secondary schools. Since the 
1960s, the governments had failed to make an adequate effort to invest 
in science subjects at the primary and secondary schools, thus accounting 
for the continued low demand for science courses at the university level. 
The existing secondary schools were ill-equipped to produce scientifically 
minded candidates for university education. As a professor B.I.C. Ijeomah 
noted,
Even with the best legislation, unless the primary and second-
ary schools are science oriented, unless technocratic conscious-
ness permeates the home, primary and secondary levels, unless 
the teachers themselves ab initio, think and teach scientifically 
the 60–40 ratio will remain a twentieth century mirage.79
Although the development of universities in the late 1980s was sensitive 
to the needs of the economy, the emphasis on sciences generated constant 
debate because of the feeling that discrimination in favour of science and 
technology courses was not a guarantee to economic development. Indeed, 
government’s efforts to train more technocrats to the neglect of the bureau-
crats, as Ijeomah noted, “would breed incompetence in the management of 
human resources.”80 Moreover, the emphasis on science and technology, 
he insisted, “is the tragedy of modem trend in university education.”81 The 
White Paper, however, believed otherwise, insisting that the lopsided uni-
versity enrolment in favour of arts-related disciplines was laying the foun-
dation to development. In line with the new attitude of the administration, 
Babangida revisited the federal universities of technology that were merged 
by his predecessor. The six-man committee he appointed under the leader-
ship of Professor Nurudeen Adedipe, had the responsibility of making 
recommendations on demerging the campuses at Yola, Bauchi, Makurdi, 
and Abeokuta from the conventional universities, as well as considering 
the possibility of converting two into specialized universities of agriculture 
mindful of its financial, physical, and academic implications.82
After conducting a study of all the federal universities of technology, 
the Adedipe-led committee discovered that nothing had really changed 
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for the better after the merger of the four universities. On the contrary, 
the committee noted that the merger promoted “high administrative cost 
and the risk to life and property occasioned by physical separation by long 
distances involving frequent commuting of staff between them and foster 
Universities.”83 According to the committee, despite the merger, the NUC 
had continued to fund the merged universities thus ensuring that they re-
tained their financial autonomy while bearing the names of their parent 
universities.84 Acting on the committee’s report, the federal government 
restored the former federal universities of technology at Bauchi and Yola to 
their autonomous status in 1988 and re-established those in Abeokuta and 
Makurdi as specialized universities of Agriculture.85 With the demerging 
of four former universities in Yola, Bauchi, Makurdi, and Abeokuta and 
the establishment of the University of Abuja (UA) in 1988, the number of 
universities in Nigeria returned to thirty-one.
The federal government had established UA based on the recognition 
that Abuja, the new federal capital of Nigeria, required an institution of 
higher learning that would cater to the educational needs of the inhabit-
ants of the territory in particular and the nation in general. Given the poor 
state of the economy, the founding of UA was not immediate. In fact, it 
took the federal government two years to establish the minimum necessary 
facilities for the university to open for academic activities in 1990 at its 
temporary campus located in Gwagwalada. This was even as Babangida 
created two additional states in the country, which shortly began to push 
for a university.86
The Impact of IMF/World Bank Policies on Universities
Since the introduction of SAP in 1986, allocation to universities declined 
even as inflation continued to rise. In 1986 the federal universities requested 
the sum of N720,922,533 but received only N347,940,519. In 1987 and 
1988, while the universities requested N731,077,751 and N805,284,664, 
the federal government allocated N270,356,000 and N434, 356, 000 re-
spectively.87 Shortfalls in allocations led to the suspension of further expan-
sion of facilities and the gradual decay of existing facilities due to lack of 
maintenance. Concerned that the universities could not properly function 
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let alone fulfill the responsibilities outlined by the president, given the 
crippling effects of under-funding, the Vice-Chancellors of Nigerian uni-
versities sent a delegation to the president in 1988 to demand more funds. 
Adamu Nayaya Mohammed, chairperson of the CVC and the leader of the 
delegation, notified the president of the dilemma facing Nigerian universi-
ties. He asked,
Given the increasing number of potential University students, 
the shortage of financial resources and the necessity for re-
definition of the contents, distribution and method of delivery 
of academic programmes, what should we do in the universities 
in order to survive and ensure that the system is sustained?88
Though the president seemed sympathetic, he did not make a commit-
ment to increase funding but lent his support for a World Bank loan for 
the education sector.89 The loan aimed to make foreign exchange available 
for the provision of facilities such as library books, journals, provision and 
maintenance of science-related equipment, and completion of abandoned 
academic facilities.90 This loan satisfied government’s notion of quality 
education as opposed to mass education. It aimed at equipping the fed-
eral universities with quality laboratories and research facilities, especially 
to champion the country’s scientific and technological development.91 As 
a condition for the extension of the loan (called eligibility criteria), the 
World Bank demanded that universities implement the recommendations 
outlined in the government white paper on curricular reform by reducing 
all the uneconomical and unviable faculties and departments and remove 
some support and administrative staff. In addition, they were required to 
raise postgraduate fees, make hostels self-financing, and increase revenues 
from non-governmental sources.92 The World Bank extended a credit 
of $120 million, dubbed the Federal Universities Development Sector 
Adjustment Credit.93 The credit was the Bank’s first attempt to assist major 
university reform in sub-Saharan Africa, targeting Nigeria, the country 
with the largest university system in Africa.94 It came at a time of low sup-
ply of university places and declining government financing caused by the 
sharp fall in petroleum prices.
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By pushing a structural adjustment of universities as a condition for the 
$120 million loan, the World Bank reaffirmed its faulty and questionable 
position on limited investment in higher education. Since the 1970s, the 
World Bank had advised African governments to redirect funds from their 
“incompetent, inefficient, and inequitable” higher education to basic edu-
cation, and allow privatization to fill the gap.95 Drawing on social rates of 
return analyses to emphasize the importance of basic education, it insisted 
that it was more productive for African countries to invest their meagre 
resources in primary and basic education. Nigeria rightly resisted the pres-
sure to give in to World Bank prescriptions in the 1970s and early 1980s 
because resources were available to fund educational expansion at all levels. 
The federal and state governments sought to provide as many young people 
as possible access to primary, secondary, and higher education. However, in 
1986, when the government of Babangida was in dire need of World Bank/
IMF assistance to resolve its balance of payment deficits, it accepted their 
conditions, which stipulated diverting resources from higher education. 
This thinking consequently guided post-1986 higher education policies as 
state support for higher education declined. University education became 
one of its casualties “for it was said to be an expensive luxury.”96 In his 
study, Sadique revealed that the World Bank influenced the federal gov-
ernment in reallocating resources in order to shift emphasis from arts and 
humanities to science, engineering, and accountancy. He further reported 
that the bank even insisted on choosing the contractors who were to supply 
the needed materials such as books, journals, and laboratory consumables, 
and that all of these contractors were foreign companies.97 World Bank's 
selfish neo-colonial interest is quite evident here.
The drastic reduction in university funding had negative consequences 
on the university system. Expansion of facilities halted while enrolment 
grew faster than the absorptive capacity of the universities. The result was 
overcrowding, infrastructural decay, and an unfriendly learning environ-
ment for both students and faculty. Besides, irregular payment of faculty 
salaries created related problems as faculty either took on part-time jobs 
or accepted bribes from students. The quality of education received by the 
students declined considerably, compromising the relevance of higher edu-
cation to societal needs. In its 1989 annual conference on the theme “The 
Role of Universities in National Recovery,” the CVC blamed the SAP for 
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the fate of universities.98 Proper funding of universities was essential to 
their smooth development. Denying them funds badly disorganized the 
universities’ central operation and consequently produced an agitated aca-
demic climate. As Ray Ekpu confirmed,
This cash crisis has resulted in jammed classrooms, suffocat-
ing hostel accommodation, congested laboratories and empty 
libraries.… These pressures on facilities are not merely physical, 
they are psychological as well. They raise the blood pressure of 
teachers and the taught and render them easily irritable, frus-
trated, angry, and the cumulative effect of these pressures is that 
if a little match is struck they catch fire.99
Many university teachers left for the private sector due to their frustration 
with government’s inability to address problems in the universities. Others 
went overseas for higher salaries and better conditions of service, a phe-
nomenon called ‘brain drain.’ The presidential committee on brain drain, 
set up in February 1989 to examine the problem, defined it as “the depar-
ture of highly trained professionals, intellectuals, talents and specialists in 
any field of endeavor … as a result of frustration from poor or inadequate 
remuneration, or from not having opportunities to fulfill professional 
aspirations in the given social context.”100 The committee’s report revealed 
a sustained exodus of intellectuals from Nigerian universities from 1987 to 
1990. For instance, data from seven universities indicate that 45 left from 
the sciences while 37 left from the arts in 1987/88 session. In 1988/89 
session, 82 left from the sciences while 43 left from the arts. In 1989/90, 
46 left from the sciences and 90 from the arts.101 As the Report of the Study 
Group Submitted to The World Bank Project Implementation Unit noted, the 
departing faculty were dissatisfied with the “ghetto-like work environment 
characterized by inadequate facilities (offices, lecture and seminar rooms, 
lecture theatres, laboratories, water, electricity) and short supplies in equip-
ment, reagents, current books and journals, teaching/learning resources 
and basic furniture.”102
An African Concord editorial of 25 September 1989 reported that in 
Obafemi Awolowo University (former University of Ife) many academic 
departments were in danger of being closed down because of the mass 
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departure of lecturers and the devaluation of the naira.103 Though the an-
nual student population increase in the universities was low, faculty in-
crease was far lower. While student enrolment in universities grew at an 
annual rate of 7 per cent, the academic staff numbers increased by only 2 
per cent. Academic staff strength increased as follows: 8770 in 1984/85; 
9014 in 1985/86; 9103 in 1986/87; 9216 in 1987/88; 9547 in 1988/89; and 
9621 in 1989/90.104
The impact of rationalization of policies of the Babangida regime was 
largely felt in university admissions. Annual enrolment rate between 1986 
and 1990 dropped significantly. It was 10.9 in 1986, but later dropped as 
follows: 6.7 in 1987/88; 7.2 in 1988/89; and 4.9 in 1989/90.105 Although 
the number of students rose from 116,822 in 1983 to 180,871 in 1990, 
that number was still insignificant, given the huge population of Nigerians 
within the eligible university age group between fifteen and twenty-five 
years.106 That age group, according to Sam Aluko, a top Nigerian econo-
mist, constituted about 25 per cent of the total population of Nigeria.107 This 
means that only 0.8 per cent of them were in school in 1990. Compared 
to other countries, Nigeria fell below Kenya’s 2 per cent; Ghana, Liberia, 
Zambia, and Ivory Coast’s 4 per cent; Morocco’s 8 per cent; and Egypt’s 
15 per cent. It was 18 per cent in the Philippines, as well as in most Latin 
American countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and 
Guatemala.108 However, in keeping with government science policy, enrol-
ments in science courses slightly surged between 1984 and 1990. Students 
in the sciences and related courses were more than those in the arts. While 
the number of students in arts-related courses increased from 60,818 in 
1984/85 to 81,339 in 1989/1990, enrolment in science-related courses 
increased from 52,920 to 91,736 during the same period.109 While these 
statistics suggest that government’s efforts at promoting science courses 
yielded dividends, ironically, there was more graduate output in the arts 
than in the sciences. Graduate output in science-related courses increased 
from 11,403 in 1984/85 to 16,080 in 1989/90 while the number in arts-
related courses jumped from 15,269 to 21,410 during the same period.110
Although the total student enrolment in the universities was low, the 
demand for admission slots was high. For instance, in 1990, JAMB re-
ceived 290,296 applications for placement in universities, out of which only 
48,504 gained admissions. This represented only 16 per cent of applicants. 
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More than 80 per cent of candidates denied admissions were from the 
South. Consequently, a high-pressure bottleneck developed for new can-
didates with each passing year. Besides, the incidence of exam cancella-
tion due to massive malpractices prevented many potential candidates from 
securing university admission. This situation has continued annually since 
the establishment of JAMB in 1977.111
Reaffirming its emphasis on technological and science-based educa-
tion, in January 1990, the federal government launched the First National 
Rolling Plan (FNRP), 1990–92, which restated that the doctrine of ration-
alization, consolidation, and cost-effectiveness to be the “guiding prin-
ciple in the overall strategy to use the available resources to maintain and 
improve existing infrastructures and the internal efficiency of the entire 
educational system.”112 The FNRP also maintained that the various cost-
reduction and cost-recovery measures started during the preceding plan 
period, such as removal of the subsidy on student feeding and movement 
towards off-campus accommodation for students would remain. Given the 
limited resources available and the scarcity of paid employment in the or-
ganized labour market, the FNRP aimed
at consolidation and maintenance of existing facilities. For this 
reason no new universities will be established during the roll-
ing plan period 1990–1992 and any state government wishing 
to do so will receive no assistance whatsoever from the federal 
government.113
The FNRP allocated a total amount of N285 million to all the federal 
universities. This accounted for about 35 per cent of the total allocation for 
the education sector, showing a reduction in the previous pattern whereby 
universities received a predominantly higher amount. This reduction was 
explained by the federal government’s new emphasis on training a middle-
level technical workforce from the polytechnics and technical colleges.114 
However, the FNRP underscored the government’s determination to re-
duce poverty and hunger when it stated that the newly established uni-
versities of agriculture at Makurdi and Abeokuta would be “sufficiently 
funded in order to make the desired impact on the nation’s food produc-
tion programme.”115 By converting two universities of technology to that 
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of agriculture and making huge financial allocations to these universities, 
it was clear that the federal government aimed to produce agricultural-
ists to help in alleviating hunger. This did not constitute massification be-
cause only a few segments of university-eligible candidates desired to study 
agriculture.
At the thirteenth annual seminar of the CVC in 1990, the president 
reaffirmed his commitment to implement the provision of the FNRP and 
cautioned the academic community, except the universities of agricul-
ture, against excessive optimism. He informed the vice-chancellors that 
the problems facing the universities were the direct consequence of gov-
ernment’s “shrinking financial resources.”116 According to the president, 
“the insatiable demand for university education” had combined with the 
“economic difficulties facing the country” to affect the proper funding 
of universities. He maintained that “the universities should always bear 
in mind that they constitute only a part of the national education system 
[and] in spite of the competing demands from other sectors of our public 
life, the Federal Government remains resolutely committed to ensure that 
the universities survive.”117 By using the word “survive,” it was apparent 
that the president was not prepared to embark on further establishment 
or expansion of university facilities but instead sought to cope with the 
consequences of past experiments with massification as well as to control 
the process.
Conclusion
What is remarkable about the period between 1983 and 1990 was the 
negative impact of the rationalization policies of the Buhari and Babangida 
governments on university expansion. By suspending further proliferation 
of universities due to the ailing economy, the federal government un-
successfully sought to consolidate and re-position the existing universities 
to make effective contributions to national economic recovery. Owing to 
the drastic reduction in government financial grants, the universities lacked 
sufficient funds to build new facilities, let alone maintain the existing ones. 
Consequently, the existing facilities in virtually all universities deterior-
ated. Massification suffered. Nevertheless, another increase in oil revenue 
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in August 1990 due to the first Gulf War compelled Babangida to re-think 
his university policy in favour of expansion, resulting in the fifth push for 
massification, 1990–2000.
185
Crisis of Nationhood: Funding Issues, 
Socio-Political Instability, and Private 
University Education, 1990–2000
If you ask any Vice Chancellor of a Nigerian university what 
keeps him awake in the night, the response is likely student 
problems: accommodation, electricity, water and classrooms. 
Note that these are basically municipal services. The other core 
responsibilities of the university such as research, innovation, and 
publications are not on their radar not because they do not care 
but it reflects the reality of the day-to-day existence in campuses. 
– Kole Ahmed Shettima, 2006
Introduction
The pursuit of rationalization policies by the regimes of presidents 
Mahammed Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida checked university expansion 
between 1983 and 1990. Funding decreased as university facilities con-
sequently deteriorated, leading to a decline in annual percentage of stu-
dent enrolment. In its 2 April 1990 cover story, “The Crash of Education,” 
Newswatch articulated the gradual decay of the physical and instructional 
facilities in all universities.1 As the problems in the universities persisted, 
the country’s economic, political, and social crisis deepened, motivating 
an unsuccessful coup attempt to topple the Babangida administration in 
7
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1990. This chapter examines university education at a time of ongoing 
political and economic crisis in the Nigerian nation-state. It shows how 
the attempted military coup in 1990 and the renewed debate over a quota 
system highlighted the lingering divisions and conflicts that continue to 
threaten the nation-building project of postcolonial Nigerian governments. 
It also demonstrates how economic and political instability affected ad-
equate funding and expansion of universities, making the establishment 
of satellite campuses inevitable and the emergence of private universities a 
welcome initiative. As this chapter demonstrates, the impact of political in-
stability on the universities, the politicization of university expansion, and 
the radicalization of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) 
are essential in understanding the problems confronting universities dur-
ing the period of incessant socio-economic and political crisis in Nigeria, 
1990–2000.
Nigeria, Still a Divided Nation
The successive postcolonial governments in Nigeria had sought to engage, 
among other things, mass university education in promoting both eco-
nomic development and nation-building. The country’s domestic scene in 
the 1990s showed that the goal was improbable. As in many developing 
countries, the implementation of the IMF-Structural Adjustment Program 
since 1986 led to increased poverty, inflation, unemployment, crime, and 
unrest in Nigeria.2 Ethnic/religious conflicts, largely involving northerners 
and southerners, continued to generate bad blood in national politics.3 In 
spite of its abundant human and materials resources, Nigeria seemed, as 
many analysts have acknowledged, a dream unfulfilled. Thomas-Ogboji 
captures Nigeria’s situation fittingly when he states,
Nigeria, the comatose giant of Africa, may go down in history 
as the biggest country ever to go directly from colonial subju-
gation to complete collapse, without an intervening period of 
successful rule. So much promise, so much waste; such a dis-
appointment. Such a shame. Makes you sick.4
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Faced with increasing economic hardship, many southerners easily blamed 
northern political elite for mismanaging the country’s resources and for 
holding on to power endlessly. Beside President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
whose regime was brief, only lasting from 1976 to 1979, all past Nigerian 
presidents since independence were northerners. Babangida had, begin-
ning in 1986, started an endless process of transfer of power to civilian 
regime, frequently reneging on his promises. Major Gideon Okar, a mil-
itary officer from a minority ethnic group in the Middle Belt region of 
Nigeria, captured the frustrations of many Nigerians with the country’s 
political leadership in a coup he led in April 1990. This coup highlighted 
the instability in Nigeria and the fear of domination and deprivation that 
had dominated the relations between the North and the South since the 
amalgamation of the two areas in 1914.5 Emphasizing southern misgiv-
ings, Gideon Orkar declared that the coup was different from others as it 
was “a well conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginal-
ized, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the south with 
a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery 
and colonization by a clique of this country.”6
The coup plotters viewed Babangida’s transition program with suspi-
cion, believing that he wanted to remain in power in order to protect the 
privilege the North had enjoyed since Nigeria’s independence.7 They saw 
Babangida’s delays in handing over power as an attempt to “install him-
self as Nigeria’s life president at all cost,” and an example of “repressive 
intrigues by those who think it is their birthright to dominate till eternity 
the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclu-
sion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south.”8 The coup plotters 
demonstrated their seriousness when Orkar announced “a temporary deci-
sion to excise the following states namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano 
and Bauchi states from the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”9 These states are 
located in the far North and had produced most of the presidents from 
the North who dictated major policies in the country. Orkar summed up 
the obstacle to Nigeria’s development when he blamed the leadership con-
trolled by northerners:
This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and 
unrivalled fostering of mediocrity and outright detest for 
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accountability, all put together have been our undoing as a na-
tion. This will ever remain our threat if not checked immedi-
ately. It is strongly believed that without the intrigues perpe-
trated by this clique and misrule, Nigeria will have in all ways 
achieved developmental virtues comparable to those in Korea, 
Taiwan, Brazil, India, and even Japan.10
With reference to quota system, which many southerners criticized, Orkar 
blamed the leaders for the “deliberate disruption of the educational cul-
ture and retarding its place to suit the favoured class to the detriment of 
other educational minded parts of this country.”11 Although Babangida’s 
administration eventually apprehended and executed the coup plotters, the 
coup continued to resonate in different circles in the country, including in 
university education. For instance when Babangida set up the commission 
on Higher Education in the 90s and Beyond chaired by Gray Longe to main-
ly “review the development of Post-Secondary and Higher Education in 
Nigeria since the last comprehensive report of the 1960 commission,” the 
issue of a quota system resurfaced.12 Most of the submissions to the Gray 
Longe Commission from South questioned the quota system of admission 
that continued to mandate 20 per cent of intakes from the educationally 
disadvantaged states. Particularly infuriating for many southerners was 
the wisdom of basing significant percentage of university admission on the 
“disadvantaged status” and “catchment area” formula. Many of the submis-
sions argued that the quota system was morally defenceless and contrary 
to the spirit of the constitution. The argument was that if the system was 
justified two decades ago because of imbalance in educational opportunity, 
the creation of thousands of primary and hundreds of secondary schools 
in the North ought to have given the so-called disadvantaged states the 
opportunity to catch up.13
As some Nigerians argued, the quota system failed to close the gap 
between the two regions due to northerner’s negative attitude towards 
Western education. According to Emman Shehu, a northerner and the 
publisher of Envoy, a weekly newspaper, “the feudal order has made it diffi-
cult for parents to allow their children to stay in school. You want to bridge 
the gap, yet you tell people that Western education is evil.”14 However, 
Shehu perceived the quota system as an insult to the North because it cast 
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the region as inherently inferior to the South. As he said, “I write the same 
examination with somebody from another state. Then you say because I 
am from Sokoto, my cut-off is 20 percent while the other man’s cut-off 
is 60 percent. This is an insult.”15 Although the northern states had been 
classified as disadvantaged since independence, the status was not meant to 
confer on them a permanent advantage. In fact, the underlying philosophy 
of the quota system was to place the North ultimately on equal footing 
with the South. But the most sustainable approach to closing the educa-
tional gap was to set a timeframe when the implementation of the quota 
system would stop while at the same time addressing the root causes of 
the North’s disadvantaged status. Chimere Ikoku, the vice-chancellor of 
UNN, affirmed that the idea of a quota system is
that someday in the future, the policy will dissolve. And we 
should ask the question, how have these states fared? Yes, state 
X is disadvantaged today. If we really want to remove the dis-
advantage, we must time the process. When will that state stop 
being disadvantaged? … What is responsible for the disadvan-
taged status? Is it classrooms, books, or teachers?”16
Although the introduction of a quota system represents government’s ef-
forts to guarantee equal representations of all Nigerians in order to foster 
national unity, ironically it became a source of disunity itself. It seemed 
to be an easy way out for the disadvantaged status of the North, but after 
what the Longe commission described as a “considerable soul-searching” 
and “careful weighting of the pros and cons,” it proposed a quota formula 
to correct many deep-seated prejudices and mollify “justified indignation” 
toward a quota system. As shown in Table 7.1, the commission wanted 
the percentage of admission allocated to merit to increase while those for 
disadvantaged states and catchment area were to decrease. It also wanted 
the criteria for discretionary admission to remain at 10 per cent from 1990 
to 2000.17
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Table 7.1: Percentage of Admission Allocated to: Merit, Catchment Area, 
Disadvantaged States, and Discretion.
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Merit 40 50 55 60 65 70
Catchment Area 30 25 25 25 20 20
Disadvantaged States 20 15 10 5 5 0
Discretion 10 10 10 10 10 10
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Higher Education in the 90s and Beyond: Report of the Commission 
on the Review of Higher Education in Nigeria (Lagos: Government Printing Office, 1991), 153.
Not all the members of the commission accepted the gradual phasing out 
of the quota system. For instance, Rex F.O. Akpofure argued that the ma-
jority report did not go far enough. In a minority report, Akpofure stressed 
that the quota system had continued to harm the minds of Nigerian youth 
precisely because its implementation contradicted the spirit of social jus-
tice. According to him, “the system should be ended quickly, before it does 
more harm to our ethos as one people.”18 Akpofure affirmed that since a 
quota system was first introduced in 1976 in admissions to federal govern-
ment secondary schools, “it should substantially have solved or reduced the 
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged States. That it is said not to 
have done so, is in my honest view because those it was intended to assist, 
no longer see the need for that special effort to close the gap.”19 The debate 
on the quota system meant that the Nigerian state still carried with it the 
burden of history. It shows that the desire to forge a united nation through 
quota in a pluralistic society where educational attainments and opportun-
ities were unequal presents a risk of compromising the unity that the policy 
originally intended to affirm.
The federal government rejected the recommendation of the commis-
sion with respect to quota.  In a white paper on the recommendations of 
the Longe’s Commission, the federal government insisted that inequality 
was an inescapable ‘fact of life’ and the government’s duty was to “rec-
ognize and address the problem pragmatically,” noting, however, that it 
will “continue to review the admissions formula from time to time within 
the context of our development.”20 This decision only confirmed southern 
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suspicion of northern domination and further added to their frustration. 
That the government discarded the phasing out of the quota system is not 
surprising. The quota system was introduced to enhance equal representa-
tions of northerners and southerners in all universities. The educationally 
‘backward’ North hoped that the system would help the region catch up 
with the educationally advanced South. The phasing out of the quota sys-
tem would affect northerners, who, of course, dominated the apex of the 
federal government. Therefore, it was only natural (though not excusable) 
for the federal government to resist this aspect of the commission’s recom-
mendations. Since the federal government was conscious of closing the 
educational gap between the North and the South, regional and ethnic 
considerations, not academic quality, overshadowed government’s decision.
The continuing tension in the country affected university education. 
Given the instability in the country, education assumed less importance 
in the scheme of things, as keeping the country together became an over-
riding concern of the government. Unrest in the country relegated univer-
sity education to the background as maintaining the integrity of the state 
through dictatorial powers became crucial. The Orkar coup, which was 
popular in the South and the Middle Belt, showed how vulnerable the 
state was; it made the federal government desperate to protect it at all cost. 
Thus, during the 1990s, according to The Economist, “Defense and police 
budgets enjoy the largest slice of the national cake (and even so the figures 
are underestimated, since the military imports are paid for with dollars 
bought cheaply at the government exchange rates).”21 As funding for uni-
versities shrank in spite of government’s rhetoric regarding its commitment 
to the expansion of university education, facilities deteriorated and learn-
ing suffered. Thus, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) was 
compelled to embark on a difficult crusade to rescue the life of universities.
Poor Funding, ASUU, and Military Dictatorship
The Orkar’s coup terrified Babangida, but he was relieved that the coun-
try’s economic fortunes changed dramatically following the U.S.-led war 
against Iraq (Gulf War) in 1990/91. Oil prices suddenly rose with a posi-
tive effect on Nigerian finances. The World Bank estimated that the total 
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oil export revenue in 1990 was US$14 billion, a 49 per cent increase over 
the 1989 level.22 Having successfully rescheduled Nigerian debts, there was 
far less fiscal pressure on the federal government. One would have thought 
that addressing social and economic issues would take centre stage in gov-
ernment’s policies. In fact, in a memorandum to the Longe Commission, 
the Committee of Vice-Chancellors advised that the oil “windfall should 
be institutionalized and made at not less than N20 million for at least 5 
years from 1990, specifically for the provision and maintenance of [uni-
versity] projects of a capital nature.”23 The CVC knew that oil sales had 
brought increased revenue to the government and called on the government 
to apply the money to maintain and expand university facilities. Judging 
by previous experience where the federal government went on a spending 
spree in similar circumstances, the CVC had good reasons to demand the 
institutionalization of grants over a five-year period.
In its report, the Longe commission blamed the funding crisis facing 
Nigerian universities on the military and civilian regime of the 1970s and 
1980 for pursuing an extravagant and unrestrained proliferation of univer-
sities because of a mistaken faith in the continuity of oil revenue. It noted 
that Nigeria’s “higher educational institutions have grown far more rapidly 
in numbers than the Ashby commission could possibly have projected.”24 
Although many factors accounted for this expansion, the commission 
located “political considerations” as the “predominant single factor.”25 It 
stated that for the next ten to twenty years, Nigeria would not be able to 
afford the luxury of indiscriminate establishment of institutions because of 
the “far reaching and often irrevocable consequences of inadequate plan-
ning for such institutions.”26 Such consequences, as the World Bank noted, 
include the incidence of “extravagance in physical development of the uni-
versities, with many grandiose projects started without the fund needed 
to complete them.”27 The commission revealed that the cost of unfinished 
projects in 1988 was N1.2 billion, and at 1991 rates, “the cost of completion 
could be up to N3.0 billion.”28 The commission cautioned government to 
avoid haphazard establishment of institutions and embarking on extrava-
gant physical projects. The Guardian special report on the “Sorry State of 
the Universities” uncovered many abandoned projects in most universities, 
which limited student enrolment as well as tied university funds.29 What 
the commission implied in its recommendation was that adequate financial 
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and physical planning ought to precede the establishment of universities in 
order to guarantee sustainable expansion of university education.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Longe Commission, 
political considerations still drove the founding of new universities that 
emerged in the 1990s. Although the federal government retained the 
states’ right to own universities since 1979, the creation of states, which 
were mostly economically unviable, reinforced their dependency on the 
federal government.30 In 1991, the federal government created ten states, 
bringing the total number of states to thirty-one. Due to the centralized 
nature of military governments, the federal government did not perceive 
state creation as a tool for decentralization, yet the beneficiaries saw them 
as federal handouts or their fair share of the national wealth. While pol-
itical in its motivation, the creation of states had implications for univer-
sity expansion. Some of the newly created states were fortunate to inherit 
existing universities within their territories, leaving the parent states with-
out either a state or federal university. For instance, Imo State forfeited 
Imo State University located in Okigwe to the newly created Abia State. 
Consequently, Imo State commenced plans to set up a university, since they 
had no control over the federal university of technology located within it. 
Because Akwa Ibom State, created in 1987, had secured a federal univer-
sity, the newly created states demanded the same, including the location of 
federal universities in their states. By 1992, five state universities emerged 
to satisfy political interests. The federal government set up the Nnamdi 
Azikiwe University, Awka, in Anambra State, in addition to establishing 
the University of Agriculture, Umudike, to balance the location of the 
federal universities of agriculture in the former northern and western re-
gions.31 Similarly, four state universities were also established: Imo State 
University, Owerri; Benue State University; Bagauda University of Science 
and Technology, Kano; and Delta State University, Abraka. These new 
universities had one thing in common: they followed the creation of new 
states. For instance, the creation of Abia State from former Imo State and 
subsequent forfeiture of former Imo State University (established in 1981) 
to Abia State, compelled Imo to establish its own university. The same ap-
plied to all other universities. The politics of state creation were, therefore, 
an essential part of the politics of founding universities.
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Members of the Longe Commission were aware of the 1990 oil boom 
and the improved financial strength of the federal government and as such 
requested the federal government to provide “80 percent of the annual re-
current expenditure of each of the Federal Universities and those institu-
tions should find the balance of 20 percent from internal revenue genera-
tion efforts and other sources.”32 Implementation of this recommendation 
would have halted the decay in the universities but the federal government 
issued a response in 1992 that flatly rejected it. Instead, it insisted that the 
government would “continue to make its contributions towards higher edu-
cation within its budgetary constraint [while] … each institution should 
work towards self-sufficiency.”33 It was odd that a government that asked 
JAMB in 1991 to increase student intake by 20 per cent would at the 
same time refuse to make a financial commitment to universities mindful 
of the potential pressure the increase would put on the existing facilities. 
Nigerians aspiring for university education hoped that the directive would 
boost the supply of university education by reducing the pressure mounted 
on JAMB each year. A very high number of candidates sat for UME exams 
yearly owing to the cumulative carry-over of unsuccessful candidates from 
previous years. Due to insufficient facilitates, many students who passed 
the exam still failed to secure admission.34 In any case, increasing student 
intake without an urgent and corresponding expansion of facilities was cer-
tainly not in the interest of universities. If anything, it threatened to strain 
already overstretched facilities.
While Babangida acknowledged in his 1991 budget speech that the 
universities “are the apex of our educational system and a veritable lever for 
national cohesion and development,” his subsequent actions contradicted 
his words.35 Consolidation of political power through patronage of mem-
bers of the armed forces became a top priority for the government. While 
the government did not favour the idea of providing 80 per cent of the 
financial needs of the universities, it was willing to spend lavishly to retain 
power. Motivated by the oil wealth and determined to sustain the loyalty 
of the armed forces, the Babangida regime launched a huge, irresponsible 
spending program aimed at rehabilitating the police and military barracks, 
thus increasing spending on security. A World Bank report completed 
in early 1991 noted that “there was a breakdown in fiscal and monetary 
discipline in 1990 … not only characterized by additional spending and 
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monetary expansion but also by a major surge in expenditures bypass-
ing budgetary mechanisms for expenditure authorization and control.”36 
In 1992, Babangida offered new Peugeot cars to nearly 3,000 of his loyal 
military officers, which cost the equivalent of $21,000 each. This amount 
was five times the yearly salary of a senior university professor, who earned 
about $4,000 a year.37
Equal attention was not paid to other sectors of the economy, including 
university education where limited vacancies denied admission to a “large 
number of eligible candidates aspiring to study in these institutions.”38 This 
apparent disregard of the plight of universities irked the Academic Staff 
Union of Universities (ASUU). It was largely due to the neglect of univer-
sity education that ASUU emerged as a strong voice for the university sys-
tem. Since the introduction of SAP in 1986, ASUU had made unsuccessful 
demands on the government to provide adequate funds for the universities, 
often citing the decay of infrastructural facilities. The government rejec-
tion of the Longe Commission recommendation to increase its financial 
allocation for universities while it continued to spend on security, as well as 
mismanaging the oil revenue, compelled ASUU to embark on a strike on 
May 1992, forcing all the universities to close down.39
The reasons for the ASUU strike and their demands echoed the main 
proposal of Longe’s report. The union proposed three ways the govern-
ment could fund the universities, namely: (1) Stabilization (or Restoration) 
Grant of at least 5 per cent of total government revenue to be earmarked 
for universities and phased in over five years; (2) Endowment Fund of 
N1billion, administered by NUC, under an appropriate Trust Deed to fi-
nance research, which would insulate the universities against “variability 
in grants and assure them of the funds needed to pursue their objectives 
vigorously”; and (3) a three year Rolling Plan for recurrent grant alloca-
tions to the universities.40 With the universities closed down, the federal 
government was compelled to commence negotiation with ASUU in June. 
As the ASUU/federal government negotiation commenced, the minister 
for education inaugurated the National Implementation Committee on the 
Report of the Review of Higher Education in Nigeria (NICRHEN) on 
19 June 1992. Part of the role of NICRHEN was to advise the federal 
government, among other things, on all financial, material, and other im-
plications of Longe’s recommendations.41 ASUU strike, which paralyzed 
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university activities, delayed the work of the committee. However, due to 
intense pressure from the civil society between 25 May and 3 September 
1992, Babangida accepted ASUU proposal and signed the agreement that 
met their demands. Universities reopened.
To guarantee sustainable financing of public universities, and in line 
with its agreement with ASUU, the federal government promulgated 
Decree No. 7 of 1993, which established the Education Tax Fund (ETF). 
Among other things, the objective of ETF was to provide funding for edu-
cational facilities and infrastructural development in all universities, poly-
technics, and colleges of education, both federal and state. This included 
the construction and renovation of lecture theatres, auditoriums, admin-
istrative blocks, and hostels.42 The decree required companies registered in 
Nigeria to pay 2 per cent of yearly profit to the ETF fund as an education 
tax. In addition, it stipulated that 50 per cent of the total collectable revenue 
would go to higher education, shared in the ratio of 2:1:1 for universities, 
polytechnics, and colleges of education, respectively.43 When the govern-
ment imposed the education tax, many foreign oil companies demanded 
exemption, arguing that the policy ran contrary to the Petroleum Profit 
Tax (PPT) Act of 1959, which precluded oil companies from paying any 
other tax after paying the PPT. The oil companies subsequently petitioned 
the finance minister, Anthony Ani. After a series of meetings, the federal 
government exempted the foreign companies from paying the education 
tax for 1993 but demanded that they still pay it to the tune of N2 billion in 
1994 and 1995.44 However, since the federal government did not appoint 
an ETF board until 1998, there was no assessment for the education tax 
for all companies in 1993 or collections. However, collections were made 
subsequently as follows: N4.5 billion in 1994–95; N6.6 billion in 1996–97; 
N6.4 billion in 1998–99. Nevertheless, it was not until 1999 that the money 
was allocated to different levels of the educational system.45
Following ASUU’s agreement with the federal government, the fed-
eral government increased the capital and recurrent grants to the federal 
universities from N3,055,864,940 in 1992 to N3,905,915,278 in 1993.46 
However, this increase did not have a significant impact on the universities 
partly because the value of the national currency had gone down such that 
the huge budgetary allocations amounted to little in real terms. According 
to the executive secretary of NUC, “the rate at which the Naira value has 
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been deteriorating has been faster than the rate at which we have been able 
to utilize the new funds that have been allocated to the universities for both 
recurrent and capital needs.”47 Besides, given the widespread corruption in 
the Babangida administration, there was a gap between what the govern-
ment budgeted and what it eventually disbursed.48 Therefore, the ASUU 
accused the government of non-implementation and violation of the 1992 
agreement and embarked on another four-month strike from May through 
September 1993.
Worse still was that due to the financial irresponsibility of the fed-
eral government in implementing the Structural Adjustment Program, the 
IMF withdrew its adjustment support, which led to the termination of 
the program. The attendant large fiscal deficits and economic stagnation 
heated the body politic, worsened the plight of universities, and showed 
that Nigeria’s economic problems were not necessarily fiscal, as the World 
Bank/IMF had dubiously suggested – and as Nigerian leaders had naively 
believed. Fiscal adjustment is not a panacea for the country’s fiscal-related 
ills unless it is “supported by measures to strengthen the quality of spending, 
addressing corruption and transparency issues.”49 Therefore, as Alexander 
Bamiloye commented, “The structural adjustment … is academic. The real 
adjustment is that of the mind as a people and as a nation.”50 Clearly, the 
real problem was human, not fiscal, and any solution that failed to address 
the human problem was bound to fail, as SAP’s failure demonstrated. The 
major human problem was leadership. As Chinua Achebe aptly stated,
There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or 
water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the un-
willingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, 
to the challenges of personal example which are the hallmarks 
of true leadership.51
This is not, of course, a simple task, given the pluralistic nature of Nigerian 
society and the historic regional conflict.
The fear of continued northern domination of the country crystallized 
in 1993 when Babangida annulled the 12 June 1993 presidential election in 
which a southerner, Moshood Abiola, emerged as the winner. The violence 
that followed the annulment threatened the corporate existence of the 
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Nigerian state, forcing Babangida to resign in August 1993.52 In an appar-
ent ploy to appease the South, Babangida handed over power to an interim 
government headed by a southerner, Ernest Shonekan. Three months into 
the new government, another military coup swept Shonekan out of power; 
Sani Abacha, a northerner, emerged as the new president. Increased vio-
lent pressure on Abacha to honour the June 12 election was met with brutal 
force, even as Abiola was thrown in prison, where he later died in 1998.
The fate of universities was sealed when Abacha became the president 
in November 1993. Taking over power in the wake of violence generated 
by the cancellation of the 12 June presidential elections, Abacha’s govern-
ment was in no mood to negotiate with ASUU, much less implement the 
1992 ASUU/FGN agreement. Consequently, ASUU embarked on an-
other strike in order to secure a commitment by government to respect 
the 1992 agreement, thereby paralyzing academic activities for five months 
from August 1994 to January 1995. In his 1995 budget speech, Abacha 
promised, as many of his predecessors had done, to devote a huge amount 
of funds to rehabilitate facilities in the existing universities in line with 
ASUU’s agreement with government in September 1992.53 Aware that 
no social and economic program would be executed successfully with-
out addressing the root causes of Nigerian economic problems, Abacha 
launched the Economic Recovery Programme, 1996–98. He argued that 
under SAP, debt rescheduling imposed a burden by bunching up payments 
later as well as attracting an extra annual sum of $2.5 billion in interest 
payments.54 Despite Abacha’s economic recovery policies, the conditions 
of universities did not get better; his government ignored ASSU’s con-
sistent demand for improved condition of service and better funding of 
universities. Consequently, the union embarked on a seven-month strike 
in 1996. Incensed by the frequent suspension of academic activities in the 
universities due to ASUU strikes, Abacha banned ASUU, including other 
university staff unions. He also dissolved their executives and asked them 
to forfeit their assets to the government.55 ASUU went underground and 
became ineffective. This ban remained in force until 1999.
Partly in search of a solution to social, economic, and political prob-
lems, and mostly to divert Nigerian attention from the dictatorship and 
corruption of his administration, Abacha promised to set up a committee 
to review the current situation of higher education, particularly to explain 
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why it had failed “to meet the nation’s developmental aspirations.”56 In his 
address, Abacha expressed concern about the sad situation of universities, 
emphasizing the need for immediate action “to address the issues so as to 
lay a solid foundation for the emergence of a befitting educational system 
that will help propel the nation into the 21st Century.”57 On 1 October 
1996, Abacha set up the Committee on the Future of Higher Education 
(COFHE), comprised of twenty-five Nigerians and chaired by a tradition-
al ruler, Alhaji Umaru Sanda Ndayako. Abacha’s decision to include five 
traditional rulers in COFHE was remarkable. In Nigeria, successive mil-
itary governments since 1983 had relied on the support of traditional rulers 
to further legitimize their regimes. Abacha’s regime went further to grant 
the traditional rulers throughout Nigeria 5 per cent of local government’s 
monthly allocations. The traditional rulers visited the government house, 
often wining and dining with the dictator. Among those who supported 
Abacha’s continued stay in power were the traditional rulers who unequivo-
cally said that Abacha was the only viable candidate to lead Nigeria.58 Thus, 
by involving traditional rulers in the COFHE, the government hoped to 
receive recommendations that would reflect its preferences.
The terms of reference of the COFHE were largely similar to those 
of the Longe Commission. It was odd that Abacha had not fully imple-
mented the recommendations of the Longe Commission before setting 
up the COFHE. In fact, the setting up of higher education committees, 
especially since 1983, had become a favourite pastime of the military rulers 
whose motives were anything but sheer love of higher education and who 
used them as tools for political distraction and diversion. This often pro-
duced discontinuity and public ruse in policy formulation and implementa-
tion. The COFHE’s conscious desire to please the government informed 
its recommendations to reduce the number of universities, reduce grants to 
universities, and thus save Abacha the financial nightmare of financial de-
mands by the universities. However, until Abacha’s regime ended in 1998, 
these recommendations were not implemented.
Low financial allocations to the universities since 1994 affected the 
maintenance and expansion of facilities to accommodate increasing de-
mand. Admission statistics revealed that demand for university places 
continued to outstrip its supply. In 1996/97, for instance, 472,362 ap-
plied for admission into all Nigerian universities but 76,430 secured 
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admissions (16%). In 1997/98, 419,807 applied but only 72,791 were ad-
mitted (17.3%).59 The major reason for low intake was inadequate facili-
ties arising from low funding and mismanagement of resources. A 1997 
special report titled “The Sorry State of the Universities,” published by one 
of Nigeria’s leading newspapers (The Guardian), revealed how the infra-
structural decay in all Nigerian universities not only affected the quality of 
learning but also limited the intake of students. It noted, for instance, that 
since the establishment of the Lagos State University in 1984 with 300 
students, the population of the institution had increased to 15,000 without 
any meaningful improvement in the initial infrastructures with the con-
sequence that “the classrooms, laboratories (where they exist), offices, and 
equipment have become overstretched.”60 At the Rivers State University of 
Science and Technology, the story of lack of facilities was the same. The 
head of the petroleum and chemical engineering department bemoaned 
the sorry state of the university thus: “the system is dead and buried. No 
other comment.”61 In the University of Jos, the report noted: “There are 
no seats to accommodate [students].”62 The report also observed that, due 
to insufficient classrooms in Imo State University, many lecturers fought 
literally over classrooms located at C and D blocks.63
Since universities lacked funds to expand facilities, many universities 
that were designed to accommodate 10,000 students ended up admitting 
many more. Data from the planning office of the University of Ibadan 
shows that “whereas student enrolment was 9,176 in the 1982/83 session, 
it had risen to 18,228 (about 100%) by 1998/99 session without any corres-
ponding expansion in facilities.”64 These problems, common in all Nigerian 
universities, significantly affected enrolment. Faced with tight financial 
constraints as well as rising public demand for university opportunities, 
universities, especially the state-owned, were left with no choice but to es-
tablish satellite campuses around the country, aimed at generating enough 
revenue to meet their financial obligations while expanding access.
Satellite Campuses
The phenomenon of satellite campuses was not new in the 1990s. In fact, 
many universities had begun as satellite campuses of older universities. 
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Notable among them was the Jos campus of the University of Ibadan, which 
later became University of Jos in 1975. However, the satellite campuses 
that emerged in the 1990s were different. The government did not establish 
them, rather the respective universities did. Lectures were often conducted 
in primary or secondary school buildings – sometimes in business centres. 
While the original intent of establishing satellite campuses was to turn 
them eventually into full-fledged universities, the universities that estab-
lished these campuses had no such plan since they mostly intended to use 
them as revenue-generating outlets. Most satellite campuses were located 
in major cities, notably Lagos, and were established without NUC ap-
proval. Institutions with campuses in Lagos include, among others, Enugu 
State University of Science and Technology, Delta State University, Ogun 
State University, University of Calabar, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, and 
Obafemi Awolowo University.65
Financial gains largely motivated the proliferation of satellite cam-
puses. This phenomenon followed increasing demand for part-time univer-
sity training by full-time-employed Nigerians. According to Sola Dixon 
and Victor Onyeka-Ben, “Because of the resources at the disposal of such 
working candidates, the universities in no time began to see in them op-
portunities to boost their revenue and thus supplement their lean purses.”66 
Thus, due to the government’s insufficient funding of universities and their 
bid to look for alternative sources of revenue, universities rushed to establish 
many learning centres in major cities. Maduabuchi Dukor, a senior lecturer 
in Lagos State University, stated that “the proliferation of satellite cam-
puses, certificates and Diplomas has a primitive capitalist underpinning. It 
is symptom of the overall greed and avarice in the Nigerian society.”67
On the other hand, the explosion of satellite campuses was motivated 
by the desire of universities to satisfy the yearning of a large number of 
citizens to further their education. O. Eruvbetine and Bamidele Folarin 
of the University of Lagos argued that the situation was “necessitated by 
the law of demand and supply in the face of the inability of government 
and the conventional university system to cope.”68 For instance, at the ma-
triculation of the Lagos satellite students of Delta State University, the 
vice-chancellor, Pius Sada, affirmed that the popularity of the program 
was manifest in the number of applicants for the program. According to 
him, out of the 6,000 qualified applicants, only 2,736 secured admission.69 
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He further noted that, in due time when facilities of the campus located at 
Ikorodu Road expanded, more students would secure places.70
Although the increase of these campuses under questionable circum-
stances and learning environments had the potential effect of expanding 
access, it threatened the quality of university education. Facing mounting 
complaints, the NUC whose responsibility it was to advise government 
on the establishment of universities, ordered all satellite campuses to close 
down in January 1998. A letter signed by Professor I.I. Uvah, director 
of academic planning for NUC, alleged that the satellite campuses were 
established without due clearance from government. He further insisted 
that such a development was contrary to the requirements that all degree 
courses be domiciled in academic departments. As Uvah warned, “It is 
illegal for any university to set up a satellite campus or study center outside 
the location approved at its inception by the federal government for its 
academic activity towards the award of degree of whatever nature without 
fresh clearance.”71 The federal minister for education, Dauda Birma, later 
endorsed this decision.72 Since over 90 per cent of the satellite campuses 
were located in the South and were largely dominated by southerners, crit-
ics from the South dismissed the decision as anti-southern and largely in-
spired by political considerations. However, the reduction of the issue here 
to regional politics seemed misplaced. Although satellite campuses were 
banned, many universities established institute of continuing education 
programs within their campuses to cater for the interests of non-traditional 
students.
Private Universities
From 1948 (when Nigeria’s first university was established) to 1998, state 
and federal governments monopolized the provision of university educa-
tion. In 1983 twenty-six private universities were founded or proposed in 
Nigeria. These universities were still in the process of securing facilities 
to admit students when the Buhari government closed them down by 
promulgating Decree No. 19 of February, called the “Private Universities 
(Abolition and Prohibition) Decree 1984.”73 By criminalizing the estab-
lishment of private universities in Nigeria, the military government chose 
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to ignore other options and seemed to offer a misleading impression that 
the emergence of these private universities had contributed to the finan-
cial difficulties that confronted the university system in particular and the 
country in general. If anything, the existence of private universities was 
supposed to spare the government the headache of being the sole provider 
of university education. It was difficult to understand Buhari’s justification 
in abolishing private universities when the government had the option of 
restructuring their operations with stiff guidelines stipulated by the NUC 
to ensure quality and standards. Pursuing this option would have gone 
a long way towards meeting the increasing demand for university places. 
Perhaps the idea of commercially run universities was strange to an aver-
age Nigerian in 1984 because the government had monopolized the sector 
since independence and was unprepared to shift its position notwithstand-
ing the economic situation.
Buhari’s swift closure of private universities after barely two months in 
office and without plans to fund the public universities adequately seemed 
short-sighted. In addition, Babangida’s inability to reopen the issue until 
1993 in the midst of poor funding of universities reveals the contradic-
tions and confusions of government policy. However, the point of how 
people could afford private education in a period of negative economic cli-
mate must have probably weighed heavily on the minds of policy-makers. 
Yet, private universities had the potential of discouraging many wealthy 
Nigerians from sending their children abroad for university training. In 
spite of the country’s economic recession, government’s inability to main-
tain and expand facilities in the existing universities and the short supply 
of university places, successive Nigerian governments prohibited the pri-
vate sector from supplying university education until 1998 when General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar issued licences to three private universities. The 
shift in the conservative attitude of policy-makers toward private owner-
ship of universities was primarily born out of rising unmet demand for 
university admission, bred by the steady deterioration of facilities in public 
universities, and ultimately nourished by World Bank/IMF’s intervention 
in Nigeria’s domestic economic policies.
Motivated by the Structural Adjustment Program, which endorsed 
both privatization and reduction in government spending, Babangida 
asked the Longe Commission to consider the possibility of engaging the 
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private sector in the provision of university education. It was the first time 
in the country’s educational history that a commission seriously considered 
the issue of private university education. While recognizing the right of 
the federal and state governments to own universities, the commission pro-
posed similar rights to private individuals and corporations.74 This recom-
mendation superseded the ban on private universities by the Buhari regime 
in 1984, and it was based on the recognition that private universities would 
complement public universities in providing more opportunities for univer-
sity training. However, the commission required evidence of adequate and 
diverse sources of capital and recurrent funding by the sponsoring body, 
public or private, before the government would approve the establishment 
of a new university.75
Although the federal government declined to make fundamental 
changes in university funding and quota as the Longe Commission had 
recommended, it nonetheless endorsed the commission’s recommendation 
to lift the ban on private ownership of universities. Clearly, the federal gov-
ernment knew that the establishment of private universities would further 
expand opportunities for university education as well as ease its burden of 
financing university expansion. Thus, it whole-heartedly accepted the idea 
and added that “individuals that satisfy the eligibility criteria can establish 
higher institutions.”76 The federal government knew that the rationaliza-
tion policies of the IMF/World Bank would make adequate funding of 
universities difficult. The emergence of private universities would thus be a 
welcome relief for the government.
In 1993, the federal government promulgated the National Minimum 
Standards and Establishment of Institutions (Amendment) Decree No. 9 
of 1993. This decree, among other things, repealed the Decree No. 19 of 
1984 called “The Private University (Abolition and Prohibition) Decree 
1984.” Decree No. 9 granted the right to establish universities to local 
governments, companies incorporated in Nigeria, and even individuals or 
associations of individuals who were citizens and who meet the criteria for 
founding new universities. It legitimized the involvement of the private 
sector in the provision of higher education. Unlike the emergence of private 
universities in 1983 without prescribed regulatory guidelines, Decree No. 
9 stipulated rigid criteria for the establishment of private universities. The 
main criteria were evidence of concrete and guaranteed sources of financial 
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support to the tune of N200 million and a minimum land area of 100 
hectares.77 These conditions recognized that lack of sustainable funding 
of public universities affected the maintenance and expansion of facilities. 
Buhari had faced a similar choice in 1984, but he chose to abolish the 
private universities. But after nine years of banning private universities, the 
federal government decided to permit their operation. It was inadequate 
funding of universities as well as the rising demand for university places 
in the face of deteriorating facilities between the late 1980s and the 1990s 
that Nigeria, like many other African countries, welcomed private-sector 
involvement in the provision of university education.78
Public response to Decree No. 9 was cautious. Twelve private indi-
viduals and organizations collected application forms from NUC in 1993 
for their proposed universities.79 Yet no private university was established 
until 1998. The delay reflects the problem associated with private firms in 
Nigeria as well as the country’s unstable polity. According to the COFHE, 
private firms in the country experienced many problems that also affected 
private universities. They relied too largely on a single individual, and such 
firms survive only in the lifetime of the individual, even where the firms are 
incorporated. In addition, the firms were over-dependent on patronage by 
the governments as the main financier of the economy, thus making their 
fortunes unstable with each change in government. This factor, including 
the stringent requirement established by the NUC, may have accounted 
for why many persons who obtained application forms in 1991 for private 
universities were reluctant to submit them. Of the twenty-nine applica-
tions forms collected from 1993 to 1996, only six were completed and duly 
returned to the NUC.80 One other reason was the scepticism of the public, 
who saw what happened to private universities in 1984, coupled with the 
uncertainties of the country’s political arena. However, by the end of 1998 
when the country’s political situation quieted, more Nigerians submitted 
applications to establish private universities.
Under Abubakar, the military leader who replaced Abacha at his death 
in 1998, the process was accelerated in that by April 1999 he approved li-
cences to three private universities: Igbinedion University, Okada; Babcock 
University, Ilishan Remo; and Madonna University, Okija.81 The philoso-
phies of these universities demonstrated awareness of the unstable and de-
caying atmosphere under which students studied in the public universities, 
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the limited intake of students, and the need to make a difference. Madonna 
University sought to “provide higher education and well balanced train-
ing in an atmosphere of peace without discrimination.”82 The philosophy 
of Igbinedion University was to “provide opportunity for young men and 
women to learn under the most conducive atmosphere, imbibe the highest 
moral and ethical values and to develop their entrepreneurial instincts.”83 
Babcock University’s mission was “to offer high quality professional, pre-
professional, general and vocational education to prepare men and women 
for responsible, dedicated and committed service to God and humanity.”84
Many Nigerians found private universities very attractive because of 
the prospect of uninterrupted academic activities. Also, some of these pri-
vate universities, such as Babcock and Madonna, were founded by reli-
gious organizations, and parents expected them to have an impact on their 
children in both academic knowledge and high morals. Moreover, many 
parents whose children were denied admissions in the public universities 
due to limited and inadequate facilities hoped that the private universities 
would provide an alternative route. As a Punch editorial noted, since only 
about 14.73 per cent of applicants secured admission into the few Nigerian 
universities, the establishment of private universities became “a normal and 
commendable supply response to a huge and growing demand for univer-
sity education.”85
With the establishment of three private universities, the total number 
of universities in Nigeria climbed to forty-five in 2000 with a total stu-
dent enrolment of about 526,780. This number was huge but the pressure 
for expansion remained. For instance, out of the 550,399 candidates that 
applied for admission to all the universities in 1999/2000, only 60,718 se-
cured admission (11.0%).86 States from the South accounted for the highest 
number of applicants and admission while those in the North accounted 
for the lowest.87 That the South maintained its lead in university enrolment 
in spite of their bigger population showed that the quota system had failed 
to address the educational disparity. Besides, the fact that the demand for 
university training remained high despite graduate unemployment occa-
sioned by economic downturn demonstrated the importance Nigerians at-
tached to university education both as a means to an end and as an end in 
itself. According to Y. Lebeau,
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Even if the university as a direct passport to becoming an elite 
in the country is no longer a reality … higher education as a 
pre-requisite to social climbing is an ideology that is still widely 
supported in Nigeria.88
This was (and is) the most formidable driving force behind the demand for 
university education.
Towards a Renewed Commitment to Educational 
Expansion
The late 1990s were a remarkable period in the country’s history as well as 
university education. World Bank’s rethinking on investment in university 
education coincided with Nigeria’s return to democracy to open up a new 
chapter in university expansion. The reduction in university funding since 
1986 was largely due to the IMF condition for SAP and the World Bank 
reports that had encouraged Africans to reduce funding for higher educa-
tion. This advice was driven by the conviction that public investment in 
universities brought meagre returns compared to investment in primary 
and secondary schools. This advice influenced the federal government’s 
drastic reduction of grants to universities. However, the bank eventually 
realized that this economic analysis was both narrow and misleading. In its 
2000 report, the bank affirmed that the prevailing “traditional economic 
arguments are based on a limited understanding of what higher education 
institutions contribute.”89 It emphasized the importance of educated people 
as “economic and social entrepreneurs” who are needed in “creating an en-
vironment in which economic development is possible.”90 That need was 
acute in developing countries, especially in Africa because
Demographic change, income growth, urbanization, and the 
growing economic importance of knowledge and skills have 
combined to ensure that, in most developing countries, higher 
education is no longer a small cultural enterprise for the elite. 
Rather, it has become vital to nearly every nation’s plans for 
development.91
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Having accorded high priority to higher education, the World Bank en-
couraged governments around the world to invest in higher education. 
This is because, as Malcolm Gills, president of Rice University, affirmed, 
“Today, more than ever before in human history, the wealth – or poverty – 
of nations depends on the quality of higher education. Those with a larger 
repertoire of skills and a greater capacity for learning can look forward to 
lifetimes of unprecedented economic fulfillment.”92 Gills further stressed 
that the poorly educated would face hard times in the coming decades.93 
In support of renewed attention to higher education, the bank’s president, 
James D. Wolfensohn declared that “it is impossible to have a complete 
education system without appropriate and strong higher education system.” 
For him,
You have to have centers of excellence and learning and training 
if you are going to advance the issue of poverty and development 
in developing countries … the key is … higher education, not 
just on the technological side, but to create people with enough 
wisdom to be able to use it.94
Training people with “enough wisdom” to champion economic develop-
ment had been one of the major goals of Nigeria’s massification program 
since 1960. Poor policy formulation and execution, coupled with geo-eth-
nic politics and economic meltdown compromised that goal, as university 
facilities failed to accommodate rising demand. The World Bank’s recogni-
tion of the critical importance of higher education and call for expansion 
thus became a renewed slogan for the revitalization of Nigeria’s university 
education. It was a slogan that gathered momentum as Nigeria returned 
to a democratic form of government in 1999 after seven years of military 
dictatorship.
The sudden death of Abacha on 8 June 1998 and his replacement by 
Abubakar marked a turning point in the history of the country and uni-
versity education. Abubakar successfully calmed the heated North/South 
tension by lifting the ban on political activities and successfully returning 
the country to democratic governance in 1999, led by a southerner and 
former military head of state, Obasanjo. Also, Abubakar lifted the ban 
on ASUU in 1998. Until its ban in 1996 by Abacha regime, ASUU was 
7: Crisis of Nationhood 209
in the forefront of the call for better funding of universities to ensure high 
standards and provide adequate facilities to accommodate increasing de-
mand. Shortly after lifting the ban on ASUU, it commenced negotiations 
with the new civilian government for better “salaries, wages and other 
conditions of service in the university system.”95 Though the government 
and ASUU signed an agreement on these three issues on 25 May 1999, 
the government’s negotiating team promised to negotiate other aspects of 
university problems. The agreement was “intended to be an interim pallia-
tive measure to enhance the income of academics, without prejudice to a 
comprehensive negotiation at a future date.”96 It only adjusted allowances 
without covering other aspects of university funding.
A comprehensive negotiation between ASUU and the federal gov-
ernment took place in 2000. The agenda for negotiation was arranged in 
order of importance with the funding of universities at the top, followed 
by basic salary, university autonomy, academic freedom, and other mat-
ters.97 Negotiation between government and ASUU teams began on 28 
August 2000, and by 11 September 2000 they reached an agreement.98 The 
agreement was comprehensive. It addressed the contentious issues of fund-
ing, basic salary, university autonomy, and academic freedom. It provided 
specific funds for recurrent and capital expenditure, as well as restoration 
and stabilization funds. It also included a clause providing for the subven-
tion of state universities by the federal government. It contained a provision 
whereby the federal and state governments would allocate to education a 
minimum of 26 per cent of their annual budgets, subject to an upward 
review beginning in 2003. In addition, it agreed that half of the 26 per cent 
annual budget allocation would be allocated to the universities. Finally, it 
provided for the restructuring of NUC and JAMB with additional admis-
sion requirements to be stipulated by the senate of each university.99
The 2000 ASUU agreement with the federal government aimed at re-
versing “the decay in the universities, in order to reposition them for greater 
responsibilities in national development … the restoration of Nigerian uni-
versities through immediate massive and sustained financial intervention 
[and] a vast improvement in the living and learning conditions of uni-
versity students.”100 It aimed to stabilize and restore universities, enhance 
opportunities for university education, halt brain drain, and promote high 
standards. In his speech at the CVC annual seminar in 2000, President 
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Obasanjo reiterated the federal government’s commitment to honour the 
August agreement and expand university education when he declared, “If 
we must join the league of developed nations, we must expand access to 
twelve times the present [university] size in the next decade.”101 By implica-
tion, the president envisaged the enrolment of about 5 million students in 
the universities by 2010. To make that possible, the communiqué at the 
end of the seminar declared: “Open access based on the principle of social 
demand for university places, remains the best option for providing entry 
to university education.”102
These pronouncements reflect the country’s’ postcolonial pursuit of ex-
pansion, democratization, and liberalization of opportunities for university 
education not only to train high-level personnel for economic and techno-
logical development but also to promote national unity and cohesion. In 
addition, they demonstrate the awareness of government and other educa-
tion stakeholders of the place of highly educated Nigerians in the twenty-
first century knowledge-driven world. Fulfilling these promises in the 
midst of economic decline, ethnic clashes, official corruption, and regional 
tension constituted the major challenge of university education between 
2000 and 2008. It is a challenge that must be met in order to achieve 
the country’s postcolonial goal of using university education to promote 
economic development and nation-building. As Julius A. Okojie, executive 
secretary National Universities Commission puts it,
To realize the vision of becoming one of the top 20 economies 
in the world by 2020AD, Nigeria must produce world class 
manpower, possible only through world class tertiary institu-
tions, with world class physical infrastructure, world class in-
structional facilities and, above all, world class human capacity 
to impart knowledge, conduct research, publish the outcomes 




Overwhelming demand for university education and limited opportunities 
typified the higher educational scene in twentieth-century Nigeria. The 
British colonial educational policy did not aim to promote nation-building 
or socio-economic development of Nigeria. From 1948 when the first 
degree-awarding institution in Nigeria, the University College of Ibadan 
(UCI), was established, until 1960, the British upheld an elitist admission 
policy at the college. Many qualified Nigerians thereby lost the chance to 
receive higher education training at the college. Only very few who had 
the means travelled to Europe, North America and Australia to obtain 
university degrees. As an ivory tower devoted to educating the country’s 
future leaders, UCI fulfilled the British educational vision for Nigeria; 
colonial authorities were thus consistently reluctant to expand higher 
education facilities and opportunities.
Nationalist struggle for educational expansion began in the 1950s. 
Then, dissatisfied with the elitist British educational practices, some highly 
educated Nigerians led a campaign against UCI and demanded changes in 
its enrolment and curriculum policies to satisfy high demand and lay the 
foundation for nation-building after independence. The exclusive control 
of all levels of education by either the missionaries or colonial government 
ended when two constitutional changes empowered Nigerians to legislate 
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on education. The Macpherson Constitution (created in 1951) granted 
regional legislatures the power to legislate on primary and secondary school 
education. In prompt exercise of its new legislative power, the two regions 
in the South, the Western and Eastern Regions, declared universal primary 
free education in 1952 and 1953 respectively. These steps underscored 
the importance that the South attached to the expansion of educational 
opportunities, an importance depicted by S.O. Awokoya as “a national 
emergency, second only to war.”1 The predominantly Muslim North, a 
region educationally disadvantaged due to religious, geographical, and 
political factors, was rather slow in pushing for expansion. Consequently, 
the educational gap between the North and South widened, and, as the 
country moved towards independence, it became a source of disunity. As 
this work has demonstrated, it was largely due to their desire to promote 
nation-building that successive postcolonial governments embraced policies 
aimed at equal opportunity, educational expansion, and the controversial 
quota system (affirmative action).
Educational development in Nigeria took a remarkable turn in 1954 
when the Lyttleton Constitution granted the regions legislative power 
over higher education matters, prompting the three regions to contemplate 
establishing universities. Although the regions independently pursued 
their education policies without central coordination, the scheduled 
independence of Nigeria, agreed upon at the 1957 London Constitutional 
Conference, meant that the three regions would be merged into one 
country. Educational concerns immediately assumed a national dimension. 
With the dire shortages of high-level personnel and the regional disparity 
in educational attainment, the need for higher education reforms became 
compelling. However, while nationalists called for educational reform, no 
study had been conducted to assess the country’s educational needs. When 
the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which had previously advocated 
the expansion of education in British colonies, particularly in Nigeria, 
offered to sponsor a study on Nigeria’s higher education needs, the national 
and regional governments enthusiastically accepted the proposal. Driven by 
the politics of the Cold War and decolonization, the Carnegie Corporation 
hoped that pushing for a reform of the British higher education system 
was vital, not only in winning the Cold War, but also in America’s future 
involvement in the emerging African nations, beginning with Nigeria.
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This book has demonstrated that the mutual understanding of 
higher educational reforms reached by the departing colonial officials, 
the Carnegie Corporation, and emerging Nigerian leaders led to the 
setting up of the Commission on Post-Secondary and Higher Education 
in Nigeria (the Ashby Commission) in 1959. The timing was significant. 
The Ashby Commission was appointed on the eve of independence when 
the role of university graduates in the process of national development 
had become imperative. In addition, the commission was set up when the 
North had realized the importance of Western education largely due to an 
uncomfortable prospect of southern domination of the country’s top policy-
making positions. Thus, Nigeria’s new leaders reformed the university 
system to help fulfill a new mission. As Okojie, the executive secretary of 
the NUC stated,
It is through education that the human resource capacity of a 
nation is developed, harnessed and deployed for nation building. 
Simply put, without education, we have no society or future as 
a nation.2
The 1960s
Following the report of the Ashby Commission that called for ‘massive’ 
expansion of university education, the federal and regional governments 
realigned university education policies to build a modern nation at 
independence in 1960. This study has revealed that the implementation of 
the Ashby recommendations marked a turning point in the development 
of higher education, particularly in the 1960s. During that period, 
the federal and regional governments expanded the opportunities for 
university education in order to train the human resources for economic 
development and engaged university education in a conscious attempt to 
integrate Nigeria’s pluralistic society. Consequently, the federal government 
approved the establishment of four universities, at Nsukka, Zaria, Ife, and 
Lagos, between 1960 and 1962, and expanded the university curriculum to 
include courses in African studies, commerce and business administration, 
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teaching, engineering, medicine and veterinary science, agriculture, law, 
and extension services.
The federal government underscored the importance of enhanced 
access to universities, particularly in science and technology courses, when 
it increased the Ashby Commission’s projection of 7,500 students to 10,000 
students.3 It also insisted that “7,580 should be taking courses in pure and 
applied sciences in view of the shortage of qualified Nigerians in those 
fields of study.”4 By establishing more universities and projecting higher 
enrolment in sciences, the federal government demonstrated its belief 
that training the work force in the universities was a vital component of 
national development. The emphasis on science courses reflects the trend of 
thinking in the 1960s, when many political elites and scholars believed that 
the wonders of the Western world derived from the sciences. Therefore, to 
sustain independence as well as to justify itself to Nigerians, the government 
sought to train Nigerians in diverse fields to help in transforming the 
economy. The emphasis on science subjects was a radical departure from 
the British concept of university education, which the Ashby report 
described as “too inflexible and too academic to meet national needs.”5 
Thus, the pursuit of diversity, modeled after the American land-grant 
colleges, coupled with the federal and regional awarding of scholarships 
and external financial support, greatly increased student enrolment from 
939 in 1959 (excluding about 1,000 who were studying overseas) to 9,695 
in 1969 (excluding enrolment in UNN).6
Even though top government officials, policy-makers, and other 
proponents of change emphasized applied sciences and vocational 
subjects as in America’s land-grant colleges, the actual implementation 
of the project, with the exception of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 
did not reflect this emphasis. Unlike UNN, which admitted candidates 
with GCE Ordinary Level certificates, other universities still followed 
the British pattern, insisting on Advanced Level. Only a few sixth form 
schools were available to prepare candidates for ‘A’ Level examinations. 
Because the cost of expanding these schools to prepare enough candidates 
for university education was enormous, there were shortages of candidates, 
especially for science courses, including those in applied sciences. Besides, 
fewer candidates demanded courses in the sciences, compared to those in 
the humanities, law, and liberal arts. The retention of the sixth form was 
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largely responsible for this. In fact, six years after the publication of the 
Ashby Commission report, its chair, Eric Ashby, regretted the decision to 
retain the sixth form. According to Ashby, “The consequences are already 
unfortunate: a valuable opportunity to provide flexibility in the educational 
system has been lost, and one university [UNN] has found it advisable to 
circumvent the rigidities of the British pattern of schooling by admitting 
students at O level.”7
By upholding even geographical location of universities to all the 
regions, the federal government sought to promote national unity through 
the provision of equal educational opportunity to all Nigerians. Yet, 
rivalries between the North and the South undermined government’s 
efforts. A notable example was the call by the vice-chancellor of Ahmadu 
Bello University, Ishaya Audu, and other lecturers in the institution in 
1969 to scrap the inter-regional scholarships awarded to poor students 
under the Indigent Students Scheme. Their opposition was simply because 
the scheme benefited candidates from the South, who maintained higher 
enrolment in all Nigerian universities.8 Instead of helping to unite the 
country, regional universities became the axis of bitter inter-regional 
rivalries. Animosities intensified when the Eastern Region decided to 
separate from the rest of the country, resulting in the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967–70). The war exemplified the lack of national unity in Nigeria. After 
the war, the president, Yakubu Gowon, adopted a centralized approach 
to governance in his administration’s determination to promote national 
unity and reconciliation, a posture largely shaped by the recommendations 
of the Dina Committee and the Curriculum Conference in 1968 and 
1969 respectively. Federal management of university expansion likewise 
characterized the postwar government’s social policies.
Post-Civil War Nation-Building
Official attempts to increase access to university education regardless of 
class, ethnicity, gender, or creed manifest themselves in the 1970s and 
1980s with the award of regional and federal scholarships to indigent 
students, the equitable geographical location and expansion of university 
facilities, the introduction of free education and the quota system, and the 
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establishment of federal regulatory and admission agencies such as the 
National Universities Commission (NUC) and the Joint Admission and 
Matriculation Board. Some of these policies were either ill-conceived or 
poorly implemented. They, in fact, mirrored larger problems in Nigeria’s 
pluralistic society. More consequential were the efforts by military regimes 
of 1966–79 and 1983–99 at pursuing centralization of university education 
policies aimed at fostering a sense of national unity and promoting 
socio-economic development. The implementation of these policies had 
unintended consequences. Not only did they compromise the sustainable 
expansion of universities but they also threatened to diminish, if not 
wipe out, the collective consciousness of Nigerians that mass university 
education originally sought to affirm.
It was in search of greater national unity after the bitter experience of 
the Nigerian civil war that Gowon embraced the notion of “fairer spread of 
higher education facilities” by locating five new universities (established in 
1975) in the educationally disadvantaged states, mostly in the north. This 
policy sought to promote the understanding that “there can only be true 
unity where educational opportunities and resultant facilities, amenities 
and benefits are evenly distributed.”9 The sudden oil wealth of 1973, 
occasioned by the Yom Kippur War, swayed the Gowon’s regime to pursue 
university expansion confidently. In 1970, Gowon’s regime committed 
itself to building “a land of bright and full opportunities for all its citizens” 
by providing education not only for its own sake as a means of developing 
an individual’s full potentials but also to prepare Nigerians for specific tasks 
and skills needed to transform the country. Oil became a major contributor 
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) beginning in 1973. The country’s 
buoyant oil revenue provided the basis for huge increases in government 
expenditures intended to expand infrastructure and non-oil productive 
capacity.
Amid the euphoria of the oil price boom, Gowon outlined grand 
plans to expand virtually all sectors of the economy in order to facilitate 
economic development. The expansion of the productive base of the 
economy simultaneously required the production of skilled labour to 
manage the expanding economy. Educating Nigerians, especially in the 
sciences, became central to fulfilling Gowon’s plans and greatly influenced 
the federal government’s deliberate pursuit of a 60:40 science/humanities 
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ratio in university admission. Nevertheless, despite the government’s 
determination to promote science education, students in the arts and 
social sciences predominated in all the universities, largely because the 
government failed to pay attention to the teaching and funding of science 
education at the secondary-school level.
Gowon’s search for a common inter-regional educational policy led him 
to grant statutory powers to the NUC and to convene a seminar on national 
educational policy in 1973. While the NUC became an instrument in 
maintaining central control of universities, the national seminar provided 
the blueprint for the implementation of an ambitious educational program 
such as free education, the geographical distribution of educational 
facilities, the abolition of the British sixth form, and the introduction of 
the American-style 6-3-3-4 system of education. What influenced these 
changes were recommendations of the Curriculum Conference of 1969, 
the UNESCO report of 1972, and increased Nigerian interest in the 
American system of education. Furthermore, to remove the bottlenecks 
that impeded access to the universities as well as to promote national unity, 
the Obasanjo regime (1976–79) further centralized university admission 
by setting up the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) in 
1978, introduced a free university education policy, and adopted ‘O’ Level 
certificates as the minimum entry requirements to all universities. Due to 
the federal government’s policies during the second attempt at expansion, 
the university education system witnessed an accelerated growth. Student 
population increased from 9,695 in 1969 to 57,742 in 1979, while the 
number of universities increased from five to thirteen.
After thirteen years of military dictatorship in Nigeria, a civilian 
government headed by Shehu Shagari came to power in 1979. Aided by 
the 1979/81 oil windfall, Shagari continued the expansion of universities 
in response to public demand. Notwithstanding the collapse of crude oil 
prices in the world market in 1981/82, the federal government borrowed 
from external financial institutions in order to finance its ambitious social 
programs, including free education and university expansion. It established 
seven universities of science and technology between 1981 and 1983. The 
location of the new federal universities in Bauchi, Gongola, Niger, Imo, 
Ogun, Benue, and Ondo states reflected the federal government’s sensitivity 
to states without universities, an attempt to ‘democratize’ university facilities 
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in the country. These universities were designed as specialized institutions 
meant to meet Nigeria’s growing needs for scientific and technological 
developments. Yet, the massive corruption among government officials and 
the mismanagement of the economy affected not just the economy but also 
sustainable expansion of university education.
Eager to close the educational gap between the North and the South, 
the Shagari regime introduced the quota system (affirmative action) in 
university admissions in 1981. From the 1950s to the 1970s, both the 
British and the southerners had objected to implementing a quota system in 
university admission. While the British rejected it because of their insistence 
on merit and high academic standards, the southerners feared that it would 
halt their educational advancement. However, by 1981 Shagari believed 
that the policy was vital in facilitating national unity. Of the four criteria for 
securing university admission under the new quota system, the Educational 
Disadvantaged criterion, which allocated 20 per cent of admissions into the 
federal universities to students from the twelve educationally disadvantaged 
states (ten from the North), was the most contentious. By all accounts, the 
introduction of the quota system represented a flawed solution to closing 
the educational gap between the South and the North. As the data on 
university enrolment reveal, enrolment of northerners in universities 
remained significantly low in comparison with southerners. Although 
the policy sought to reduce tension that educational disparities generated 
between the two areas, it achieved the opposite effect. Perceiving the policy 
as a form of discrimination favouring the under-represented states, the 
‘advantaged’ states, mostly in the South, were exasperated. Faced with the 
increasing number of their qualified indigenes who were denied admission 
into federal universities partly due to the new quota policy, state governors 
in the South moved swiftly to establish their own institutions. Backed, of 
course, by the 1979 constitution that empowered states to own universities, 
eight states established universities between 1981 and 1983, even when 
their financial capabilities declined sharply due to the fall in oil revenue.
The short period of civilian rule from 1979 to 1983 witnessed rapid 
expansion of university education. The number of universities increased 
from thirteen to fifty-three; and student enrolment rose from 57,742 to 
116,822. Yet, the economic depression of 1982/83, occasioned by the decline 
in oil revenue and aggravated by official corruption and mismanagement 
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of the economy, forced the Shagari regime to reduce the government’s 
social expenditure and attempted to impose higher fees for public services, 
including university education. Although the Shagari regime ended 
in a military coup in December 1983, the military administrations that 
ruled Nigeria between 1983 and 1990 implemented the policy initiated 
by Shagari in 1983. This study has shown that official reaction to the 
economic meltdown of 1983 shaped the rationalization policy instituted by 
the Buhari and Babangida administrations from 1983 to 1999. During this 
period, economic recovery overshadowed the goal of national integration 
and development through liberal social policies.
Setbacks in Expansion
One of the most potentially significant steps in the push for mass university 
education was the creation of the National Open University (NOU) in 
1983. NOU conceptually was at the heart of education for all. It sought 
to put university education within the reach of all Nigerians, regardless of 
age or location. Poor communication infrastructure, however, delayed the 
successful commencement of studies. Lacking the financial resources to 
address the problems, the Buhari regime disbanded NOU in 1984, just a 
few months after he came to office. In this same year, Buhari also abolished 
the twenty-six private universities that had emerged under questionable 
circumstances in 1983. The swiftness with which the federal government 
promulgated the decrees that shut down these universities underscores 
how policy decisions were often rooted not in thoughtful considerations 
but in hysteria. It provides a window into the problems of Nigeria itself that 
made Chinua Achebe to liken the country  as “a child. Gifted, enormously 
talented, prodigiously endowed and incredibly wayward.”10 Engaging 
the private sector in providing higher education would have afforded the 
country a viable option to expand educational opportunities. The idea of 
private ownership of universities that Buhari overlooked in 1984 ultimately 
became a welcome initiative in 1998 when the Abubakar government 
issued licenses to three private universities. Along with NOU, which was 
resuscitated in 2001, private university education has remained a common 
feature of the country’s educational scene since 2000.
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Buhari’s austerity measure gave way to the IMF-sponsored Structural 
Adjustment Program introduced by Ibrahim Babangida (1985–93) to 
revamp the economy. SAP implied a reduction in the government’s social 
expenditures. The federal government reintroduced fees in universities; 
reduced the grants allocated to universities, and required them to generate 
income to supplement government grants. This was the thrust of the 
rationalization policy. Expansion contracted. Although student population 
increased from 116,822 in 1983 to 180,871 in 1990, the annual percentage 
increase dropped from 10.9 per cent in 1986 to 4.9 per cent in 1989/90. 
Worse still, as this study has demonstrated, the population increase 
without improvement in funding or the establishment of more universities 
or the maintenance of existing facilities resulted in overcrowding and 
deterioration in university facilities, a decline in academic quality, a brain 
drain, and the radicalization of the Academic Staff Union of Universities 
(ASUU) in the 1980s and 1990s.
Nigeria’s sudden increases in oil revenue following the Gulf War 
in 1990/91 seemed to have inspired Babangida to set up the Gray 
Longe Commission, aimed at articulating a proposal to guide the 
federal government’s long-term sustainable support of universities. The 
commission, among other things, recommended that government should 
phase out the 20 per cent admission quota allocated to candidates from the 
disadvantaged states and provide 80 per cent of the capital and recurrent 
financial needs of the universities. Babangida rejected these proposals. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the quota system to close the educational 
gap between the North and the South, the federal government’s refusal 
to phase it out shows its stubborn refusal to acknowledge reality. It also 
demonstrates that the quota system performed a political rather than an 
educational purpose for the ruling northern elite.
Rejecting the funding proposal even as the administration carried on 
with its corrupt practices and wasteful spending caused great disaffection 
within the university community. Demand by ASUU for adequate funding 
of universities and the resultant showdown with successive governments in 
Nigeria came to dominate the higher education scene throughout the 1990s. 
Frequent boycotts of classes by ASUU to press for their demands disrupted 
academic activities in all universities, compelling Abacha’s government to 
proscribe the union in 1996. Deprived of funds to expand their facilities, 
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many universities set up satellite campuses around the country to expand 
access and generate revenue to meet their financial obligations. By all 
standards, the satellite campuses made a mockery of higher education 
since they operated under questionable circumstances with inadequate 
learning facilities. The total student population of 526,780 in the year 
2000 was a remarkable increase in access to university education, yet only 
less than 20 per cent of the qualified and aspiring candidates secured 
admission each year due to the lack of available spaces.11 The expansion of 
university facilities did not keep pace with increase in student population. 
As universities admitted students beyond their capacity to absorb them, 
the result was overcrowding. Data from the University of Ibadan show that 
“whereas student enrolment was 9,176 in the 1982/83 session, it had risen 
by about 100% to 18,228 by the 1998/99 session without any corresponding 
expansion in facilities.”12
Recent Trends
By 1999, “Nigeria emerged from the more than three decades of political 
instability and military dictatorship with its once-proud university in 
tatters.”13 The new civilian government under President Obasanjo believed 
that “in the knowledge economy of the twenty-first century, human capital 
contributes up to 60% of the wealth of nations,” and therefore insisted that 
“The key instrument for our development lies … in education, especially 
tertiary education.”14 Renewed emphasis on university expansion led to 
major developments in the education system since 1999. Not only is it 
outside the parameters of this study to attempt a historical account of these 
events, but it is also imprudent for historical studies to focus on current 
issues. Yet no history text on Nigeria that ignores the accelerated and 
astonishing changes in the country’s higher educational scene since 2000 
can claim completeness.
The proliferation of universities, the struggle for funding, and the 
resultant instability in universities are some of the conspicuous trends 
in the country’s higher educational scene during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. By 2008, the number of universities stood at 93. 
While the federal and state governments respectively owned 27 and 32 
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of these universities, 34 were private institutions. Only 9 out of 34 private 
universities were located in North, meaning that 11 out of the 19 states in 
the North had no private universities.15 This, no doubt, has the potential 
of widening the educational gap between the North and the South. Even 
with a total student population of 1,096,312, only 150,000 out of over 
a million candidates who apply annually for admission into universities 
secured spots.16 Taking advantage of candidates who are desperate to obtain 
higher education, many profit-motivated and criminally minded persons 
have established universities without approval. Since 2000, universities of 
questionable legal status “have mushroomed across Nigeria.”17 Although 
the NUC embarked on a crusade to identify and close these universities, 
their existence underscored the limited opportunities that characterized 
university education since 1948.
If Nigeria hopes to realize its ambition to become one of the top twenty 
world economies by 2020, it has to provide adequate higher education 
facilities and opportunities for training a workforce capable of meeting 
the challenges of global competition. Given the inadequate facilities in 
Nigerian universities, that prospect seem “entirely delusional,” as Dan 
Agbese of Newswatch affirmed.18 Harnessing its abundant human capital 
as other industrialized countries do stands between Nigeria and economic 
development. During his visit to some Nigerian universities in 2001, 
MacArthur Foundation president, Jonathan Fanton, came away with two 
distinct impressions of Nigeria:
the people I met with … were truly inspiring. The deep reservoir 
of human talent is there. But the conditions are clearly not equal 
to the potential of the people: under-maintained buildings, 
empty library shelves, over-crowded classrooms, science labs 
without modern equipment.19
Nothing much has changed since Fanton made his assessment in 2001. 
ASUU’s insistence on better funding of universities led to frequent strikes for 
most of the subsequent years, disrupting academic activities in universities. 
ASUU’s four-month strike (June–October 2009) ended when the federal 
government made a commitment to progressively attain “UNESCO’s 
prescription that a minimum of 26 per cent of the annual budget should 
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be allocated to education” by 2020.20 That remains to be seen. Troubled by 
the incidence of malpractices and irregularities in the conduct of JAMB’s 
annual conduct of the University Entrance Examination (UME), most 
universities have instituted post-UMEs, which threaten the legitimacy of 
JAMB. Since JAMB has failed to accomplish what it was establish to do, 
i.e., ease access to university education, its abrogation is only a matter of 
time.
While public universities enroll 96.6 per cent of university students, the 
34 private universities contributes only 3.4 per cent.21 Private universities can 
only make significant contributions to educational expansion and human 
capital development if they address what Okebukola, the former executive 
secretary of the NUC, called their “high fee regime” and “aristocratic 
network.”22 Even so, Okebukola, like other stakeholders, must recognize 
that, unless government plays an active role in university education, as many 
advanced countries did at various periods in their history, crushing demand 
and limited opportunities will continue to defer the country’s dream of 
becoming an industrial power. Blind obedience to the IMF/World Bank’s 
one-size-fits-all prescription of both reducing subsidizes to education and 
pursuing privatization is a recipe for failure. Although the involvement of 
the private sector is a welcome development, they alone cannot meet the 
demand for university education. Unless government takes investment in 
higher education as a high order political business and holds university 
administrators accountable for the funds allocated to improve the quantity 
and quality of education, Nigeria may lose the critical human capital needed 
to maximize its developmental potentials in the twenty-first century.
Holding the university managers accountable is as critical as allocating 
adequate funds. In that regard, efforts by Ikedi Ohakim, the governor of Imo 
State, to investigate top university administrators at Imo State University is 
a refreshing development in the search for the soul of university education. 
Ohakim constituted a panel in 2008, headed by Nnamdi Asika, to 
investigate, among other things, the award of contracts in the university. 
In its report, released in 2009, the panel indicted, among other persons, the 
vice-chancellor, I.C. Okonkwo for various offences.23 Okonkwo appeared 
before the panel in November 2008 and claimed that he was receiving 
only N57.5 million as a monthly subvention, whereas the actual sum, 
according to the panel, was N113 million. The panel found him liable of 
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corruption, gross mismanagement of funds, and questionable practices. 
Okonkwo was immediately retired and was asked to refund N55 million to 
the university.24 Adequate funding of universities while instilling financial 
discipline, as Okonkwo’s case illustrates, may be a model (if done without 
political considerations) in overhauling the battered university system. This 
is crucial because, as Ray Ekpu cautioned, “If we don’t rescue education, we 
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Through analysis of exceptionally rich data obtained from the Carnegie 
Corporation in New York, and from Nigeria’s national archives, author 
Ogechi Anyanwu demonstrates how the pursuit of mass university 
education not only decolonized the elitist British education system but 
also ultimately reshaped modern Nigeria. More importantly, he argues 
that the impact of these policies cannot be fully understood without 
looking closely at the intersection of domestic and external politics dic-
tating the direction of higher education development as a vehicle for 
nation-building in Nigeria’s pluralistic society.
Although numerous studies have been made of Nigeria’s higher educa-
tion development in particular, and that of Africa in general, no work 
has placed the pursuit of mass university education (massification) at 
the centre of that country’s postcolonial higher education reform or 
discussed it as a policy-driven and need-driven phenomenon. In The 
Politics of Access: University Education and Nation-Building in Nigeria, 
1948–2000, Anyanwu undertakes a historical analysis of the diachronic 
impact of Nigeria’s domestic socioeconomic, political, and ethno-
religious forces, as well as external interests, on the country’s policy 
initiatives, shifts, and outcomes of mass higher education policies. 
OGECHI ANYANWU is an assistant professor in the Department 
of History and African/African-American Studies at Eastern 
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 “ … a genuinely original piece of scholarship … [and] … a window 
into both the promise and problems of Nigeria itself. It is a premium 
addition to the understanding of educational policy in Africa and 
most especially in Nigeria.” 
Pablo Idahosa, Professor, Division of Social Science 
and Coordinator, African Studies, University of Toronto 
